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1. CHAPTER 1: PRODUCTIVITY, THE PRODUCTIVITY SLOWDOWN AND THE 
PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX 
1.1. Overview 
The introduction is intended to provide a broader context for the analysis of the productivity 
paradox. Productivity is not regarded as particularly newsworthy in the financial press in South 
Africa, unlike in the United States of America (USA) and the European Union (EU), where 
productivity statistics are regularly reported on and debated in the financial media. The 
introduction thus starts with an examination of the importance of productivity in improving living 
standards and raising economic growth. The economic significance of productivity is therefore 
accepted as given, and “proof” of the proposition is not provided here.  
The productivity slowdown in the early 1970s in the USA is briefly discussed, and Robert Solow’s 
role in productivity research introduced to contextualise his famous remark that “you can see the 
computer age everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (Solow 1987:36). The economics of 
computerisation and the role played by information and communications technology in the 
productivity slowdown are reviewed. The productivity revival in the mid-1990s and Solow’s 
comments on the revival are discussed.  
Chapter 2 examines productivity in the context of technical progress, the Solow “residual” and the 
aggregate production function.  
The analysis and measurement of productivity is discussed in chapter 3. The economic theory of 
index numbers, such as the construction of index numbers and the index number problem, is 
explained. The importance of index numbers is stressed because they are the cornerstone of 
productivity analysis. Many of the measurement issues encountered in the productivity slowdown 
(as indeed many other areas of economic analysis) are part and parcel of index number theory 
and practice.  
Chapter 4 explores the official productivity statistics as captured in the National Income and 
Product Accounts (NIPA) of the USA, as well as several related issues, such as productivity 
definitions, data revisions, and the ICT sector and computers in these accounts.  
The productivity paradox is explored more fully in chapter 5 using the analytical tools developed 
in the previous chapters. An understanding of the economics of computerisation is relevant to the 
analysis of the productivity paradox. The importance of and relationship between aggregate, 
industry and firm level studies of productivity, which do not necessarily have results consistent 
with each other, are considered. The way in which these studies can shed light on the productivity 
paradox is examined. 
The most important and convincing explanations of the productivity paradox, such as the 
mismeasurement hypothesis, are discussed in chapter 6. Secondary explanations are examined 
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in chapter 7. These are tested and evaluated against the tools developed in previous chapters. 
The productivity revival in the mid-1990s is discussed against the issues raised during the 
productivity slowdown period of 1973 to 1995. The chapter also briefly examines the impact of the 
productivity paradox on economic policy. 
Chapter 8 concludes that the productivity paradox remains largely unresolved in the sense that 
no single explanation can account for the extent of the productivity slowdown between 1973 and 
1995. The question of whether the productivity revival in 1995 can be attributed to 
computerisation and whether it supports the utopian claims of the proponents of the new 
economy is still a moot point. 
 
1.2. Notes on some of the conventions used in the dissertation 
The terms “multifactor productivity (MFP)”, “total factor productivity (TFP)” and the “Solow 
residual” (or simply “residual”, or “productivity residual”) are used interchangeably, because they 
are “three names for the same concept” (Fernald & Ramnath 2004:53), even though they are not 
identical. 
The expressions “information technology (IT)” and “information and communications technology 
(ICT)” are also used interchangeably. The use in the text is usually dictated by what the author 
being discussed prefers. These terms include computer and communications hardware, as well 
as the software and related services that are required to operate the hardware (NRC 1994:23, 
note). More specifically, ICT industries are classified as both manufacturing and service 
industries. More specifically, ICT manufacturing “refer[s] to the manufacturing of 
telecommunications equipment, computers, semi-conductors, and other electronic equipment”; 
and ICT services “refer to the provision of telecommunications services, computer services and 
software” (Strydom 2003:1-2). 
The terms “technical change or progress” or “technological change or progress” are similar but 
not identical in meaning and often used synonymously.  
The subject of the dissertation is the productivity paradox of information technology; in the 
literature, the paradox is also referred to variously as the “computer paradox”, the “IT (or ICT) 
paradox”, the productivity paradox, the Solow paradox, or a blend of these terms.  
All abbreviations used in the dissertation are listed after the table of contents. 
 
1.3. A note on productivity and other statistics 
The dissertation refers to several sources of productivity statistics, which are based on an 
author’s own calculations, and which are in turn based on primary or official sources. The 
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statistics are thus not always consistent and cannot strictly be compared. They do, however, 
reveal similar trends, which is the main point. As Cox and Alm (2003:6) states that “it’s a 
Herculean task to calculate a productivity number that sums up the efforts of 130 million workers, 
employed in millions of establishments that produce more than $11 trillion in output.” 
Furthermore, the official statistics are revised periodically, and the base year is shifted forward, 
resulting in changes in the calculated levels and growth rates. The USA in particular revises its 
National Income an Product Accounts (NIPA) regularly. As the base year shifts, growth rates and 
other time series often differ, albeit sometimes only marginally. Therefore an author writing in the 
1980s may have different set of numbers to work with compared to one writing 20 years later.  
 
1.4. A note on productivity growth rates and productivity levels 
Productivity growth rates must be distinguished from productivity levels. The debate around the 
productivity slowdown and productivity paradox in the US has centred largely on productivity 
growth rates, as US productivity levels are typically of the highest that has been attained globally. 
High productivity levels are the result of the accrual of high historical productivity growth rates. 
The productivity slowdown and productivity paradox are concerned with productivity growth rates, 
rather than with levels. A productivity slowdown does not mean that productivity levels are 
declining, but that the rate of increase is slowing. The study of productivity levels has been 
conducted by Maddison (1995 & 2001) and is of interest in analysing and comparing cross-
country productivity performance.  
 
1.5. The importance of productivity 
Many economists have emphasised productivity's economic significance, for example, John 
Kendrick, in his path-breaking Productivity trends in the United States (Kendrick 1961:13): "The 
story of productivity, the ratio of output to input, is at the heart of man's efforts to raise himself 
from poverty." 
The significance of productivity to developed and developing countries alike cannot be 
overestimated. All countries were once poor and underdeveloped and many economic historians 
are of the opinion that the developed countries have achieved economic growth and development 
largely through the dynamics of productivity. Whereas the history of economic growth and 
development reveals how the growth path towards economic advancement unfolds (as measured 
by a relatively high per capita GDP), the story of productivity is the main driving force through 
which the goal of sustainable and long-run economic advancement and progress is reached. 
Economic failures have often resulted from productivity failures.  
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One of the main objectives of economic development is the continual and cumulative 
improvement in the living standards of a country's citizens. The standard of living refers to the 
material well-being of an individual (or a household), based on the quantities of goods and 
services that are consumed. Productivity is the main cause of the improvement in living 
standards. Not only is productivity growth "the basic source of economic progress" (Gordon 
1996:45), also “in the long run, productivity growth is the single most important economic 
indicator” (Paradox lost 2003:13). 
Industry Canada (2003) has unpacked the relationship between the standard of living – as 
measured by per capita GDP – and productivity. The analysis shows that increases in the 
standard of living are caused by an increased amount of work being done, multiplied by increased 
productivity. These interrelationships are demonstrated by the following basic economic equation, 
reproduced here as an aide-mémoire: 
workedHours
GDPx
Population
Workersx
Workers
workedHours
Population
GDP =  
The first term denotes increases in the standard of living (or per capita GDP); the second term 
and third terms denote the increased amount of work being done (people working longer hours 
and more people working); and the final term denotes increased labour productivity. Significantly, 
in the longer term, only increased productivity boosts the standard of living because “the 
prospects for growth in the other two factors will be exhausted” (Industry Canada 2003).  
However, more fundamentally, differences in higher productivity growth rates affect the pace at 
which living standards improve. Applying the “rule of 73” and actual data (based on Cox & Alm 
2003:8, exhibit 2), a productivity growth rate of 1.5% (1973 to 1995) implies living standards (as 
measured by per capita GDP) doubling every 48 years; whereas a productivity growth rate of 
2.7% (1950-1973) implies living standards doubling every 27 years. But productivity growing at 
3.2% (1995-2003) implies living standards doubling in a mere 22 years – in other words, in about 
a single generation.  
According to Hall and Jones (1999:83), productivity also describes differences in efficiency 
between nations. Differences in output between countries can be interpreted as differences in 
human and physical capital as well as productivity. However, it is productivity that plays the key 
role. For example, based on extreme examples, in 1988, a US worker produced 35 times more 
output than a worker in Niger (Hall & Jones 1999:83): “Different capital intensities in the two 
countries contributed a factor of 1.5 to the income differences, while different levels of educational 
attainment contributed a factor of 3.1. The remaining difference – a factor of 7.7 – remains as the 
productivity residual.”  
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The full significance of this statement will become clear when growth accounting is discussed in 
chapter 2.  
The importance of productivity needs to be emphasised because the subsequent discussion of 
the productivity slowdown and productivity paradox will appear trivial without an understanding of 
productivity's central role in economic growth and development, and in the improvement in 
national living standards and economic welfare. 
Adam Smith (1982:443.) also discussed the importance of productivity in the Wealth of nations, 
first published in 1776: 
The annual produce of the land and labour of any nation can be increased in its value by 
no other means, but by increasing either the number of its productive labourers, or the 
productive powers of those labourers who had before been employed. … The productive 
powers of the same number of labourers cannot be increased, but in consequence either 
of some addition and improvement to those machines and instruments which facilitate 
and abridge labour; or of a more proper division and distribution of employment. 
Historically, the debate about the significance of productivity to economic growth has been on-
going since the late 1950s, with the publication of Solow's 1956 and 1957 articles, as well as 
those by Abramovitz (1956) and several studies by Kendrick (1961, 1984). Their research 
showed that (Metcalfe 1987:619):  
modern growth in the US economy was in proportionate terms at least three-quarters due 
to increased efficiency in the use of productive inputs and not to the growth in the 
quantity of resource inputs per se. The implication was quite devastating: the explanation 
of economic growth appeared to lie outside the traditional concerns of economists, to 
constitute a residual hypothesis.  
In the late 1960s, Fabricant (1969:99) wrote that productivity is important for national earnings: 
"Two main causes determine the national average of hourly earnings. One is the general price 
level, and the other is national productivity." He argued that between 1889 and 1965 there was a 
close relationship between the rate of change of real earnings and in labour productivity, when 
average earnings multiplied by a factor of 20 (Fabricant 1969:99&103).  
Another prominent economist, Paul Krugman (1994a:56) argued, more recently, in a memorable 
quote: “Depression, runaway inflation, or civil war can make a country poor, but only productivity 
growth can make it rich. In the long run, barring some catastrophe, the rate of growth of living 
standards in a country is almost exactly equal to the annual increase in the amount that an 
average worker can produce in an hour." 
The theme of productivity was also taken up by the influential business writer and management 
guru, Michael Porter (1990:6), who wrote as follows in The competitive advantage of nations:  
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We must abandon the whole notion of a "competitive nation" as a term having much 
meaning for economic prosperity. The principal economic goal of a nation is to produce a 
high and rising standard of living for its citizens. The ability to do so depends not on the 
amorphous notion of "competitiveness" but on the productivity with which a nation's 
resources (labour and capital) are employed. … The only meaningful concept of 
competitiveness at the national level is national productivity. A rising standard of living 
depends on the capacity of a nation's firms to achieve high levels of productivity and to 
increase productivity over time. 
Another management guru, Peter Drucker, considers productivity from a different perspective. He 
links productivity growth to the determination of income distribution and income inequality in 
particular. Drucker argues that, according to Pareto’s law, productivity determines income 
distribution and governments’ redistribution efforts will be ineffective. Pareto’s law states that 
national income is always distributed unequally; therefore the distribution of national income, that 
is, independently of its average level, is the same in all countries (Greenwald & Associates 
1973:422). The reasons are as follows: “The less productive an economy, the greater the 
inequality of incomes. The more productive, the less the inequality” (Drucker 1989:67). 
According to Rees (1980:1-2), productivity has several positive spin-offs. Firstly, it enables some 
people to consume more without causing other people to consume less; it may even result in all 
people consuming more. Income rises for all, rather than being redistributed. Secondly, following 
from the first proposition, productivity growth can mediate social conflict through the distribution of 
a “social dividend”, because increasing income attenuates class conflict. Thirdly, falling 
productivity can add to inflationary pressures if there is “political and social bargaining over 
income shares” as some social groups attempt to keep their real incomes growing at rates 
consistent with the previously higher productivity growth (Rees 1980:2). Lastly, high productivity 
growth could help enhance social welfare, because the efficient use of factor inputs will produce 
high levels of measurable output of goods and services that consumers value, thus leaving some 
scope to produce more unmeasured outputs that improve goods and services of a “public good” 
nature and other social priorities, such as improved health, safety, conservation and the 
environment.  
Productivity also helped to reduce the average working week in the USA from “76 hours in 1830 
to 60 in 1890, 39 in 1950 and just 34 today” (Cox & Elm 2003:5), thus substantially adding to the 
availability of leisure time.  
Productivity and the accompanying improvement in living standards and welfare are achieved 
gradually and in the long run. However, the powerful and compounding effect of small but 
increasing rates of change is a commonplace in economics. To illustrate from historical 
productivity data: according to Fabricant (1969:13 & 20), during the 80-year period from 1889 to 
 16
1969, labour productivity growth averaged 2.4% in the private domestic economy, which excludes 
the government sector (labour productivity falls to 2.1% for the whole economy if the government 
sector is included); whereas total factor productivity equals 1.7% over the same period. These 
figures are considered to be "sharp – even remarkable" when their compounding effect is 
considered, since they imply that in 1969 the "average worker in the United States today 
produces more than six times as much in an hour of work as did his grandfather or great-
grandfather in 1889" (Fabricant 1969:14). 
Indeed, the long run, despite being famously dismissed by Keynes with the quip that in the long 
run we are all dead, is the appropriate time frame of reference for productivity changes. Jacob 
Viner (1940:112) stressed the importance of the long run: "No matter how refined and how 
elaborate the analysis, if it rests solely on the short view it will still be close to the layman's 
economics and still be a structure built on shifting sands." 
William Baumol echoes this view (Baumol 1989; Baumol, Blackman & Wolf 1989, chapter 1), and 
argues that "productivity growth can provide miracles in the long run and already has yielded 
improvements in living standards unimaginable at any time in human history before the 19th 
century" (Baumol 1989:611). 
In sum, productivity is more evolutionary than revolutionary, an expression attributed to the 
Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan (Roach 1998a:156). 
In terms of growth analysis, through comparative cross-country studies, with particular reference 
to developing countries, TFP plays an equally important role. It is opposed to the “capital 
fundamentalism” hypothesis, a term introduced by King and Levine (1994), which states that 
capital and investment are the main drivers of long-run economic growth (Easterly & Levine 2001: 
179): 
Factor accumulation does not account for the bulk of cross-country differences in the 
level or growth rate of GDP per capital (sic); something else – TFP – accounts for a 
substantial amount of cross-country differences. Thus, in searching for the secrets of 
long-run economic growth, a high priority should be placed on rigorously defining the 
term “TFP,” empirically dissecting TFP, and on identifying the policies and institutions 
most conducive to TFP growth. 
The topic of productivity, critical as it is, however, is not the subject of this dissertation. A 
comprehensive and perceptive discussion of the importance of productivity can be found in 
Productivity and American leadership: the long view, by William Baumol, Sue Blackman and 
Edward Wolff (Baumol et al. 1989:9-94, chapters 1-3) and in many other publications (see the 
bibliography).  
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It is difficult to overstate the significance of productivity. In a nutshell, it is regarded by many 
economists, government agencies and businessmen alike as a – if not the – sine qua non of 
economic growth and development.  
 
1.6. The 1973 productivity growth slowdown  
In the early 1970s, in the USA, the post-war productivity growth machine came to a sudden halt, 
when productivity growth suddenly halved. The productivity numbers speak for themselves: 
according the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), between 1948 and 1973, the average growth 
rate in labour productivity (output per hour of all persons) was 2.9% per annum; however, 
between 1973 and 1979 it fell to 1.2%; between 1979 and 1990 recovered to 1.4%, and between 
1990 and 1995 it rose marginally to 1.6% per annum in the private nonfarm business (BLS News 
2003:6, table B).  
It is not surprising that when the USA experienced a productivity slowdown, the news was 
received with alarm. The country experienced a recession in 1974-1975 with rising 
unemployment and inflation, largely because of the oil crisis, when the crude oil price suddenly 
rose steeply. Labour productivity was seen as the culprit and workers were accused of not 
producing enough output per man-hour (Sweezy & Magdoff 1979). Productivity henceforth 
occupied centre stage in the economic debate in the 1970s, during the Carter administration.  
Several economists expressed their concern. For example, Denison (1979b:1) argued as follows 
"Beginning in 1974 the situation became disturbing and also puzzling." Darby (1984:301) refers to 
the productivity slowdown in terms of a "productivity panic", demonstrating the seriousness of the 
issue: "Indeed something akin to a panic has followed reports that labour productivity growth 
declined from an average annual rate of 2.6 percent over 1948-65 to 1.9 percent over 1965-73, 
and to 0.5 percent from 1973 to 1979."  
In a similar vein, Baumol (1989:611) stated the following: 
A near flood of writings tell the American public that the United States teeters on the brink 
of economic mediocrity, its competitive position about to be lost to Japan, to the other 
miracle economies of the Far East, and even to the venerable industrial economies of 
Europe. Declining U.S. productivity growth coupled with the distinctly higher growth rates 
of its rivals, both of which are very real, are generally cited as the prime reasons for his 
prospect. 
The concern was that the USA would lose its economic hegemony and experience a reversal in 
living standards, the advance of which was painstakingly achieved over a century (Baumol et al. 
1989:29-64, chapter 3).   
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According to Arnold and Dennis (1999:10), the slowdown between 1973 and 1989, however, if 
placed in a broader historical perspective "looks less like an aberration and more like a return to 
longer-term rates of growth." Table 1.1 shows that the 1973-1989 slowdown merely reverted to 
previous long-term rates of per capita GDP growth. Similar trends are discernible in the average 
growth rate of 14 European capitalist countries, including the USA and Canada. The latter 
variable is a more appropriate measure for historical comparisons and is more readily available. 
These figures reinforce the relevance of taking a long view. Gordon (1999b:124, table 1) draws a 
similar conclusion.  
 
 
The causes of the abrupt slackening in productivity growth in the 1970s were the subject of 
analysis before it was labelled the productivity paradox (Denison 1979b; Maddison 1987). USA 
economists debated the slowdown with intensity. For example, in June 1980 the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston held a conference entitled "The Decline in Productivity Growth", where 13 
prominent economists debated the issue. Also, in 1988, a conference, entitled "Symposium on 
the Slowdown in Productivity Growth", was held on the productivity slowdown and the findings 
published in The Journal of Economic Perspectives in 1988, with contributions by eminent 
economists such as Michael Boskin, Stanley Fisher,  Zvi Griliches, Dale Jorgenson and Mancur 
Olson. There are many other comprehensive studies of the slowdown that appeared soon after it 
first became apparent in the 1970s, including Baumol and McLennan (1985), Baily and Gordon 
(1988), Denison (1979a; 1979b & 1983) and Nordhaus (1972). 
The productivity growth slowdown was therefore a precursor to the productivity paradox. Prior to 
1973, there were short periods of declines in productivity growth rates, but the causes of the 
slowdown could generally be explained. It was only after 1973 that the causes of the productivity 
growth slowdown could not be easily accounted for (Denison 1979a: 122). In short, there 
appeared to be a structural break in mid-1973 (Blinder 2000). 
 
Table 1.1: Per capita GDP growth (%) 
 1820-1870 1870-1913 1913-1950 1950-1973 1973-1989 
US 1.2 1.8 1.6 2.2 1.6 
Source: Arnold & Dennis (1999:10) (based on Maddison) 
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1.7. Solow and the productivity paradox 
The debate around the productivity slowdown made a volte-face after a now-famous quip and 
frequently quoted remark by Robert Solow, that the computer age is evident everywhere except 
in the productivity statistics (Solow 1987:36). In a review of a book by Cohen and Zysman (1987), 
which deals with the myth of de-industrialisation of the American economy, captioned We'd better 
watch out (Solow 1987:36), Solow quotes the authors' view on technology and productivity: " 'We 
do not need to show that the new technologies produce a break with past patterns of productivity 
growth. …[That] would depend not just on the possibilities the technology represents, but rather 
on how effectively they are used.' " 
Solow then continues, expressing the essence of his view of the authors of the book's position 
and, more importantly, of the computer revolution in general: "they, like everyone else, are 
somewhat embarrassed by the fact that what everyone feels to have been a technological 
revolution, a drastic change in our productive lives, has been accompanied everywhere, including 
Japan, by a slowing down of productivity growth, not by a step up. You can see the computer age 
everywhere but in the productivity statistics (italics added).” 
This quote sums up the core of the productivity paradox: a technological revolution based on 
computerisation was accompanied by a slowing down of productivity growth. This unexpected 
outcome – the productivity paradox – was aptly described by Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996:2) as 
a clash of expectations and statistics.  
Solow’s quip has given rise to a lively debate about productivity, economic growth and policy 
issues in the USA. His aphorism suggests a causal link between increasing computerisation and 
the general productivity slowdown. It is evident from the above quote that Solow had two things in 
mind. Firstly, high investment in ICT was accompanied by slow productivity growth, and 
computerisation was identified as the culprit. Secondly, Solow had not only the slowdown in the 
USA in mind, but also the international implications and consequences of the productivity 
slowdown, which is evident in his reference to Japan. Indeed, subsequent research claimed that 
the slowdown was not caused by factors unique to the USA (Motley 1993).  
The debate extended to the co-called "new economy", which the productivity paradox appears to 
undermine. According to Whalen (2001:42), "If the New Economy can be summed up in one 
word, it would be "productivity".” Advocates of the new economy believed that an era of sustained 
and permanent productivity gains was just round the corner, in which new advances in 
technology, particularly computer technology, will play a fundamental role. The new economy has 
indeed been acclaimed as the Third Industrial Revolution. New economy advocates claim that 
technological innovation and globalisation will raise productivity growth (Greenspan 1998). 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999:110) refers to the optimism based on the expected spillovers 
generated by the IT investment into the rest of the economy as "a kind of a Computer Cargo 
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Cult". This view is summed up by Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000:186): “that the impact of IT is like 
phlogiston, an invisible substance that spills over into every kind of economic activity and reveals 
its presence by increases in industry-level productivity growth across the U.S. economy”. 
In the USA, and elsewhere, the new economy is purported to herald a "profound and fundamental 
alteration in the way our economy works" which "creates discontinuity from the past and promises 
a significantly higher path of growth than we have experienced in recent decades" (Greenspan 
1998). Based on high productivity growth, the new economy is purported to have rewritten the 
“rules of the game” and the economy can grow at a faster pace than was previously possible, 
without generating higher inflation (Krugman 1997a:124).  In other words, the new economy can 
permanently “raise the speed limit” of the economy in terms of growth (Jorgenson & Stiroh 
2000b). Whereas the consensus view was that the US economy’s potential growth was about 
2.2% previously, the new economy optimists believed that GDP growth rates of 3.5% or even 4% 
were achievable (Jorgenson & Stiroh 2000b:229). Thus the new economy is perceived to alter the 
organisation of production, international trade and the delivery of value to customers.  
The ultimate embodiment of the new economy is of course in the internet, or the so-called 
“Information Superhighway” (Sichel 1997a:2). Numerous publications have dealt with the 
burgeoning internet and will not be re-examined here. The internet’s size as measured by its 
contribution to GDP is still relatively small. In 1998 it contributed some US$159 billion or 1.8% to 
GDP and e-commerce sales were estimated at 1.01% of retail sales (Landefeld & Fraumeni 
2001:26). However, it is worth remembering just how optimist the electronic commerce 
enthusiasts were. In a 1999 survey of business and the internet by the influential newspaper, The 
Economist, the opening paragraph states: “In five years’ time … all companies will be Internet 
companies, or they won’t be companies at all” (Net imperative…1999:5). 
The new economy adherents also base their enthusiasm on the idea that the golden age of the 
computer will take time to assert itself, as was the impact of the electric motor on manufacturing 
in the 1920s (Gordon 1999a:2). This view is based on the influential paper by Paul David "The 
dynamo and the computer: an historical perspective on the modern productivity paradox" (1990). 
The computer is a general purpose technology, whose impact diffuses only slowly and gradually 
through the economy. 
Although the decline in productivity growth has been referred to as "the major macroeconomic 
event in the United States over the past generation" (DeLong 1997:2), as can be expected not 
everyone was panic-stricken by the productivity paradox, certainly not members of the ICT 
industry! It appears that the concern was mostly confined to the economics profession. One ICT 
industry commentator, Ives (1994:xxi), the editor of the influential MIS Quarterly, argued that most 
of the arguments in support of the “alleged paradox” are largely unfounded.  
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Solow's sceptical comment was particularly pertinent, because his two seminal papers "A 
contribution to the theory of economic growth" (1956) and  "Technical change and the aggregate 
production function" (1957) established him as a leading expert in the subjects of economic 
growth and technical change. Confusingly, these two papers draw opposite conclusions; the 1956 
paper developed the Solow growth model, while the 1957 paper argued that it was productivity 
that mattered, not capital accumulation (Bosworth & Collins 2003:190). In his 1957 paper, Solow 
came to the startling conclusion that capital formation played a smaller role in economic growth 
than had hitherto been expected. That study thus contradicts the "capital fundamentalism" view 
(see King & Levine 1994), the dominant economic development theory in the neoclassical 
paradigm in the 1950s and 1960s, and which asserted that investment and capital formation are 
the primary determinants of long-run economic growth (Easterly & Levine 2001:260).  
Solow (1957:320) showed, in particular, that whereas gross output per hour doubled from 1909 to 
1949, 87.5% of the increase was attributable to technical change and the rest to the use of 
capital. It examined productivity from the supply side (Syrquin 1988:254). Thus Solow’s research 
results attributed seven-eighths of the increase in output to "technical change in the broadest 
sense" (Solow 1988a:313). According to Metcalfe (1987:619): “The implication was quite 
devastating: the explanation of economic growth appeared to lie outside the traditional concerns 
of economists, to constitute a residual hypothesis.” 
Solow (1957) used the production function to underpin the analysis of economic activity and 
analysed the role of capital in labour productivity trends. The rate at which the production function 
shifts outwards is referred to as total or multifactor productivity, which is also a “residual”. 
Generally, MFP is a measure of technical change. The fact that MFP is a residual indicates that it 
also manifests other influences (Dean & Harper 1998:7). The full result that Solow obtained was 
that “the rate of growth of labour productivity depends on the growth rate of the capital-labour 
ratio, weighed by capital’s share, and the growth rate of MFP” (Dean & Harper 1998:7). Solow 
argued that MFP, rather than labour productivity, was a superior measure of technical progress 
(Dean & Harper 1998:7).  
Generally, Solow’s work initiated a new research programme, growth accounting, based on the 
aggregate production function. Solow’s 1957 paper is also the methodological basis of the BLS’s 
productivity measurement program (Dean & Harper 1998:7). 
His conclusions were also in broad agreement with other economists about the role of technology 
in economic growth, particularly Denison (1967, 1974, 1979a, 1987). Solow (1988a:314) 
concurred with Denison that "technology remains the dominant engine of growth, with human 
capital investment in second place". Yet “in a certain subtle sense” labour is the most important 
factor of production, as evidenced by the fact that wages account for some three-fourths of 
national product (Samuelson 1980:502). 
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Solow received the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in December 1987 "for his contributions to 
the theory of economic growth" (Nobel Prize 1987). In his Nobel Lecture, Solow (1988a) provided 
valuable insights into the productivity paradox. His model concluded that permanent increases in 
savings and investment will lead to a higher level of real income, but not to a higher growth rate of 
real income; only technical progress, in the broadest sense, will result in a higher growth rate in 
real income. A short-run growth spurt may result from higher savings and investment, but not a 
permanently higher growth rate – the permanent growth rate is independent of the saving and 
investment rate. Technological development is therefore the main engine of growth in the long 
run (Solow 1988a:314). 
 
1.8. The productivity paradox and computerisation 
The economics of computerisation plays a vital part in the productivity paradox literature. In The 
computer revolution: an economic perspective, Sichel (1997a) examines computerisation and the 
productivity paradox from an economic perspective, a book which Solow (1998) favourably 
reviewed in Challenge. Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Loveman (1994) also examine the role of IT 
in productivity.  
The first computer was delivered to a commercial customer in 1954 (Baumol 1989:321). 
Computers become economically important from about 1959 – when revisions to the System of 
National Accounts (SNA) to account for quality changes in computers and peripherals were first 
introduced in December 1985, indexes were estimated back to this date (Landefeld & Grimm 
2000:18).  The personal computer (PC) boom followed in 1983 and 1984, when businesses spent 
hundreds of billions of dollars on purchasing office computers (Bowen 1986:20-21). Bowen’s 
1986 article, published in the influential Fortune magazine, was entitled “The puny payoff from 
office computers”. 
Significantly, the quality-adjusted prices of computers and peripheral equipment have declined at 
surprisingly high rates, at an average of about 24% per annum in recent years, according to a 
recent estimate (Landefeld  & Grimm 2000:18). According to Sichel (1997a:3), between 1970 and 
1994, prices of computers and peripheral equipment declined at an average annual rate of 
15.1%, but over the same period the overall price level increased by 5.2%. According to the 
Economic Report of the President (US Congress 2003:68), computer prices fell at a 26% annual 
rate between 1995 and 2000. These prices are not the actual prices paid for computers and 
equipment in shopping outlets, but market prices adjusted for quality changes. The computing 
powers of mainframe computers, minicomputers and personal computers (including peripheral 
equipment) have all risen at an equally rapid pace and this is the main reason for the decline in 
computer prices.  
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It is reasonable to say that IT and computerisation are therefore possible candidates for the 
slowdown in productivity growth, because the personal computer was invented and 
computerisation became more widespread in the 1970s, when investment in and use of IT 
increased dramatically. It therefore seems that there is some association (whether causality or 
correlation) between IT investment spending and lower productivity. This counter-intuitive result – 
that, in effect, computers slow us down – is more plausible when we consider that ICT costs can 
be high and reduce the needed flexibility to improve productivity. For example, Stephen Roach  
(1998a:158) points out the enormous costs associated with the Year 2000 bug or Y2K were “a 
prime example of the deadweight of the information age”.  
However, the main issue whether or not the association between computerisation and 
productivity is causal or merely coincidental remains undecided. The aim of this dissertation is to 
examine this issue more closely.  
 
1.9. The 1995 productivity growth recovery and Solow’s ostensible retraction 
After 1995 there was a sudden productivity growth acceleration. According to the BLS (BLS News 
2003:6, table B), labour productivity between 1995 and 2000 bounced back to 2.5% per annum in 
the private nonfarm business. The Economist newspaper declared that the ‘”productivity paradox” 
has been solved’ (Paradox lost 2003:13). Advocates of the new economy have not been 
disappointed, as higher productivity growth is a cornerstone of the “new economy” paradigm.  
In 2000, Solow is reported to have said: “You can now see computers in the productivity 
statistics”, but added that “I will feel better about the endurance of the productivity improvement 
after it survives its first recession” (Uchitelle 2000:4). Subsequently, in 2002, Solow stated the 
following in an interview (Clement 2002): “It could mean that eventually productivity responded, 
that at last we do see computers in the productivity statistics.… Even now, however, we don’t 
have the complete story. … there does not appear to be a miracle in productivity terms that we 
can attribute to the computer. … So I think that the outcome is still unresolved.” 
Solow’s partial retraction has not been as widely reported as his earlier famous pronouncement, 
but both his change of opinion and reservation are important.  
The productivity recovery, however, deepens the paradox instead of resolving it. This dissertation 
will deal mainly with the period from 1948 to 1995 and will refer to but not examine in depth the 
recovery period of 1995 to 2002. There are several reasons for this decision. 
(1) Productivity statistics are revised and there is a delay before the results are released. Labour 
productivity statistics are available on a quarterly basis, but MFP statistics are only published 
after a long delay. At the end of 2003, the labour productivity statistics for 2003 were published, 
but MFP statistics for 2001 were only published in April 2003. 
 24
(2) Productivity growth trends and the business cycle are positively correlated. It is a stylised fact 
that both labour productivity and multifactor productivity are procyclical – thus productivity rises in 
booms and falls in recessions (Fernald & Basu 1999:1). Output growth and productivity has a 
correlation coefficient of about 0.8 (Fernald & Basu 1999:3). According to Arnold and Dennis 
(1999:8), labour productivity growth is weaker or negative during economic contractions, but 
recovers during an economic expansion. According to the standard view, productivity is 
procyclical because: ”Labor productivity falls when output falls because firms retain more workers 
than required to produce low current output. They do this to avoid the costs of laying workers off 
now and hiring replacements in the future when activity recovers” (DeLong & Waldman 1997:33).  
This implies that the business cycle must be correctly assessed and have run its course before 
an accurate assessment can be made. Unless a business cycle has been completed, a transitory 
productivity revival could be confused with a  permanent one (Gordon 2000b:54). According to 
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the economic research institution that 
determines the USA business cycles, the most recent trough (at the time of writing) occurred in 
March 1991 and peak in March 2001, a record expansion of 120 months or 10 years.  
(3) Productivity must be studied over the long term, because it influences the economy 
persistently and cumulatively, albeit gradually. Examining short-run fluctuations can be 
misleading as the long run is the appropriate time frame for productivity analysis, as was argued 
above. The recovery period from 1995 to the present is relatively short in comparison with the 
earlier productivity cycles.  
Stephen Roach, a long-standing and guarded IT sceptic, wrote that productivity must be 
distinguished from efficiency. In the mid-1990s, downsizing and other forms of cost-cutting were 
widely used to improve profitability, thus reducing labour and capital resources and improving 
efficiency. Although this can produce the same macroeconomic results as a true productivity 
recovery (Roach 1998a:154), it will not result in sustained productivity improvements, but only 
short-term gains. Furthermore, “If a new era of prosperity is truly at hand, there must be more 
than slash-and-burn cost cutting and micro miracles. The micro must be converted to the macro” 
(Roach 1998a:160). Only continual investment in innovation and human capital can lead to 
sustained productivity improvements.  
Moreover, during periods of accelerating productivity growth, there has been an increase in 
employment (Roach 1996:82): “Sustained productivity growth, however, hinges on getting more 
out of more — deriving increased leverage from an economy’s (or company’s) expanding 
resource base”.  
(4) The productivity growth resurgence in 1995 presents additional problems, which do not relate 
directly to the productivity paradox. Despite similarities, the recent sustained resurgence requires 
a separate study. The productivity growth slowdown period is marked by structural breaks in 1973 
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and 1995 in the productivity growth rates when compared to previous trends. One of the new 
economy sceptics, Robert Gordon (2003), points out that the revival actually presents five new 
puzzles, and has changed his mind to become a new economy devotee. It would, however, be as 
difficult to show that computerisation is responsible for the productivity growth revival, as it is to 
show that it caused the productivity growth slowdown. 
The recovery has indeed been remarkable: according to The Economist (The new “new 
economy” 2003:65), labour productivity growth recovered to 2.5% from 1995 to 2000; and at an 
even higher rate of 3.4% from 2000 to 2003. According to the 2003 Federal Reserve Bank of 
Dallas Annual Report (Cox & Alm 2003:8, exhibit 2), the productivity resurgence “has not only 
reversed the 22-year slowdown but also eclipsed the historical trend of 2.3 percent a year” as 
shown by the following trends (Table 1.2): 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, as two eminent economists observed, the attention has shifted somewhat in recent years: 
“The post-1973 puzzle was never resolved, just abandoned by economists when they were 
confronted with a new problem – the acceleration of U.S. productivity after about 1995” (Bosworth 
& Triplett 2003:1). However, the productivity growth slowdown remains a challenge to explain and 
understand, because it goes to the heart of many key economic issues, as argued above.  
 
1.10. Concluding remarks 
The USA is one of the most computerised economies in the world. More than half of all homes 
have personal computers, many with high-speed access to the internet. Business investment in 
IT resulted in the computer industry becoming a growth industry in the closing decades of the 
20th century. Billions of dollars have been and continue to be spent on ICT investments. Roach 
Table 1.2: Productivity growth trends: 1870 to 2003 
Period Change 
1870-2003 2.3% 
1950-1973 2.7% 
1973-1995 1.5% 
1995-2003 3.2% 
Source: Cox & Alm (2003:8, exhibit 2) 
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(1991:84) refers to this phenomenon as a “technology overdose” because corporate America has 
taken an extremely large wager on the productivity pay-offs of computerisation. The enormous 
fixed costs associated with ICT investments have led the US economy to move from a variable-
cost to a fixed-cost regime, particularly in the service sector.  
It is almost impossible to conceive of the US economy outside the context of the impact of 
computers. The productivity paradox has played a key part in the assessment of the impact of 
computerisation and ICT not only on the standard of living and economic growth in the USA and 
other OECD countries, but also in some developing countries. 
The USA has largely escaped from poverty by means of productivity growth. It has the highest 
labour productivity levels and per capita GDP in the world today. According to Maddison 
(2001:351), in 1998 the USA had the highest labour productivity level (GDP per hour worked) in 
the world of $34.55 (measured in 1990 international dollars per hour). In comparison, the UK’s 
productivity was $27.45 and Japan's $22.54. Furthermore, in the same year the USA had a per 
capita GDP of $27 331 (measured in 1990 international dollars), compared to the Western 
European average of $17 921 and the world average of $5 709 (Maddison 2001:28 & 279). There 
is no greater testimony than these figures to the power of human beings’ productive efforts to 
raise themselves from poverty. 
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2. CHAPTER 2: PRODUCTIVITY AND TECHNICAL CHANGE 
2.1. Overview 
Chapter 1 reviewed the economic importance of productivity growth. Chapters 2 and 3 will 
analyse the building blocks of productivity analysis, including production functions, technical 
change and the measurement of productivity using index numbers. The analytical literature on the 
Solow computer paradox refers frequently to these topics. Thus, an understanding of the 
computer paradox is difficult, if not impossible, without an understanding of these concepts. 
Moreover, a knowledge of the methodology of the growth accounting approach is useful in the 
critical analysis of productivity and the computer paradox. Also, the statistical agencies in the US 
(such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], Bureau of Economic Analysis [BEA], etc.), as well 
as those of other countries, rely specifically on these concepts and methodology to construct their 
national accounts.  
Chapter 4 will explain how productivity and computers are accounted for in the US national 
accounts while chapter 5 examines the economics of computerisation.  
This chapter analyses the relationship between productivity, the methodology of the neoclassical 
research programme, technical change, the total factor or multifactor productivity “residual” (also 
called the Solow residual), and the Cobb-Douglas production function. These topics are all part of 
what is called growth accounting. They form an organic whole and are the building blocks of 
productivity measurement in the national accounts. Schreyer and Pilat (2001:131) argue that 
Solow’s aggregate production function approach to technical change and productivity analysis 
(see Solow 1957) has yielded fruitful results, and that “the theory of the firm, index number theory 
and national accounts” are thus consistently integrated in the System of National Accounts 
(SNA).  
 
2.2. Productivity measurement in the neoclassical framework 
In terms of economic models, the neoclassical view and the new growth theory are incorporated 
in productivity measurement. In the neoclassical view, capital accumulation drives growth in the 
short run, but because capital is subject to diminishing returns, in the long run, productivity is 
largely driven by exogenous (i.e. largely unexplained) technical change. The so-called “new 
growth theory” goes beyond this view and avoids diminishing returns to capital and argues that 
technical change is endogenous. This line of research was pioneered by Romer and is known as 
endogenous growth theory (Romer 1990b). Neoclassical analysis can explain what happened to 
growth in the USA (for example, after 1995 it was mainly ICT investment); whereas only the new 
growth theory can explain why technical progress accelerated in ICT industries (after 1995) 
(Stiroh 2001a:37-38). Thus both models can add to the understanding of productivity growth. 
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According to Prescott (1997:10-11), the neoclassical production function is the cornerstone of the 
theory of multifactor productivity and adds: “A beauty of this simple construct is that it accounts 
for the balanced growth that has characterized the U.S. economy for nearly two centuries. 
Another beauty of this construct is that it deals with well-defined aggregate inputs and outputs. A 
final beauty is that it is based upon a lot of theory.” 
Several characteristics of growth accounting and the neoclassical framework are discussed 
below.  
Firstly, long-run growth is driven by technical change only (Stiroh 2001a:40). Capital 
accumulation drives growth only in the short run  (Stiroh 2001a:37). Technical change is 
exogenous and is not explained in the model; hence, the very foundation of economic growth is 
largely unexplained (Stiroh 2001a:37). Technical change is equivalent to or shorthand for total 
factor productivity. In the neoclassical framework, if capital accumulation instead of TFP is the 
dominant factor or source of growth, it is expected that growth will eventually slow down in the 
long run. This issue is fundamental to the neoclassical view: growth studies that find capital 
accumulation to be more important than TFP do not disprove the neoclassical model. They 
merely imply that growth will eventually slow down, because of diminishing returns to capital, as 
only TFP supports long-run growth. Thus an excessive reliance on capital accumulation and 
capital formation can only result in slower economic growth (Collins & Bosworth 1996:187). The 
study by King and Levine, Capital fundamentalism, economic development, and economic growth 
(1994: 282) concluded that capital accumulation is part of economic development, but does not 
ignite growth: economic growth results in capital accumulation, not the other way round. The 
arrow of causality runs from growth to capital accumulation. Capital  fundamentalism is embodied 
in the well-known Harrod-Domar (H-D) growth model, which can be summed up as the view that 
“increasing investment is the best way to raise future output” (King & Levine 1994:259). 
This debate has focused in particular on economic growth in East Asia or the so-called “Asian 
tigers”, that is, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. According to Collins and 
Bosworth (1996:141), with reference to the East Asian countries: “We suggest that there is some 
evidence that these economies are evolving toward a greater emphasis on TFP gains and that 
future growth can be sustained.” This is linked to the debate sparked by the 1994 article by Paul 
Krugman (1994b), The myth of Asia’s miracle, which is based on Young’s 1995 article, The 
tyranny of numbers: confronting the statistical realities of the East Asian growth experience. 
Krugman argued that economic growth based merely on increases in input (as in the former 
Soviet Union and East Asia) without an increase in productivity, that is, in the efficiency – or 
growth in output per unit of input – with which the inputs are used, will result in diminishing returns 
(Krugman 1994b:172). Rapid growth rates in the former Soviet Union and the Asian Tigers can 
easily be explained as primarily input-driven growth, without any growth in efficiency. This also 
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throws light on the productivity panic after the 1973 productivity slowdown in the USA, because 
long-term growth is associated more with productivity growth rather than simply input-driven 
growth and capital accumulation.  
Secondly, broadly defined capital investment produces largely internal benefits (which accrue 
only or mainly to the investor, with no benefits spilling over to the boarder economy) and 
decreasing or diminishing returns to scale (Stiroh 2001a:38 & 42). However, the new growth 
theory typically stresses external benefits and constant as well as increasing returns to scale.  
Thirdly, in terms of the direction of causality “faster technical change induces higher output, 
saving, investment, and capital accumulation, so part of historical capital accumulation itself is 
due to technical change in a deeper sense” (Stiroh 2001a:40). 
Generally, capital accumulation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for growth (Solow 
1962:86). Growth accounting captures all the phenomena that affect economic growth, thus 
accounting for the sources of growth by breaking down GDP growth into factor inputs and 
production technologies (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:433).  
 
2.3. Growth accounting and the aggregate production function 
According to Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004:433), growth accounting was pioneered by Solow 
(1957), Kendrick (1961), Denison (1962) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). Growth accounting 
is an empirical methodology which separates GDP growth into changes associated with the factor 
inputs and production technologies (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:433).  
Growth accounting has become the foremost heuristic device for gaining an understanding of 
how economies grow and develop and how development in different economies can be 
compared in this regard. Growth accounting encompasses all the economic tools discussed 
below, including the Cobb-Douglas production function, the Solow residual and index numbers. 
Growth accounting undoubtedly has some limitations. It separates the overall growth rate into the 
proximate sources of growth, such as labour, capital and technology. These are the customary 
exogenous variables used in economic models (North 1993:65). However, the ultimate elements 
or variables underlying economic growth are not explained, because growth accounting cannot 
identify the primary causes of growth (North 1993; Collins & Bosworth 1996:139). In a similar 
vein, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004:457) state that growth accounting “is only an accounting 
decomposition” and that it does not amount to a theory of growth (2004:460). According to these 
authors, the ultimate causes of growth are institutions, government policies, consumer 
preferences, technology, and other factors.  
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The neoclassical production function is the foundation of the neoclassical growth theory. The 
Cobb-Douglas production function has been the preferred form of this function in most 
neoclassical research in this area. In a review of production functions, Griliches and Mairesse 
(1995:2) argue that the production function “is a tool, a framework for answering other questions”. 
The empirical estimation of the production function presents many statistical difficulties. For 
example, the estimation of the production function by means of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
requires the explanatory variables to be exogenous. This requirement is unlikely to hold given the 
available data – hence the usual identification problem arises. The identification problem arises 
when simultaneous equations (such as supply and demand using price and quantity data) are 
estimated in econometric models (see Koop 2000:207).  
The Cobb-Douglas function is but one of many functional forms that aggregate production 
functions can assume. This function is one specific form of the more general constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function and translog production function. According to Maddala (1979:310): 
“Different functional forms for the production function imply different schemes for weighing the 
input ratios in the construction of the input index.” The weighting issue is discussed below. 
Many economists have pointed out the problems arising from aggregation. One problem is how to 
derive predictable macroeconomic variables from the underlying microeconomic variables. For 
this reason, 19th century neoclassical economists refused to aggregate micro-production 
functions into an aggregate level (Blaug 1992:171).  
The aggregate production function was attacked by the Cambridge School of Economics (CSE) in 
England. The controversy became known as the Cambridge Controversy, which raged in the 
1930s between the CSE and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) at Cambridge in 
the USA. This controversy and problem of aggregation is reviewed in chapter 6 because it 
pertains to the critique of productivity analysis. 
The aggregate production function can be used to analyse capital-labour substitution and 
increased efficiency in the use of resources. According to Metcalfe (1987:619), the early studies 
were based on the aggregate production function as the central organising concept. Growth in 
output per worker was disaggregated into: (1) capital-labour substitution, demonstrated by a 
movement along the production function; and (2) increased efficiency in resource use, 
demonstrated by shifts in the production function. 
However, Nelson (1973) asks whether growth accounting leads to a new understanding or to a 
dead end, and argues that it may be theoretically impossible to distinguish between movements 
along a production function and shifts in the production function. This issue is explored further 
below under forms of technical change.  
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2.4. Primal and dual approaches to productivity measurement 
The standard method of measuring TFP is also referred to as the primal method, which uses 
physical stocks of inputs. Solow employed this method to estimate productivity growth and 
technical progress in his 1957 paper. In contrast, the “dual” method uses factor price data rather 
than information on stocks (Aiyar & Dalgaard 2005:83). The dual method was pioneered by 
Jorgenson and Griliches in their seminal paper, The explanation of productivity change (1967). 
They showed the equivalence between price- and quantity-based growth accounting methods 
(Jorgenson & Griliches 1967:252).  
Several studies used the two different approaches to examine the East Asian growth miracle 
(Hsieh 1999, 2002; Young 1995). Some studies, that rely on the primal approach (e.g. Young 
1995), found that factor accumulation was the driving force and that TFP played almost no role in 
East Asia’s impressive growth performance. This view was challenged by Hsieh (1999, 2002), 
who refined the TFP calculations by employing the dual approach. He found that TFP did in fact 
play the most important part in East Asia’s high growth performance. The dual approach will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 6.  
 
2.5. The production function and productivity 
Production functions generally define the technological relationship between average input levels 
and the level of output. The inputs can be any combination of the usual factors of production, 
land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship. 
The general production function is of the form 
),( LKfQ =   
where Q = output of the whole economy;  K = total quantity of capital; and L = total quantity of 
labour. When the production function shifts over time, it can be written as 
),,( tLKfQ =  
where t = technical progress. The variable t is introduced specifically to allow the production 
function to shift over time (Allen 1973:236). The equation can be extended to include other inputs, 
such as intermediate inputs and raw materials. This is discussed further in chapter 5.  
2.6. The basic growth accounting formula 
Under neutral technical change (discussed below) the production function is written as: 
),( LKfAQ =  
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where Q = output;  A = the efficiency parameter or technical progress; K = capital; and L = labour. 
It can be shown that the growth rate of output will be  
L
L
K
K
A
A
Q
Q Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ βα . 
This is the basic growth accounting formula (Hall & Taylor 1997:75-77 & 96-97). The parameter α 
denotes the share of capital in national income; and the parameter β the share of labour in 
national income. These are calculated or estimated empirically (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:434). 
The values of α and β are derived from the national income and product accounts (NIPAs). 
Typical values are α = 0.3 and  β = 0.7 (Hall & Taylor 1997:97). This issue is reviewed below. 
Chapter 4 will show how actual values of the shares of capital and labour in income are derived 
from the NIPAs.  
The value of 
A
AΔ
 is a residual value because it is not calculated directly. This became known as 
the Solow residual and is equated with productivity and technological change. The residual will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
 
2.7. Measurement of output and input 
The measurement of output and input is complex and will be briefly reviewed in relation to the 
central question of the productivity paradox. Both output and input are measured in terms of 
market transactions (Jorgenson & Griliches 1967:251). Economic activities that are nonmarket 
based are therefore excluded from growth accounting. There must be a match between goods 
and services produced and the inputs used to produce the output, because a mismatch will distort 
the measurement of productivity (NRC 1979:88-90). For example, leisure and charitable activities 
are excluded, because they are not market transactions (NRC 1979:89).  
Output at national level is measured by the real product or output (in other words, real GDP) in 
the familiar system of national accounts.  
The two main factor inputs are labour and capital. It is imperative that capital and labour inputs 
should be measured accurately. Capital input can be measured by the flow of services from the 
stock of physical capital, such as the amount of “machine-hours” (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:436-
438). Similarly, labour input can be measured by the number of workers or, more accurately, the 
number of hours worked. Inputs can be adjusted for quality changes (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 
2004:436-438).  
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When labour and capital inputs are adjusted for quality changes, the size of the residual is 
reduced, as shown by Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). Therefore a failure to adjust inputs for 
quality improvements will overstate productivity growth and hence technological progress. 
Since computerisation is a form of capital, it is necessary for it to be measured accurately. There 
are several major concerns in the measurement of computers (particularly accounting for quality 
improvements), which forms the core of the criticisms of the computer productivity paradox. 
These concerns will be discussed in chapter 3 as well as in other sections of this dissertation. 
Many of these issues have been used as a basis for criticising the growth accounting 
methodology, and will be taken up in chapter 6. 
 
2.8. The Cobb-Douglas production function and productivity 
The Cobb-Douglas production function occupies a controversial role in economic analysis, 
despite the fact that it is ubiquitous. Its widespread use derives from the ease with which it can be 
developed mathematically (Brown 1987:460). Brown (1987:460) captures its contentious nature, 
in stating that “it possess restrictive properties and perhaps for that reason it has become for 
some an object of disdain, often regarded as a child’s toy in the world of real economics. But for 
others, the Cobb-Douglas is at least a venerable form, and, effectively it and its putative inventor 
are regarded fondly.” 
The various criticisms of the Cobb-Douglas production function will be discussed in chapter 6, 
where several explanations of the productivity paradox will be evaluated. This aspect of the 
analysis of productivity is mentioned at this point, because the productivity model (which therefore 
includes the economics of computerisation and the Solow paradox) seems to rest on rather shaky 
theoretical grounds, despite the confidence in the orthodox approach in the US NIPAs and other 
OECD countries. This chapter analyses the way that the Cobb-Douglas function is actually used 
in the productivity literature, despite these reservations and critiques.  
According to Hennings (1987:331), the link between the Cobb-Douglas function and index 
numbers is that capital is a "fairly homogenous and amorphous mass which could take on 
different forms" and thus "capital consisted of capital goods: but their aggregation into a more or 
less homogenous aggregate was considered an index number problem which could be solved in 
principle as well as in practice". It was the aggregation of capital that led to the so-called 
“Cambridge capital controversy”, as mentioned earlier. The controversy does not appear to have 
been resolved yet.  
The general form of the Cobb-Douglas production function is similar to the basic production 
function, and is written as:  
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βαLAKQ =   (α >0, β >0)   (1) 
Various properties of the Cobb-Douglas function are discussed below. A discussion of these 
properties is included here because they pertain to the measurement of productivity and the 
Solow paradox.  
For greater convenience, the Cobb-Douglas function can be converted into a linear form, using 
natural logarithms. Thus equation (1) can be written as: 
LKAQ lnlnlnln βα ++=       (2) 
where ln = a natural logarithm.  
Similarly, equation (2) can be expressed as rates of change or growth rate over a particular 
period, where the growth rate is denoted by an asterisk (*). Thus: 
*ln*ln*ln*ln LKAQ βα ++=      (3) 
Hence Q*, L* and K* denote the rates of change of output, labour and capital over a particular 
period respectively. 
 
2.9. Returns to scale 
Constant returns to scale are an important property of the Cobb-Douglas function. Returns to 
scale will be discussed in subsequent chapters, because the assumption of constant returns to 
scale can be a limiting factor in productivity analysis. The idea of increasing returns has been 
incorporated into growth theories by several researchers, such as Romer (1986) and others. 
A function is said to be homogenous to degree )( βα + . If 1=+ βα , the function is linear and 
homogenous and exhibits constant returns to scale. In the standard growth accounting model 
presented here, it is assumed that the production function exhibits constant returns to scale 
(OECD Manual 2001:128).  
According to Allen (1973:50), with constant returns to scale, only one parameter is required, since 
1=+ βα , so that αβ −= 1  (0<α<1); and the function can be written as 
 αα −= 1LKAQ  
Under the long-run laws of production, returns to scale need not be constant, but may be 
increasing or decreasing. The determination of the scale of production is an empirical issue 
(Pearce 1992:376). If constant returns to scale apply, that is, 1=+ βα , then output Q will 
change in proportion to the change in both inputs K and L.  If  1<+ βα , decreasing returns to 
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scale apply and the increase in output is less than the proportional change in inputs; and if 
1>+ βα , increasing returns to scale applies and the increase in output is larger than the 
proportional change in inputs (Glass 1980:215). 
 
2.10. Elasticity of substitution 
The elasticity of substitution measures the degree of substitutability between factors of 
production. The elasticity of substitution between factors is equal to unity when the production 
function under constant returns to scale is linear and homogenous (Allen 1973:51). Thus the 
elasticity of substitution for the Cobb-Douglas function is unity. This may not be a realistic 
assumption, because a study by Arrow et al. (1961:246) found evidence that the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labour is typically less than unity. 
Elasticity of substitution (σ) is defined as the change in the capital-labour ratio, K/L, divided by the 
marginal rate of technical substitution of labour for capital MRTSLK (Glahe & Lee 1981:421). The 
marginal rate of technical substitution is the rate at which one input must be replaced by the other 
input in order to maintain the same level of output (Schotter 1997:170). When σ = 1 (as with the 
Cobb-Douglas function), a 10% change in the MRTSLK will yield a 10% change in K/L.  
Unity of substitution is one of the Cobb-Douglas function’s main restrictions. The constant 
elasticity of substitution (CES) and translog functions relaxes this restrictive assumption.  
Maddala (1979:309) states that the different functional forms of the production function differ in 
their elasticities of substitution. Significantly, according to Maddala (1979:309), the different 
functional forms do not produce significant differences in productivity measurement and other 
issues such as disequilibrium, measurement problems and aggregation problems are more 
important. The choice of functional form will not make much difference in productivity 
measurement (Maddala 1979:317).  
 
2.11. Factor income shares and the distribution of the product 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004:30) contend that the behaviour of factor income shares is the key 
property of the Cobb-Douglas function. The marginal productivity theory of distribution, on which 
the theoretical determination of factor shares is based, is a cornerstone of neoclassical economic 
theory. 
If the production function shows constant returns to scale and is linearly homogenous, then 
Euler’s theorem holds. This theorem is also referred to as Euler’s product exhaustion theorem 
(Koutsoyiannis 1979:478). Euler’s theorem states that the value of output Q is exhausted in factor 
payments, if each factor, capital and labour, is paid the value of its marginal product. The 
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marginal product of capital is equal to the rental price of capital; and the marginal product of 
labour equals the wage rate (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:30). It follows that if each factor earns 
the value of its marginal product, then the sum of all the factor payments will be precisely equal to 
the total product. In other words, the product Q is attributable to the factors, labour and capital, 
without any surplus or deficit (Allen 1973:43).  
Apart form the marginal theory of distribution, empirical analysis shows that relative shares of 
capital and labour in income have been relatively stable over time. However, according to Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004:30), although the factor shares have been relatively stable in the USA , 
this is not the case in all countries.  
In general, in the USA the shares for K and L in income have been calculated by the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) and the results published in the NIPAs. This calculation will be 
discussed in chapter 4. In this calculation, in 2001, the share of labour was 72% and that of 
capital 28% in national income (in current dollars) in the USA. 
Labour is the dominant factor of production, in the sense that wages represent about three-
quarters of the national product and property incomes the remaining one-quarter (Samuelson 
1980:502). Paul Douglas, one of the eponymous inventors of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function, found that labour’s share was 0.75 in early studies of American manufacturing between 
1899 and 1922 (Douglas 1948:6).  
Other researchers have drawn comparable conclusions. Depending on their research focus, 
researchers estimate either the share of labour or the share of capital. Maddison (1987:659) 
estimates a capital share of 32% for advanced capitalist economies from 1960 to 1973. Maddison 
(1987:660, table 8) also provides a summary of four other estimations for industrial countries and 
finds an average of 40.3% over different post-Second World War periods. Collins and Bosworth 
(1996:154-6), in their study of economic growth in East Asia, estimated a capital share of 0.35.  
Senhadji (2000:141) estimates the share of physical capital for 88 countries between 1960-1994 
and finds that capital’s share varies greatly across regions, with sub-Saharan Africa the lowest 
mean value (0.43) and industrial countries the highest (0.64). Generally, researchers have 
estimated the proportion to be between 70 and 75% for labour and 30 and 25% for capital.  
Solow (1958), Kravis (1959) and other economists are not convinced that factor shares were 
constant. Arrow et al. (1961:225 & 246) found varying degrees of substitutability between capital 
and labour in 24 different manufacturing industries, but found it to be typically less that unity. 
However, Gollin (2002) found that, when appropriate adjustments to income-share calculations 
are made, the share of labour in income across countries varies between 0.65 and 0.80. This 
shows that factor shares are almost independent of levels of economic development.  
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As discussed above, factor shares are typically calculated from the NIPAs, but these may give 
inaccurate results. The accuracy of factor shares arose in the debate about the sources of growth 
of the East Asian countries and the so-called “Asian miracle”, discussed above (see also Nelson 
& Pack 1999; Krugman 1994b; Sarel 1997; Young 1995).  
Senhadji (2000:152) and Sarel (1997:14) show that TFP’s contribution to output is highly 
sensitive to and depends on the share of capital: the higher α is, the lower the TFP contribution to 
growth is.  
To improve the accuracy of the measurement of the factor shares Sarel (1997) provides 
alternative measures for its calculation. Apart from the “national accounts” and “regression” 
approaches, Sarel (1997:14-17) proposes a new method for the calculation of capital’s share in 
output. He argues that factor shares calculated from the NIPAs in East Asian countries are 
inaccurate and shows that TFP did indeed play an impressive role in the East Asian growth 
miracle, a view which contradicts earlier studies (see Krugman 1994b; Young 1995). Using the 
dual approach, Hsieh (1999, 2002) obtained similar results that technological progress did play a 
key part in East Asian growth. The above disagreements make it clear why Robinson (1934:398) 
referred to this theory as the “adding-up problem”. 
These issues will also be explored in chapter 6.  
 
2.12. Labour productivity, capital deepening and multifactor productivity 
The equations in section 2.8 can be restated to calculate labour productivity growth (LP*). LP* is 
the difference between output growth and labour input growth and can be expressed as LP* = Q* 
− L*. We assume constant returns to scale. By re-arranging equation (3) and discarding the 
natural log notation, one obtains 
**)*)(1(*** ALKLQLP +−−=−= β     (4) 
Since 1)( =+ βα , and αβ =− )1( ,  
**)*(* ALKLP +−=α       (4.1) 
Equation (4) shows that growth in labour productivity can be separated into two components. The 
first right-hand component in equation (4.1), *)*( LK −α , accounts for capital deepening, which 
is adjusted for capital’s contribution to the production process by a weight of α. The second right-
hand component, A*, is a residual and accounts for MFP.  
The fact that LP is the sum of capital deepening and MFP is a basic and fundamental result. 
Many productivity studies assume that the reader is familiar with this equation. It is also often 
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assumed that productivity refers to LP; MFP is usually referred to as MFP or TFP, or as technical 
progress or similar derivations and synonyms.  
Using equation (4.1) it can be shown that if the share (or factor weight) of capital (α) is relatively 
small, then labour productivity growth and multifactor productivity growth will be almost equal. If 
the capital-labour ratio is stable, labour productivity growth and multifactor productivity growth will 
be almost equal. However, labour productivity growth and multifactor productivity growth rates will 
diverge if the contribution of capital is significant and the capital-output ratio is not fixed (Gust & 
Marquez 2000:666).  
The labour variable L is usually measured in labour hours; and the capital variable K usually 
measured in tangible capital stock, which may include land, although land is often ignored in the 
production process. The change in output that cannot be explained by changes in the 
contributions in labour or capital is denoted by A*. This variable is therefore a residual because it 
is the remainder after the contributions of labour and capital have been subtracted from output. 
The residual A* has been equated with multifactor productivity (MFP) and technical or 
technological progress. (Schreyer & Pilat 2001:131.) 
MFP growth results from technical progress, technological advances and through improvements 
in production techniques and processes, rather than from increases in factor inputs. For example, 
a production process can be redesigned so that output increases while retaining the same 
number of machines, materials and workers as before (US Congress 2003:68). MFP is estimated 
to be the difference between the growth in output and the growth of the combined inputs of labour 
and capital. 
Productivity can be defined as the ratio of a volume measure of output to a volume measure of 
input used – that is, it is the ratio of output (or real GDP) to the inputs that are used to produce 
that output. Similarly: “The rate of growth of total factor productivity is the difference between the 
rate of growth of real product and the rate of growth of real factor input” (Jorgenson and Griliches 
1967: 249).  
Productivity growth may imply that there is a net saving or cost reduction in the production 
process (NRC 1979:37). Productivity is thus a measure of the efficiency of production: it 
describes how efficiently input is converted into output. It follows that per capita income, for 
instance, will only increase when there is an increase in output per unit of input (Krugman 1994b).  
This basic formula for multifactor productivity (A) reveals the interrelationship between output and 
input: 
  
LK
QA βα +=  
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where Q is real output, K is capital input and L is labour input (NRC 1979:43). 
Capital deepening means that the amount of capital per worker increases, in other words, the 
capital-labour ratio rises, so that labour productivity can be improved as more capital is available 
per worker (Schreyer & Pilat 2001:131).  
The Cobb-Douglas production function is restricted in various ways, as the foregoing summary 
shows. Researchers have therefore sought more flexible forms of the production function. 
Examples of such forms are the CES and translog function, as mentioned above. The important 
translog function is reviewed below.  
 
2.13. The translog production function  
The transcendental logarithmic production function or translog production function is a 
generalisation of the Cobb-Douglas production function. Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni 
(1987:31-68) show the importance of the translog function in productivity analysis. 
The translog function is a quadratic function using natural logarithms: 
 22 )(ln)(lnlnlnlnlnln KLKLKLaQ εδγβα +++++=  
where Q is output, L is labour, K is capital and a, α, β, γ, δ and ε  are constants, and ln is the 
natural logarithm. If the parameters γ = δ = ε = 0, the translog function reduces to the Cobb-
Douglas form. When these parameters are nonzero, the elasticity of input substitution is also 
nonzero (Pearce 1992:124 & 434).  
The translog function was introduced to test theories of production and estimate parameters (e.g. 
elasticities) under the minimum of a priori assumptions (Stern 1994:172). It has an advantage 
over the Cobb-Douglas form in that it has fewer restrictive properties and can be used to 
aggregate diverse inputs. This is a useful property because it enables disaggregation (or 
separability) between inputs, such as capital (equipment and structures) and labour, so that the 
possibility of substitution between these factors (and the elasticity of substitution between them) 
can be examined (Berndt & Christensen 1973:82 & 100). 
In particular, the translog function relaxes the assumption of unitary elasticity of substitution. 
Factor substitution is unrestricted and “allows the elasticities of substitution among inputs to vary 
as input proportions vary”, a desirable property, which the Cobb-Douglas function lacks (BLS 
1983:34). 
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2.14. Forms of technical change 
The terms “technical change” and “technological change” (or progress) will be used 
interchangeably in this dissertation, although they do not mean exactly the same thing. Generally, 
technical change or progress means that more output can be produced from the same quantities 
of labour and capital involved in the production process (Pearce 1992:423). Since 
computerisation is a form of technical change, the precise nature of the change involved must be 
examined.  
There are two main types of technical progress – embodied and disembodied. The two views 
differ on the transmission mechanism from technical change to economic growth. Disembodied 
technical change affects economic growth independently of capital accumulation, whereas 
embodied technical change requires investment to influence output. (Hercowitz 1998:217).  
The two views have different implications for the analysis of productivity and the Solow paradox - 
the correct identification of the form of technical change involved in computerisation is analytically 
essential. In particular, because new technologies to produce capital goods have developed 
rapidly since the mid-1970s, the transmission mechanism of technological progress to output 
growth must be analysed and understood (Hercowitz 1998:217). Also, according to Schreyer and 
Pilat (2001:158), the distinction has significant implications, because embodied technical change 
is dependent on market transactions, whereas disembodied technical change is not.  
The disagreement over the precise nature of the difference turned into a controversy, the so-
called “embodiment” versus “disembodied” controversy. It originated in the 1960s when Solow 
and Jorgenson disagreed on the importance of capital-embodied technical change. The opposing 
views are articulated in Solow’s 1960 paper, Investment and technical progress, and Jorgenson’s 
1966 paper, The embodiment hypothesis. Solow’s view was that embodied technological change 
is the dominant mechanism and consequently that investment is the key factor in growth 
(Hercowitz 1998:217). Jorgenson (1966:2), however, argued that the two types of technical 
change cannot be distinguished from the available data and that the transmission mechanism 
could therefore not be determined.  
Finally, Denison (1964) argued that the embodiment hypothesis was unimportant, because the 
changes in the age distribution of the capital stock have a minor impact on output growth (Hulten 
1992b:964). 
 
2.15. Disembodied technical change 
Disembodied technical change is a relatively simple interpretation of technical change, which 
does not specify a transmission mechanism. It “applies equally and alike to all resources of men 
and machines in current use” and appears costless, like "manna from heaven" (Allen 1973:236). 
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It occurs independently of capital accumulation or any other economic variables (Pearce 1992: 
110).  
According to Solow (1960:91) this form of technical change was something like “a way of 
improving the organisation and operation of inputs without reference to the nature of the inputs 
themselves. The striking assumption is that old and new capital equipment participate equally in 
technical change.”  
According to Mokyr (1990a:7), technological change, in this interpretation, is a “part of economic 
growth that cannot be explained by more capital or more labour, and that thus must come to be 
regarded as a free lunch” and affects output growth independently of capital accumulation 
(Hercowitz 1998:217).  
Technology is generally considered to be disembodied, which must mean that technological 
diffusion should be almost instantaneous (Atkeson & Kehoe 2001:1). However, this is not so, as 
the slow diffusion of the use of the adoption of electricity in the production process shows (see 
David 1990). 
In terms of computerisation, disembodied technical change is not caused by the technological 
sophistication of computer equipment, but by the networking and interconnectedness that the 
internet and e-mail make possible, allowing people to work more productively (OECD 2004:11). 
 
2.16. Embodied technical change: technical change embodied in new investment 
Solow (1960:91) proposed that an alternative model of technical change be found, since the 
disembodied formulation “… conflicts with the casual observation that many if not most 
innovations need to be embodied in new kinds of durable equipment before they can be made 
effective. Improvements in technology affect output only to the extent that they are carried into 
practice either by net capital formation or by the replacement of old-fashioned equipment by the 
latest models, with a consequent shift in the distribution of equipment by date of birth.” 
According to Denison (1962:91): “To speak of technical progress embodied in capital is simply to 
refer to changes in the quality of capital goods.” Allen (1973:237) notes that embodied technical 
progress applies only to “certain tranches of capital equipment, usually machines produced and 
installed currently, together with the associated labour crews. Capital becomes essentially a 
mixed stock of different ‘vintages’. Machines of different vintages are different in kind, as new 
machines are more productive than older similar machines.”  
Under embodied technical progress, “manna from heaven” drops only on certain types of capital 
equipment, typically the newest, and also on certain sections of the labour force (Allen 1973:254). 
The specific ages or vintages of capital and humans must be distinguished. In short, older 
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machinery does not benefit from embodied technical change. Thus, the age of capital equipment, 
or vintage capital, plays the more important role in the analysis. Embodied technical change can 
thus be described as investment-specific technical change (Greenwood, Hercowitz & Krusell  
1997). 
Labour, too, can be distinguished by age and training. Thus, according to this view, neither capital 
nor labour is treated as homogenous.  
Embodied technical change requires investment to affect output (Hercowitz 1998:217). Hence 
technical progress is dependent on new capital and technical progress is embodied in new 
capital.  
Computer equipment is generally classified as capital equipment. The silicon chip represents 
technical progress because it has made many technologies and hence capital obsolete since it 
requires a new investment in different forms of capital (Pearce 1992:125).  
Hercowitz (1998:223), in his review essay on the controversy, concludes “that ‘embodiment’ is the 
main transmission mechanism of technological progress to economic growth”, thus lending 
support to Solow’s view. Similarly, Greenwood et al. (1997:359) concluded that 60% of post-war 
productivity growth is attributable to investment-specific (or embodied) technological change.  
 
2.17. Neutrality of disembodied technical change 
Allen (1973:237) discusses the issue of the neutrality of disembodied technical change and 
suggests that although neutral technical progress shifts the production function, it does not alter 
the balance between capital and labour – hence it is neither capital saving nor labour saving.  
Non-neutral technical change can therefore be classified as either labour saving or capital saving. 
Inventions can be labour saving or capital saving, but if the invention does not save relatively 
more of either input, but generates the same amount of output, the invention is called neutral or 
unbiased (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:52). 
According to Hahn and Matthews (1964:825), the purpose of defining neutral technical change is 
to get a sense of those characteristics that will not change the balance between capital and 
labour. Because technical change causes a shift of the entire production function, a new problem 
arises “in deciding which point on the old production function to compare with which new point on 
the new one” (Hahn & Matthews 1964:825).  
Consequently, alternative definitions of neutral technical change were formulated to deal with the 
problem. There are three types of neutral technical change: Hicks-neutral, Harrod-neutral and 
Solow-neutral technical progress.  
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2.18. Harrod-neutral technical progress 
According to Allen (1973:237), Harrod-neutral technical progress occurs when the shift of the 
production function over time is of the form 
),( LKFY α=   
where α = α(t). (Y rather that Q is used when output is the same as income and there is no lag 
between output and income [Allen 1973:11 & 236]). This form of technical change denotes an 
“all-round increase in the efficiency of labour” (Allen 1973:237-8) because it is labour augmenting, 
since it corresponds to an increase in the labour force, “so that one man does as much as two 
men used to do, then as much as three men, and so on” (Allen 1973:238).  
According to Blaug (1992:172), Harrod-neutral technical progress is defined as points in the 
growth process where the capital to output ratio remains unchanged at a given rate of interest 
and constant relative factor prices (i.e. wages and profits). This implies greater quantities of or 
more efficient labour, leading to a change in labour's coefficient in the production function (Pearce 
1992:423).  
More specifically, the Harrod-neutral production function, is written as: 
 )](,[ tALKFY ⋅=  
where A(t) is an index of technology. It is referred to as labour-augmenting technical progress 
because output is increased in a similar way to an increase in the stock of labour (Barro & Sala-i-
Martin 2004:52).  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004:53) argue that technological progress must necessarily be labour-
augmenting in a model with a steady state, where all the variables grow at constant rates in the 
long run. 
2.19. Solow-neutral technical progress 
According to Allen (1973:239-40) Solow-neutral technical progress applies when the shift of the 
production function over time is of the form: 
 ),( LKFY α= . 
This form is more relevant to embodied or vintage-type technical progress (Allen 1973:239), as 
discussed above.  
Solow-neutral technical progress is defined as points in the growth process where the labour to 
output ratio remains constant (Pearce 1992:423). More specifically, the Solow-neutral production 
function is written as 
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 ]),([ LtBKFY ⋅=  
where B(t) is an index of technology. The function is capital augmenting because production is 
increased by technological improvements in a similar way to an increase in the capital stock 
(Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:52). 
2.20. Hicks-neutral technical progress 
According to Allen (1973:239-240), Hicks-neutral technical progress obtains when the shift of the 
production function over time is of the form: 
 ),( LKFY α= . 
This was the first form of technical progress to be proposed and can be characterised as “manna 
from heaven” in the most obvious sense. It fits in neatly with the idea of neutrality (Allen 
1973:239). Hicks-neutral technical progress depends only on time and is thus independent of the 
factor inputs (Jorgenson et al. 1987:35).  
Hicks-neutral technical progress is defined as points in the growth process where the capital to 
labour ratio remains unchanged at constant relative factor prices (Blaug 1992:172). Since the 
ratio of the marginal product of capital relative to labour is unchanged, the share of output 
allocated to capital and labour remains the same (Pearce 1992:423).  
More specifically, the Hicks-neutral production function (which includes time variable t to reflect 
the effects of technological progress) is written as: 
 ),()(),,( LKFtTtLKFY ⋅==  
where T(t) is an index of the state of technology (Barro & Sala-I-Martin 2004:52). 
According to Gundlach (2001:14), the growth accounting literature uses Hicks neutrality as the 
standard concept. Also, the OECD Manual (2001:19, box 1) states that the index number 
approach implies Hicks neutrality.  
Gundlach (2001), analyses the differences between the Solow, Hicks and Harrod interpretations 
of economic growth. The difficult question is: How does a production function shift from one state 
to another? (Gundlach 2001:8.) Different types of shifts require different interpretations of factor 
accumulation and technological change (Gundlach 2001:9).   
 
2.21. Conclusion 
Norsworthy (1984:309) discusses the different approaches used by three prominent researchers 
who work within the growth accounting framework, namely Kendrick, Jorgenson and Denison. He 
points out that research has revealed various shortcomings in the growth accounting approach to 
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productivity analysis. However, despite these shortcomings, the neoclassical framework provides 
the only basis on which the factors of production can be aggregated to measure multifactor inputs 
(Norsworthy 1984:310).  
Also, Norsworthy (1984:327) notes that the growth accounting framework is a “filing system that 
is complete, in the sense that all phenomena that affect economic growth must do so through 
input factor quantities, relative factor intensities or total factor productivity growth, either simply or 
in combination”.   
In subsequent chapters, an interpretation of the productivity slowdown and the computer paradox 
is conducted within the growth accounting framework. However, the growth accounting 
framework uses the index number approach to provide the actual measurements of output, inputs 
and productivity. This approach is the topic of the next chapter.  
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3. CHAPTER 3: INDEX NUMBERS AND PRODUCTIVITY 
3.1. Overview 
This chapter deals with four interrelated issues: (1) the economic theory of index numbers; (2) a 
brief review of index numbers and the index number problem; (3) quality adjustments and the 
measurement of inflation and real output; and (4) the construction and use of index numbers for 
the calculation of hedonic price indexes for computers. The hedonic method is used estimate the 
effects of quality changes on prices (ILO 2004:446).  
These issues have direct implications for the measurement of productivity and the Solow 
paradox. Index numbers affect the measurement of computerisation in two important ways: 
computer prices tend to fall rapidly; and computer output is difficult to measure.  
This chapter is not intended as an introduction to index numbers or index number theory, and 
assumes that the reader is familiar with the construction and calculation of basic index numbers. 
Its aim is to discuss the problems encountered in the measurement of computerisation and the 
ICT sector.  
 
3.2. The economic theory of index numbers 
The use of variables based on index numbers is widespread and influences many economic and 
business investment decisions, as highlighted by Diewert (1987:767): “Index numbers are used to 
reduce and summarize … (the) overwhelming abundance of microeconomic information. Hence 
index numbers intrude themselves on virtually every empirical investigation in economics.”  
The theory, construction and application of index numbers is fundamental to the productivity 
paradox, as it is to many other fields of economic analysis. Index numbers are the main 
operational tool for productivity analysis, because they make possible the integration of economic 
theory and the national accounts (Schreyer & Pilat 2001:131). Economic variables such as inputs 
and outputs are measured by means of index numbers. The measurement of quality changes in 
particular plays a vital part in the accuracy of index numbers.  
Price indexes in particular, affect the accuracy of productivity measurement (Eldridge 1999:35). 
For example, the measurement of inflation, which is used to deflate nominal output to obtain real 
output, is also based on index numbers. If inflation is not correctly measured, real output and 
hence productivity will not be correctly measured, because real output is the numerator in the 
calculation of productivity. 
Marris (1958:186-187) argues that prices and money play a major part in economic analysis, but 
money, the measuring rod of value, itself changes in value (Marris 1958:188): “Index numbers, 
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then, are largely devices for mitigating deceptions caused by changes in the value of money”. 
The central theoretical problem of index numbers is “to pull down the veil of money.” 
According to Motley (1992a:7), the economic theory of index numbers “begins with the 
assumption that the quantities of individual goods and services that we observe consumers 
buying are those that maximize their satisfaction (or utility) given their incomes and prices they 
face.”  
Two issues feature prominently in the debate over index numbers, namely the principles of the 
construction of weighted aggregates, and the relevance of the particular weights applied in 
relation to a measure of public welfare (Marris 1958:188).  
The construction of index numbers is a problem of economic theory as well as of statistical 
technique. Frisch (1936:1) argues as follows: “Indeed, all discussions about the “best” index 
formula, the “most” correct weights, etc., must be vague and indeterminate so long as the 
meaning of the index is not exactly defined. Such a definition cannot be given on empirical 
grounds only but requires theoretical considerations.”  
According to Allen (1975: 37), their construction must be aligned with the goal they are expected 
to achieve; there “can be no ‘measurement without theory’ in economics and the social sciences 
as in the physical sciences.”  
 
3.3. Index numbers: a special kind of average 
Moroney (1956:48) states that index numbers are single numbers that summarise or aggregate a 
range of values over periods of time and “are really nothing more than a special kind of average.” 
The various types of indexes are reviewed briefly in order to understand their use in the system of 
national accounts and their relevance to the measurement of productivity and the Solow paradox. 
Several aspects of index numbers that are relevant to the subsequent discussion of the 
productivity paradox will be surveyed.  
Several issues are pertinent to productivity measurement in general and some relate more to the 
analysis of computerisation – however, the two issues are interrelated. The methodology of 
hedonic prices and their application to IT are reviewed.  
Although the index number approach is the standard approach used for productivity 
measurement, the econometric approach is also followed. This dissertation will focus exclusively 
on the index number approach, because it is closely associated with Solow’s work, even though 
there are synergies between the two approaches (Schreyer & Pilat 2001:131). The economic 
theory of index numbers, as developed by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982: 1393) also 
acknowledges Solow’s contribution.   
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There are two basic types of indexes: price indexes and quantity indexes. Output (GDP) is a 
quantity index, while inflation is a price index. The most familiar price index numbers are the 
consumer price index (CPI) and the producer price index (PPI).  
Although only two variables, prices and quantities, are used to construct index numbers, such as 
price indexes (e.g. consumer inflation) or quantity indexes (e.g. real GDP growth), they are 
interrelated. According to Allen (1975:1): “Index numbers come in pairs in economic theory, one 
of price and the other a matching one of quantity. In economic practice, they tend to be found 
paired off in this way. Sometimes one or the other is used alone; but there is almost always a 
mate to it in the background.” 
 
3.4. The index number problem 
An understanding of index numbers and the index number problem is essential for the analysis of 
the Solow paradox, since references to index numbers appear frequently in the productivity 
literature (Allen 1975). 
Index number problems play a critical role in the calculation of productivity (Diewert 1987). Such 
problems do not arise when dealing with nominal quantities (Prescott 1997:11). Real output is 
measured by price indexes which are based on a fixed base year. Thus if products (like 
computers) undergo large price changes, the index is biased (Oliner & Wascher 1995:19-20). It is 
the conversion of nominal values to real values that creates the index number problem. 
The index number problem relates to the problem of aggregation and arises “when an attempt is 
made to compare two sets of variables at two points in time using a single number since there are 
many different ways of aggregating variables into a single measure” (Pearce 1992:199).  
Put differently, the index number problem is: "How to construct an aggregate quantity (or price) 
measure of two or more components when their relative prices (or quantities) are changing" 
(Dean, Harper & Otto 1995:28-29). Therefore, depending on the methodology used (i.e. a base-
weighted index compared to a current-weighted index, or other indexes), different answers may 
be obtained using the same price and quantity values.  
The problem applies to computers (classified as manufacturing output in the US System of 
National Accounts) in particular, whose prices have been falling rapidly and continuously since 
the 1970s.  
 
3.5. Index number bias 
Although index numbers are intended to improve accuracy in economic calculations, they also 
introduce many types of bias. The International Labour Organisation (ILO 2004:443) defines the 
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CPI bias as a “systematic tendency for the calculated CPI to diverge from some ideal or preferred 
index, resulting from the method of data collection or processing, or the index formula used.”  
The calculation of real GDP when the base year shifts illustrates one type of index number bias. 
In the case of base weighted indexes, the further back the base year, the higher the GDP growth 
rate will be. Whelan (2000b:4-5) shows the calculation of the US real GDP growth rate for 1998 
using different base years: “The growth rate of fixed-weight real GDP in this year was 4.5% if we 
use 1995 as the base year; using 1990 prices it was 6.5%; using 1980 prices it was 18.8 percent; 
and using 1970 prices is was a stunning 37.4 percent! …[because] Categories with declining 
relative prices tend to have faster growth in quantities”. This is further discussed in section 5.13. 
Although there are several types of index number bias, the types of bias that distort productivity 
and computerisation measurement will be discussed here.  
There are several types of bias in the measurement of inflation, such as substitutions bias (or the 
cost of living bias [see ILO 2004:444]); representativity bias (see ILO 2004:448); outlet bias; and 
calculation bias. Inflation bias affects productivity and computers directly. The Boskin 
Commission (1996) published a comprehensive report on inflation bias in the US consumer price 
index. The National Research Council (2002) subsequently published a comprehensive report on 
conceptual and statistical issues in developing cost-of-living indexes (COLI).   
Index number bias, applied to computerisation and the ICT industry, is discussed more fully 
below. The index number problem and the productivity paradox will be evaluated in chapter 6. 
To illustrate how the use of different index formulas causes real output to diverge, Filardo 
(1995:57) constructed a fictitious two-sector economy, in which prices decline rapidly in the 
“computer” sector but are stable in the “other” sector. His calculations are given below.  
 
Table 3.1: A fictitious economy: the national accounts 
 Economic data 
 1987 1992 1993 1994 
Pcomputer 100 45 35 30 
Pother 100 100 100 100 
Qcomputer 1 1.7 2.8 3.8 
Qother 100 110 112 116 
Source: Filardo (1995:57) 
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On the basis of the data in table 3.1, the following real growth rates are obtained: 
 
Since the relative price of computers (Pcomputer) has fallen, the quantity of computers purchased 
(Qcomputer) has increased almost fourfold. However, since the price of “other” (Pother) has remained 
stable, the quantity of “other” (Qother) purchased has increased marginally, between 1987 and 
1994. Consumers generally purchase larger quantities of goods and services whose prices have 
fallen.  Real output growth in 1993 and 1994 is overstated by the fixed-weighted 1987 base index, 
because the computer industry is too heavily weighted (by price) in 1987. The chain-weighted 
index and the fixed-weighted 1992 index yield the same growth rates. This overstatement is 
referred to as the substitution bias (equal to the difference between the two fixed-weighted 
indexes) and amounted to a 0.6 percentage point in 1993 and a 0.5 percentage point in 1994 
(Filardo 1995:58-59). These problems and different types of indexes will be discussed in more 
detail below.  
3.6. Overview of index numbers 
Several types of index numbers are relevant to productivity measurement and technological 
change. The most widely used index numbers are the Laspeyres, Paasche, Fisher, Törnqvist and 
Divisia indexes. These, as well as other important forms, will be reviewed below. 
3.6.1. The Laspeyres index 
The Laspeyres index number, formulated in 1864 by Etienne Laspeyres, is a base-weighted 
index whose weights are derived from values obtained in the base year, which is typically a few 
years in the past (Bannock et al. 1989:239). The problem is that the base year weights, which 
remain constant, can quickly become outdated and the index can therefore be biased. The 
Laspeyres index suffers from substitution bias and has an upward bias, because of the effects of 
substitution (Motley 1992a:6).  
Table 3.2: A fictitious economy (contd.): real growth rates 
 1993 1994 
Fixed-weighted 1987 base 3.1 4.1 
Chain-weighted base 2.5 3.6 
Fixed-weighted 1992 base 2.5 3.6 
Substitution bias 0.6 0.5 
Source: Filardo (1995: 57) 
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3.6.2. The Paasche index 
The Paasche index is a current-weighted index, formulated by H. Paasche in 1874. Its weights 
are derived from values in the current period rather than the base period in the past (Bannock et 
al. 1989:307). The index also suffers from substitution bias, but has a downward bias, because of 
the effects of substitution (Motley 1992a:6). 
Neither the Laspeyres nor the Paasche index is adequate for economic analysis, mainly because 
of the basis on which the weights in the index are changed, which is not frequently enough. 
Government statistical agencies in the developed world tend to conduct household surveys only 
every five years or so to establish consumption patterns for the consumer price index. For 
example, in the measurement of consumer price index, consumption habits may change over a 
short period of time (as new products are introduced and products no longer desired disappear or 
see their consumption decline) and a base-weighted index will not capture current consumption 
patterns. A current-weighted index, however, will not sufficiently capture long-term changes 
(Numbers Guide 1991:24). 
3.6.3. The Fisher ideal index 
The Fisher ideal index is the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes (Motley 
1992a:7). Its value lies between the Laspeyres and Paasche indexes by construction (Motley 
1992a:8). The meaning of “ideal” will be discussed below. 
3.6.4. The Törnqvist index 
This widely-used index was developed by Törnqvist in 1936 to calculate the Bank of Finland’s 
consumption price index, with the intention of speeding up the calculation of the cost of living 
index. The weighting system indicated “the share of the respective class of goods in the total 
value of consumption” (Törnqvist 1936:27).  
Motley (1992a:7) defines the Törnqvist price index as “the weighted geometric average of the 
increase in individual commodity prices, with weights equal to the average expenditure shares in 
the base period t and the current period s”. Its value typically lies between the Laspeyres and 
Paasche indexes by construction (Motley 1992a:8). The ILO (2004:449) states that it is a 
symmetric as well as a superlative index (see below).  
The Fisher ideal index and the Törnqvist index give similar results in most cases and can be used 
interchangeably (Motley 1992a:8).  
The translog production function (discussed in chapter 2) is consistent with the Törnqvist index 
(BLS 1983:34). The translog function takes into account the fact that “input factor prices and 
quantities observed in a given year are most relevant for computing weights in that year.” (BLS 
1983:34). For example, if the price of capital increases relative to the cost of labour, firms will use 
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relatively less capital and more labour. Therefore, as the relative price of capital rises, the relative 
quantity used falls. When input indexes are calculated, the weights used are based on the factors’ 
average cost shares. These cost shares or weights may have changed as the price of capital has 
risen; but a base-year index captures only the quantity change, whereas the Törnqvist index 
captures both changes.  
3.6.5. Fixed-weight indexes 
A fixed-weight price index holds the quantities fixed which were obtained for some selected (base 
or current) year. According to this approach, the basket of goods used in the index is thus 
identical in all years. The Laspeyres and Paasche indexes are examples of fixed-weight indexes. 
Fixed-weighted indexes possess one important type of bias, the substitution bias, which makes 
them undesirable for economic, particularly CPI, analysis. According to Triplett (1975:22): “… 
when substitution occurs, the Laspeyres index (or any other fixed-weight formula) will, because it 
holds weights constant, overstate the change in the true cost of living …That is, the Laspeyres 
index overweighs commodities whose prices rise most rapidly because consumers will cut their 
consumption of those commodities (substituting other goods for them), even if real income 
remains unchanged” (Italics in the original).  
Since these indexes use a fixed set of quantities, the quantities in the base period (as in the 
Laspeyres index) become progressively outdated and thus of little relevance to the later periods 
to which prices are being compared. The base period weights have to be updated continuously to 
maintain relevance, thus creating a new CPI series (ILO 2004:11).  
The problems associated with fixed-weight indexes can be improved by the use of chain indexes. 
Chain indexes provide a rolling comparison between the base and current years by using all the 
data that have cumulated up to the current year (Allen 1975:177). The chain index in turn can be 
refined by the integral index varying continuously over time (Allen 1975:177). Chain and 
continuous (Divisia) indexes will be discussed further below. 
3.6.6. Ideal, exact and superlative indexes 
The term “superlative” index was defined by Fisher (1922), who devised several index number 
tests, based on whether or not an index possesses certain desirable statistical qualities. These 
quality tests are beyond the scope of this dissertation and are reviewed by the ILO (2004) and 
Ruist (1968:155-156). 
Fisher (1922) rated only four indexes as “superlative”. Superlative price indexes (1) used 
quantities in the base as well as the current year; and (2) used geometric averages, rather than 
arithmetic averages. Fisher’s ideal index (also a superlative index) is the geometric average of 
the Laspeyres and the Paasche indexes (Ruist 1968:156). 
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Exact and superlative index numbers were further defined by Diewert (1976). A small class of 
index numbers can be classified as superlative. Superlative index numbers are desirable in the 
calculation of the CPI, because they can be expected to approximate the cost of living index 
(COLI). The COLI is discussed below.  
According to Motley (1992a:7), exact indexes “measure changes in the true cost of living (that is, 
the cost of obtaining a certain level of satisfaction) in terms of the observable prices and 
quantities of individual goods and services”, so that “price and quantity observations provide 
information about utility levels”.  An index is an exact index if it is equal to the true cost of living 
index in relation to consumer preferences expressed in a particular functional form (ILO 
2004:449).  
Symmetric indexes attach equal importance to price and expenditure data in both of the periods 
being measured (ILO 2004:3 & 449). The Fisher and Törnqvist price indexes are examples of 
superlative indexes. The Fisher ideal index and the Törnqvist index are two vital and widely used 
exact indexes. 
3.6.7. Chain indexes 
The chain index is simply a frequently reweighted index (Hulten (2000:7). More comprehensively 
it is “an index number series for a long sequence of periods obtained by linking together index 
numbers spanning shorter sequences of periods” (ILO 2004:444). Generally, indexes are 
calculated at regular intervals, and chain indexes link these together in a series of index numbers. 
The use of chain indexes was suggested by Marshall in 1887 (Ruist 1968:156). 
When several Laspeyres indexes are linked in a series, a measurement problem arises. For 
example, if annual CPI indexes between 1990 and 2000, with 1990 as the base year, are 
constructed, a comparison between inflation in 1998 and 1999 is flawed, because the quantities 
consumed in 1990, which are outdated, are used as the basis of comparison. Chain indexes seek 
to overcome this problem.  
The chain-weighted indexes are Fisher ideal indexes (where the base years change annually) 
with adjacent years as bases (Filardo 1995:57; Landefeld & Grimm 2000:19).  Chain-weighted or 
chain-type indexes minimise the substitution bias.  
Chain-type indexes were introduced into the US NIPA to calculate changes in real output and 
prices in 1996 (Parker & Triplett 1996:37). This  resolved the substitution bias as well as the bias 
that resulted from updating the base period. The introduction of chain indexes resulted in a 
reduction of real GDP growth in all periods (Parker & Triplett 1996:38).  
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3.6.8. The Divisia index 
The Divisia integral index, or Divisia index for short, is used to define an index that varies 
continuously over time (Allen 1975:178-80). This index was devised the French economist F. 
Divisia in 1925, who (Balk 2000:2) 
presented a novel solution to the problem of splitting a value change into two parts, a part 
due to prices and a part due to quantities. …The novelty of Divisia's indices was that, as 
functions of continuous time, they take into account the prices and quantities of all, 
infinitely many, intermediate periods. Thus a Divisia index number is not only dependent 
on the initial and terminal points of the time interval considered, but will as a rule depend 
on the entire path that the prices and quantities belonging to an economic aggregate 
under consideration have taken. 
The index can be calculated directly from input quantities and prices and output quantities and 
prices (Baumol et al. 1989:234). However, in practice, chain indexes are regarded as sound 
approximations for Divisia indexes (ILO 2004:445). 
The Divisia index is considered appropriate for the measurement of technological change. Solow 
introduced the Divisia quantity index in his seminal 1957 paper for the measurement of 
productivity growth (Balk 2000:4). Hulten (1973:1017) affirms that “In his 1957 article, Solow … 
showed that, under certain circumstances, it is the natural way of indexing technical change.” 
Hulten (1973:1017) points out that many other researchers have made use of this index to 
measure productivity change, such as Denison (1962 & 1967) and Kendrick (1961).  
Despite its advantages, the Divisia index suffers from a number of restrictive assumptions, such 
as constant returns to scale (Baumol et al. 1989:233-234), which will be discussed in chapter 6, in 
which the major explanations of the productivity paradox will be analysed.  
3.6.9. Malmquist index 
Caves et al. (1982) use the Malmquist index for input, output and productivity measurement. The 
index is based on discrete data points over time, instead of on a continuous function of time. 
Under constant returns to scale, the Malmquist index reduces to the Törnqvist index (Caves et al. 
1982:1394). 
3.7. Hedonic indexes 
Hedonic methods are applied extensively to computer and peripheral equipment in the NIPAs of 
the USA and other OECD countries. This aspect of index number theory is therefore of the 
utmost importance to the measurement of productivity and the role of computers in the 
productivity slowdown.  
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Hedonic techniques are econometric analyses which seek to separate quality changes from price 
changes in a price index. Unless quality changes can be quantified, they cannot be distinguished 
from price changes. This problem has been regarded as one of the most serious defects in price 
indexes (Griliches 1961:55).  
Hedonic techniques have their origin and theoretical basis in consumer theory, which was 
pioneered by Lancaster (1966), and subsequently refined by Rosen (1974). However, the use of 
hedonic methods dates back to 1928, when Waugh examined quality factors influencing 
vegetable prices, and to 1939, when Court published a paper on hedonic techniques applied to 
the US automobile industry (see Moulton 2001:2). The econometrician Griliches (1961) was one 
of the pioneers of hedonic techniques, which he used to adjust price indexes for quality changes 
to the price of automobiles. Also, in the 1960s, the US government instigated the Stigler 
Commission to investigate inflation and the quality change bias in the US national accounts.  
These techniques have gradually been adopted by the US statistical agencies. The first US 
agency to use hedonic methods was the Bureau of the Census, which deflated single-family 
houses under construction using a sales price index, starting in 1968 (Moulton 2001:3).  
More recently, the accuracy of price indexes, particularly the CPI, was re-examined, following the 
remarks by the Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan, in 1995 that the CPI is overstated 
and the subsequent instigation of the Boskin Commission (1996) in 1996 to examine possible CPI 
bias (Hulten 2003:5). Following these developments, the National Research Council Committee 
on National Statistics published a comprehensive review of cost-of-living and price indexes in 
2002 (NRC 2002). Quality change and hedonic methods are examined in detail in the NRC report 
(NRC 2002:106-154). All these events are closely related to the use of price hedonics in the 
calculation of the CPI.  
Since consumers perceive goods and services as a bundle of characteristics, the hedonic 
approach is also called the characteristics approach, and (Griliches 1971:4) 
is based on the empirical hypothesis … which asserts that the multitude of models and 
varieties of a particular commodity can be comprehended in terms of a much smaller 
number of characteristics of basic attributes of a commodity … and that viewing the 
problem in this way will reduce greatly the magnitude of the pure new commodity or 
“technical change” problem, since most (though not all) new “models” of commodities 
may be viewed as a new combination of “old” characteristics.  
Hedonic functions and indexes are interrelated: hedonic functions define the relations between 
prices of goods and services and the quantities of characteristics embodied in them; whereas 
hedonic indexes are built on the information from hedonic functions (Triplett 1987:630-633). 
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It should be noted that hedonic techniques are open to criticism: although the automobile can be 
measured in terms of measurable characteristics such as horsepower and weight, the consumer 
may not care about these characteristics, but value the car in terms of the “ride” and “handling” 
characteristics, which are difficult or impossible to measure (Bresnahan & Gordon 1997:20). 
Hulten (2003:9) reviews price hedonics critically and finds many problems are associated with the 
hedonic method; although some of the problems are the usual ones associated with statistical 
techniques. As in the NRC report (2002:141, recommendation 4-3), which advocates “a more 
cautious integration of hedonically adjusted price change estimates into the CPI”, Hulten 
(2002:12) favours a conservative approach, despite hedonics being the most promising method 
to account for quality changes. Ortiz (1999:12-3) also sounds several warnings. 
Despite these reservations, the use of hedonic methods is expanding in the official statistics of 
the USA and has indeed accelerated over the last 10 years (see Moulton 2001).  In the USA 
hedonic techniques were used in 10 NIPA components in 2001 (table 3.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3.3: Hedonic inventory: NIPA prices that reflect hedonic techniques   
(2001) USD billion % of GDP 
 Gross Domestic Product                               10 128.0  
 Total hedonic components                      2 257.5 22.29% 
  - Computers and peripheral equipment*       246.8 2.44% 
  - Software*                               90.4 0.89% 
  - Structures                                  552.7 5.46% 
  - Telecommunications*                       32.1 0.32% 
  - Photocopiers 2.8 0.03% 
  - Audio & Video 50.2 0.50% 
  - Apparel                                     239.3 2.36% 
  - Household appliances 30.8 0.30% 
  - Rent 1 009.4 9.97% 
  - Education writing equipment  3.0 0.03% 
Source: BEA (2004); Note: * ICT industries. 
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As indicated in the above table 3.3, in 2001 hedonic techniques were applied to NIPA 
components which amounted to 22.3% of GDP, and to ICT industries (computers and peripheral 
equipment, software and telecommunications) which amounted to 3.65% of GDP.  
3.8. Indexes and quality change 
As stated above, the main reason why index numbers are reviewed here is that they are 
potentially biased and this could help explain the Solow paradox. It is often claimed that the 
measurement of inflation is inaccurate because quality changes of goods and services (which is 
usually understood to be quality improvements) are not measured accurately. This has been 
referred to as the “quality change bias”.  
There are two types of quality errors: the failure to identify a quality change in a good or service 
and the failure to make the correct quality adjustment to the identified change. In principle, quality 
bias can be in either direction: upwards or downwards (Moulton & Moses 1997:306).  
Inflation is therefore overstated to the extent that quality improvements are understated. In turn, 
the overstatement of inflation results in the understatement of productivity, because real output is 
also understated. The claim makes economic sense because if the price of a good or service 
increases by 10%, but if this price increase is accompanied by a quality increase of the same 
magnitude, there has been no real price increase. Similarly, if the price of a good or service 
increases by 10% and quality improves by 7%, there is a 3% actual price increase. Thus all or 
part of the price changes can be explained by quality changes. The trick is to distinguish between 
technological change or progress and pure price increases or inflationary pressures. Hedonic 
models are used to overcome the problem of quality change bias.  
This concern is not new. Zvi Griliches, one of the pioneers of hedonic price indexes, stated the 
following, which appeared in Price Statistics of the Federal Government, published in 1961 
(Griliches 1961:55): “If a poll were taken of professional economists and statisticians, in all 
probability they would designate (and by a wide majority) the failure of the price indexes to take 
full account of quality changes as the most important defect in these indexes.”  
Much of the disagreement focuses on the measurement of real GDP (the output quantity index) 
because it is an inflation-adjusted or deflated variable. The measurement of inflation has been 
under scrutiny and its accuracy examined by the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer 
Price Index (also known as the Boskin Commission) which published its findings in 1996. The 
commission came to the conclusion that, on average, inflation had been overstated by about 
1.1% over an extended period. Of this total, 0.4% was attributed to substitution bias; 0.1% to 
outlet bias; and 0.6% to quality and new goods bias. Quality changes and the introduction of new 
goods thus accounted for 55% of the overall bias, whereas substitution and outlet biases 
accounted for 36% and 9% respectively.  
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The measurement of inflation is relevant to the Solow paradox, because nominal output (the 
productivity numerator) is deflated by some measurement of price increases (inflation) to arrive at 
real output. Clearly this can have a major influence on the outcome. If inflation is overstated (as 
has been claimed), real GDP will be underestimated and hence productivity too. Much of the 
productivity debate has been around the measurement of output, as opposed to input. 
Gordon and Griliches (1997) provide a concise overview of quality change and new products in 
relation to the concept of a cost-of-living index (COLI). The COLI refers to “a comparison in two 
time periods of the minimum expenditure required to achieve the same level of well-being” 
(Gordon & Griliches 1997:84). In a collection of essays on the economics of new goods by 
Bresnahan and Gordon (1997:2), the authors note in their Introduction that there is a close link 
between the COLI and contribution of new goods to consumer welfare.  
 
3.9. Indexes and the introduction of new products 
Although the economics of new goods is discussed more in the context of the consumer surplus, 
new goods also affect productivity and computerisation, because “a computer capable of 
completing a previously infeasible task is a new good” (Bresnahan & Gordon 1997:23).  
The index number problem also appears with the introduction of new goods in a price index. 
There are two types of new products bias: the failure to include  new products without a long 
delay, and the failure to account for the consumer’s surplus (i.e. the net welfare benefit to the 
consumer) emanating from the new product (Moulton & Moses 1997:306). 
Generally, a new good is introduced into a price index by estimating a “virtual price” or the 
reservation price, a price which sets consumer’s demand for the product just equal to zero prior to 
the introduction of the good (Bresnahan & Gordon 1997:21; Moulton & Moses 1997:306).  
The quality bias and the new product bias are not separate biases, because the consumer 
surplus resulting from the introduction of the new good should capture the price decline early in 
the product’s life cycle. The new product bias is usually upward (Moulton & Moses 1997:306).  
 
3.10. Hedonic indexes and ICT 
Several studies have applied hedonic techniques to the problem of price measurements in 
computerisation and have examined the quality adjustments that are made in the national 
accounts for computers. The main tool for making quality adjustments for computers is the 
application of hedonic methods. For example, Berndt et al. (1995:266) found that, taking quality 
changes into account (using hedonic methods) for personal computers, prices fell by about 30% 
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per year between 1989 and 1992. They found different rates of annual price declines for mobile 
computers (24%) and desktop computers (32%).  
One of the earliest studies of the economics of computers is by Chow (1967:1130), who found 
that the stock of computers grew by about 78%, whereas computer prices fell by about 20% per 
year between 1954 and 1965. Chow (1967:1120) does not use hedonic techniques, although he 
employs three basic characteristics in his calculations: “multiplication time, memory size, and 
access time”. Chow (1967:1121) considers only computer hardware in his study, but argues that 
software characteristics are also important for analysis.  
Gordon (1987) examined the post-war evolution of computer prices and finds that hedonic 
techniques calculated that the prices of personal computers declined by 19.8% between 1951 
and 1984. In a study of semiconductor prices, Grimm (1998:8) found that the price index of 
memory chips declined by an average of 37% per annum from 1975 to 1985 and by 20% from 
1985 to 1996; and the price index for microprocessors by 35% from 1985 to 1996. Landefeld and 
Grimm (2000:19, table 2) provide a summary of various studies that have made quality 
adjustments to computer and equipment prices. The quality-adjusted estimations vary from a 
decline in prices of between 14 and 40% per year. However, since 1995, up to about 1998, the 
rate increased to between 30 and 40% per year. Moulton (2001:5) states that computer price 
indexes calculated by the BEA fell by 17.5% per year between 1959 and 2000. Chwelos 
(2003:199) found that between 1990 and 1998 the quality-adjusted price of laptops declined  by 
an average of 40% per year. Other studies have found similar rates of decline (Berndt & 
Rappaport 2001). 
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) introduced hedonic methods in the NIPAs for computer 
and peripheral equipment in December 1985 covering the  period 1972 to 1984 (Moulton 2001: 
4). Subsequently, the BEA introduced hedonic indexes for memory chips and semiconductors in 
January 1996 (Moulton 2001:5). Hedonic methods for computers were introduced later by the 
Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) to calculate consumer price inflation (CPI) in 1998 (Moulton 
2001:7). Significantly, the BEA expanded its definition of capital, so that software expenditure was 
classified as fixed investment in 1999 (Moulton 2001:5).  
Cole et al. (1986) summarised IBM’s research into the application of hedonic methods to 
computer processors and peripheral equipment. They point out that the market for computers is 
characterised by disequilibrium, because of rapid technological change and the introduction of 
new products. This characteristic is evident from the observation that “two sets of prices coexist 
for products possessing the same characteristics – one price for the products based on the old 
technology and one for the products based on the new” (Cole et al. 1986:43). 
The study concludes that the so-called “matched model” approach, which is the standard 
approach used in the NIPAs, understates price movements for computers. A further problem 
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arises in the construction of a price index for computers because products that exist in the current 
period may not have existed in the base period. In the matched-model approach only products 
that existed in both periods are used in the index and those that exist currently are ignored. 
Because product turnover is rapid, price index numbers using this method are biased (Cole et al. 
1986:48-50.) 
However, these methods have been criticised, particularly when applied to computers. McCarthy 
(1997) argues that a distinction should be drawn between the potential output and actual input of 
computers, particularly personal computers. McCarthy (1997:3) captures the essence of the 
matter when he argues that computers are different from other types of capital insofar as 
computers have many built-in redundant features that most users will never use.  
McCarthy (1997:6-7) raises two additional significant concerns – increasing complexity and 
quality improvement in software. The increasing size and complexity of operating systems and 
software results in growing inefficiencies between the hardware and the software. The growing 
complexity of and addition of largely unused features to desktop software packages (software 
which is also referred to as “bloatware”) is captured by the quip: “What Intel giveth, Microsoft 
taketh away.” Improvements in software programming have not kept pace with the rapid 
improvements in hardware quality, as measured by hedonic methods. The effect is that the joint 
improvement of software and hardware is lower than that of hardware alone as software 
developments continue to lag.  
Hedonic methods are used in only a few European countries. Ahnert and Kenny (2004) provide 
an overview of European price statistics and the role of hedonics. Significantly, only Germany and 
the UK make hedonic quality adjustments for personal computers in their consumer price inflation 
calculations (Ahnert & Kenny 2004:27-28). The use of hedonic methods is therefore largely 
confined to the USA.  
 
3.11. Software, quality changes and measurement 
Generally, computer hedonic techniques focus on computer hardware and omit the analysis of 
computer software characteristics and quality change. Anselmo and Ledgard (2003) discuss 
productivity measurement in the software industry and contend that there are no acceptable 
productivity benchmarks for software. They propose that three yardsticks, functionality, 
complexity and quality, should form the basis of software productivity measurement (Anselmo & 
Ledgard 2003:125). 
The authors maintain that there is a perception that programming standards are low and that the 
software is bug-ridden. Significantly, Anselmo and Ledgard (2003:121) find that software 
productivity is declining faster compared to other industries: “The semiconductor industry had the 
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most productivity growth (86%) from 1990 to 1995. In that same period, productivity for the 
software industry decreased by 10%, indeed, the worst decline of all industries surveyed.” 
The overall functionality of the ICT industry cannot be divorced from the software component 
because hardware and software are complements. A productivity decline in the one industry 
cannot be fully compensated by productivity improvements in the other and will thus lower the 
overall productivity in the ICT industry. Chapter 6 will discuss the interaction of hardware and 
software and its effect on the combined productivity of the ICT industry.  
 
3.12. Conclusion 
This chapter showed that index numbers problems are a major challenge for the measurement of 
economic variables, but particularly for computerisation and the ICT industry. Krugman (1999:25) 
remarked that “anyone who has seen how economic statistics are constructed knows that they 
are really a subgenre of science fiction … actual estimates of economic growth are based on a 
good deal of fudging: on ‘imputations’ and ‘approximations’”.  
Index numbers are widely used to measure economic variables in the USA and other countries’ 
national accounts. Many index numbers are biased and therefore unsuitable for accurate price 
and quality measurements. Because computer hardware undergoes rapid quality improvements, 
it is essential that computer prices be adjusted to capture these improvements more accurately. 
Indeed, quality change poses the most challenging problem for the construction of price indexes.  
Hedonic methods are the best methods available to estimate quality adjustments. However, they 
are not without problems, as explained above. These issues will be analysed more fully in chapter 
6.  
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4. CHAPTER 4: PRODUCTIVITY AND COMPUTERISATION IN THE NATIONAL INCOME 
AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS 
4.1. Overview 
The previous chapters provided the theoretical and methodological background to productivity 
measurement. This chapter examines the national accounting side of productivity, that is, how 
productivity and computerisation are actually incorporated into the USA national income and 
product accounts (NIPAs). The manner in which computerisation is actually accounted for in the 
NIPAs and the productivity performance of the USA are then discussed. The most recent 
multifactor productivity data (and the dissertation’s cut-off point) from 1948 to 2002 are dealt with.  
According to the OECD manual (2001:18), “the production theoretical approach to productivity 
measurement offers a consistent and well-founded approach that integrates the theory of the firm, 
index number theory and national accounts”. The emphasis in this chapter is on productivity and 
related statistics in the US national accounts.  
 
4.2. Revisions of the NIPAs and productivity measures 
The productivity measures are subject to frequent revisions, which introduces an element of 
uncertainty, because productivity analyses can be based on outdated data. According to the BLS 
(2007c), quarterly labour productivity and costs are revised two to three times after the initial 
release. In addition there are three-year, five-year and variable time period revisions to the source 
data.  
One recent important methodological change (as distinct from data recalculations as new 
information becomes available) was the switch from the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) measure to the 1997 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). (The codes 
are numerical classifications of industries used by many government statistical agencies.) The 
two systems are incompatible for the purposes of MFP measurement. This implies that MFP 
measures up to 2002 cannot be compared to the latest MFP data, which are based on the NAICS 
system starting in 2003, but revised back to 1987. MFP measures based on the SIC system will 
not be updated (BLS News 2005:1). MFP measures based on the old SIC system run from 1948 
to 2002, whereas MFP based on the newer NAICS system runs from 1987 (to 2005 at the time of 
writing) (BLS News 2006a:1). This study will therefore deal with the period from 1946 to 2002, 
because this period is adequate to discuss the productivity paradox and captures a sufficient time 
span of the productivity revival (since 1995).  
The BEA has made two significant recent revisions to the NIPAs, namely the “Comprehensive 
revision of the national income and product accounts” in 1999 and 2003. In 1999 three papers (1) 
“Measuring the New Economy”, by Landefeld and Fraumeni; (2) “Recognition of business and 
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government expenditures for software as investment: methodology and quantitative impacts, 
1959-98” by Parker and Grimm; and (3) “Measurement of banking services in the U.S. national 
income and product accounts: recent changes and outstanding issues” by Moulton, played a 
critical role in the revisions. All these papers refer to the productivity issues already discussed. 
The 2003 revisions did not have a productivity focus.  
 
4.3. Productivity definitions in the US and other OECD national accounts 
Generally, productivity is the ratio between real output and real inputs used to produce that 
output. According to the OECD manual (2001:11) it is “commonly defined as a ratio of a volume 
measure of output to a volume measure of input use.” Hence, productivity is the ratio of some 
measure of output per unit of input which relates the outputs of production to the inputs used to 
create them (Dean et al. 1995:30).  
It measures the economic efficiency of production, revealing how effectively inputs are converted 
into output, thus enabling more goods and services to be produced without requiring an increase 
in labour time (BLS 2004). In terms of the actual measurement of output and inputs, Schreyer and 
Pilat (2001:146) define productivity as “the ratio of a quantity index of output to a quantity index of 
inputs”. Suffice it to say that the actual measurement of output and inputs depend on the index 
numbers actually capturing what the theory requires. 
Output and input are expressed as real variables, that is, at constant prices based on a particular 
year. Output can be expressed as either gross output or value-added output (Schreyer and Pilat 
2001:128-136). Output is measured by the total goods and services produced; and the inputs by 
the physical and human resources used in the production process. Various inputs can be used: 
labour, capital, or labour and capital combined, or intermediate inputs such as energy, materials 
and services. There are several advantages and disadvantages to the different approaches. 
Value added is generally preferred because it avoids double counting.  
Productivity measurement relates to a specific level of “an establishment, a firm, an industry, a 
sector or an entire economy” (Schreyer & Pilat 2001:129). 
 
4.4. The Cobb-Douglas function and the NIPAs 
The equation  
**)*)(1(*** ALKLQLP +−−=−= β  
(equation (4) in chapter 2) is the core equation used in the NIPAs. It can be refined by further 
disaggregating the variables, as discussed in chapter 5. 
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Productivity is not a single concept, but a family of concepts (Fabricant 1969:116). However, 
there are two main productivity measures: single factor productivity measures and total factor 
productivity (TFP), or multifactor productivity (MFP). Single factor productivity measures are 
labour productivity (LP) and capital productivity. Multifactor productivity measures are in the form 
of capital-labour MFP; or of capital-labour-energy-materials MFP, or KLEMS MFP. In the KLEMS 
MFP measure, capital (K) and labour (L) are the main inputs, and energy (E), materials (M) and 
purchased business services (S) the intermediate inputs (OECD 2001:12-13). The KLEMS 
method is appropriate for industry level analysis. 
The terms “TFP” and “MFP” are often used interchangeably. Since the USA statistical agencies 
use the term “multifactor productivity”, it will be adopted here as well. 
Although this study focuses mainly on labour productivity and multifactor productivity at aggregate 
level, industry and firm level productivity are also discussed (chapter 5). KLEMS MFP is therefore 
included, because it includes intermediate inputs. The various methods can be interpreted in a 
different way with diverse purposes, advantages and limitations. The OECD Manual (2001:14-18) 
discusses these fully.  
Timmer (2001) explores the KLEMS approach and provides an overview of sources and 
methods. We give a brief overview here.  
Table 4.1 the principal productivity measures. 
Following on table 4.1, labour productivity (based on gross output or value added) is defined as 
LP = 
inputlabourofindexQuantity
addedvalueoroutputgrossofindexQuantity
 (5.1) 
Similarly, capital-labour MFP based on value added is defined as: 
MFP = 
inputcapitalandlabourcombinedofindexQuantity
addedvalueofindexQuantity
 (5.2) 
The denominator, the quantity index of combined labour and capital input, is equal to a quantity 
index of labour and capital, where each factor is weighted with its current-price share in total 
value added.  
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The KLEMS multifactor productivity is defined as 
KLEMS MFP = 
inputscombinedofindexQuantity
outputgrossofindexQuantity
 (5.3) 
The denominator, the quantity index of combined input, is equal to a quantity index of labour, 
capital, energy, materials and services, where each factor is weighted with its current-price share 
in total value added.  
 
4.5. Labour productivity 
Labour productivity (LP) is the ratio of the output of goods and services to the single input, labour, 
measured in labour hours, devoted to the production of that output (BLS 2004). In short, labour 
productivity, or output per hour of all persons, is the standard commonly-used measure and is 
generally the appropriate measure to assess the economy's ability to increase potential national 
income (BLS 2004). In the US business sector, labour costs comprise about 60% of the value of 
all output produced (BLS 2004). 
Table 4.1. Main productivity measures 
 Single factor productivity 
measures 
Multifactor productivity measures 
 Labour input Capital input Capital and 
labour inputs 
Capital, labour, 
energy, materials 
and services 
inputs 
Gross output 
Labour 
productivity 
based on gross 
output 
Capital 
productivity 
based on gross 
output 
Capital-labour 
MFP based on 
gross output 
KLEMS 
multifactor 
productivity 
Value added 
Labour 
productivity 
based on value 
added 
Capital 
productivity 
based on value 
added 
Capital-labour 
MFP based on 
value added 
_ 
Source: OECD Manual (2001:13, table 1) 
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Labour output can be expressed as output per worker or output per hour. Importantly, however, 
"labour productivity reflects the influence of all factors that affect productivity, including capital 
accumulation, technical change, and the organisation of production. While the intensity of labour 
effort is obviously a factor that does affect labour productivity, it is generally significantly less 
important than the amount of capital a worker has to work with or the level of production 
technology" (CSLS 1998:7). 
 
4.6. Multifactor productivity 
Multifactor productivity (MFP) is the ratio between real output of goods and services and the 
combined contribution of all inputs, but mainly of labour and capital. In essence, MFP measures a 
combination of changes in efficiency in the use of factor inputs and changes in technology 
(Collins & Bosworth 2003:114).  It is also a useful tool to gauge the economy’s productivity 
capacity of potential output which, in turn, has a direct bearing on growth and inflation (OECD 
Manual 2001:12).  
MFP is appropriate for the assessment of the economy's efficiency in its use of capital and labour 
combined in the production process (CSLS 1998:8). 
 
4.7. Unit labour costs 
Unit labour cost (ULC) also features in productivity analysis and is an indicator of inflationary 
pressures on producers (BLS News 2006b:10). The BLS defines unit labour cost as the ratio of 
total labour compensation to real output, or equivalently, as the ratio of hourly compensation to 
productivity. Therefore 
hours
output
hours
oncompensatilabourtotal
ULC =  (5.4) 
From the above equation we see that generally when hourly compensation rises, ULC rises as 
well; but when productivity rises, ULC falls. If both numerator and denominator change by the 
same percentage, ULC will be unchanged.  
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4.8. LP and MFP: general issues 
The term “productivity” used in the popular media usually refers to LP (output per hour), not MFP 
or TFP. According to the BLS “Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector is the productivity 
statistic most often cited by the press.” (BLS 2004).  
In practice, measurement of the numerator and the denominator is subject to error. Errors in the 
indexes could produce large errors in the productivity ratio but could also cancel out (Fabricant 
1969:16). An understanding of index numbers is therefore essential for the analysis of the 
productivity paradox. The use of index numbers was covered in chapter 3 (see Allen 1975; 
Diewert 1987; Oliner & Wascher 1995). 
Labour and multifactor productivity are two different measures of “overall” productivity. The best 
or most appropriate measure depends on the circumstances as well as the intended use of the 
results. As argued in the Introduction, labour productivity is closely associated with a country’s 
standard of living. Labour productivity also depends on capital deepening and is therefore subject 
to additional measurement error.  
TFP clarifies technical change, but TFP can be criticised on theoretical grounds. Sargent and 
Rodriquez (2000:11-13) argue that the choice depends on the following: 
(1) the time period of interest – TFP is a better long-run guide, whereas labour productivity is 
more appropriate for periods of less than a decade;  
(2) the integrity of the capital stock data –  there are biases in capital stock estimations for 
TFP and cross-country comparisons are subject to differing methods between statistical 
agencies; and  
(3) the underlying economic growth model - whether neoclassical or new growth theory.  
MFP growth is usually lower than LP growth. This is so because the capital stock grows at a 
faster rate than employment (labour), resulting in a rising capital-labour ratio. The growth rate of 
capital and labour combined (MFP) is thus higher than the growth rate for labour alone (LP); and 
the larger denominator of labour and capital combined compared to labour alone (holding the 
numerator constant), results in lower MFP growth compared to LP growth (see equations (5.1) & 
(5.2) above). 
 
4.9. Factor income shares in the NIPAs 
Factor inputs are usually weighted according to their income shares. Factor income share are 
discussed in chapter 2. This chapter shows how the shares of capital and labour in income are 
actually calculated from the NIPAs.  
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The share of income is derived as follows (table 4.2): 
 
 
The actual weights change from year to year. For example, in Hall and Taylor (1997:38), the 
weights for 1996 are 73% for labour and 27% for capital, a marginal difference.  
 
4.10. Sectors and subsectors in productivity measurement 
Productivity measures are available for major sectors as well as subsectors of the US economy. 
Table 4.3 is useful to determine the differences between the different sectors for which LP and 
MFP data are available. 
The two sectors for which MFP is calculated are the “Private business sector” and the “Private 
nonfarm business sector” (BLS 2007b).  
The three main sectors for which LP is calculated are the “Private business sector”, the “Private 
nonfarm business sector” and the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector in turn is 
subdivided in the “Durable goods manufacturing” sector and the “Nondurable goods 
manufacturing” sector. 
Table 4.2: National income by type of income: labour and profit shares in 2001 (US$ 
billions) 
    % share in 
total income 
Labour 
 
Compensation of 
employees 5 874.9 72% 
Profits Proprietors’ income 727.9  
Rental income of 
persons 137.9  
Corporate profits 731.6  
Net interest 649.8  
Total profits 2 247.2 28% 
National income  8 122.1 100% 
Source: BEA (2002:D-6, table 1.14); based on Hall & Taylor (1997:38, table 2.5) 
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Multifactor productivity measures exclude government enterprises as shown in table 4.3. In 
particular, the private business sector “excludes the output of general government, government 
enterprises, non-profit institutions, the rental value of owner-occupied real estate, and the output 
of paid employees of private households”. The private nonfarm business subsector “excludes 
farms, but includes agricultural services” in addition to the above exclusions of the private 
business sector. According to the BLS (2003), the private business sector accounts for 76% of 
GDP in the USA. This sector essentially measures the for-profit sector and is the broadest sector 
for which MFP is measured (BLS 2007b). 
As mentioned above, according to the BLS: “Output per hour in the nonfarm business sector is 
the productivity statistic most often cited by the press” (BLS 2004). 
 
Table 4.3: Derivation of the private business sector 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
          Less: General government 
Equals: Total private economy 
          Less: Output of household workers, nonprofit institutions, gross 
housing product of owner-occupied dwellings and the rental value of 
nonprofit institutional real estate 
Equals: Business sector 
          Less: Government enterprises 
Equals: Private business sector 
          Less: The farm sector 
Equals: Private nonfarm business sector 
Source: Notes to BLS (1997) 
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4.11. Data sources and procedures used in the US productivity measurements 
4.11.1. The statistical agencies: BLS and the BEA 
The productivity calculations are based on indexes provided by two US government agencies: the 
US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) of the US Department of Labour and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis (BEA) of the US Department of Commerce. The BLS regularly publishes 
productivity statistics: labour productivity is published every quarter; but MFP less regularly, since 
it is based on data not available on a quarterly basis. The BEA publishes the monthly Survey of 
Current Business, an important source of US productivity and other data and general economic 
analysis. All of the data discussed in this chapter are available online on the two agencies’ 
respective websites.  
The BLS and BEA publications can be confusing because the bureaus’ nomenclature does not 
always tally with the theoretical or academic expositions. An overview is therefore included here 
with comments on conventions and methods, data sources and procedures. 
Productivity calculations are based on indexes provided mainly by the US BLS and the BEA as 
mentioned. Output data are provided by the BEA and adjusted by the BLS to remove the output 
of government enterprises. Capital measures are provided by the BEA and the US Department of 
Agriculture.  
Industry productivity measures published by the BLS are only available at the aggregate national 
level: industry productivity statistics are not broken down for separate regions, states and cities 
because data sources do not provide the required information. 
The BLS publishes productivity statistics at different time intervals. The series on labour 
productivity measures are published quarterly under the general heading “Productivity and 
Costs”. These data series are published promptly: for example, the data release for the 2006 
fourth quarter and annual averages (revised) was available on 6 March 2007. Multifactor 
productivity series are published annually under the general heading “Multifactor Productivity 
Trends”. These series are published after some delay, for example, the annual release for 2005 
was only published on 23 March 2007.  
It is useful to know that LP and MFP measures are available as follows (table 4.4): 
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4.11.2. The BLS and labour productivity 
Labour productivity, which the BLS refers to as “output of all persons”, is published quarterly. 
Labour productivity is published for the following categories on a quarterly basis: “business”; 
“nonfarm business” – a subsector of the business category; “nonfinancial corporations” – a 
subsector of the nonfarm business category; “manufacturing, total” – a subsector of the 
nonfinancial corporations category; and lastly the “durable manufacturing” and “nondurable 
manufacturing” subsectors – subsectors of the total manufacturing category. Labour productivity 
measures include government enterprises (BLS 2003).  
Table 4.4: Availability of productivity measures of major sectors and subsectors 
Productivity measure Input(s) Index available 
Labour productivity 
Business Labour Quarterly 
   Nonfarm business Labour Quarterly 
      Nonfinancial corporations Labour Quarterly 
         Manufacturing, total Labour Quarterly 
            Durable manufacturing Labour Quarterly 
            Nondurable manufacturing Labour Quarterly 
Multifactor productivity 
Private business Labour, capital Annually 
    Private nonfarm business Labour, capital Annually 
KLEMS multifactor productivity 
Manufacturing and 20 2-digit SIC 
manufacturing industries services 
Labour, capital, energy, 
materials, services 
Annually 
Source: BLS (1997:89, table 1) 
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Labour, which is the only input, is an “index of the hours at work of all persons including 
employees, proprietors, and unpaid family workers classified by education, work experience, and 
gender.” (BLS 2005: 15, footnote 4). 
4.11.3. The BLS and multifactor productivity 
Multifactor productivity is published annually, because it is based on data not available on a 
quarterly basis.  Multifactor productivity measurements are published as indexes that measure 
the value-added output per combined unit of labour and capital inputs. Two sectors are covered, 
namely the “private business” sector and the “private nonfarm business” subsector. The latter is 
often referred to in the literature as well as in this dissertation.  
According to the BLS (BLS 2003), multifactor productivity relates real output to combined inputs, 
which are essential factors in the production of output. The contributions made by the specific 
factors of production are not measured. The joint influences of these essential factors are 
measured, thus capturing the effects of technological change, efficiency enhancements, 
economies of scale, resource reallocation between industrial sectors and other factors impacting 
on economic growth.  
4.11.4. The BLS and KLEMS  
A second measure of multifactor productivity is also available, the so-called “KLEMS multifactor 
productivity” measure. KLEMS multifactor productivity indexes measure sector output per 
combined units of the capital, labour, energy, materials and purchased business services inputs. 
The sectors measured are for aggregate manufacturing; and for 20 two-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) manufacturing industries. It is also published annually and also excludes 
government enterprises (BLS [S.a.]). 
 
4.12. Computers in the NIPAs 
Computers are listed in four sections in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) 
(Haimowitz 1998; Landefeld & Fraumeni 2001:28). The sections are personal consumption 
expenditures, business fixed investment, government and net exports. Computers are not defined 
in exactly the same way under the four components (Haimowitz 1998:29). 
Two of these sections are of interest for the analysis of computers and the Solow paradox. The 
first, “Final sales of computers”, in nominal and in chained dollars, is published in the national 
accounts and shown graphically in figure 4.1. The series starts in 1978 as shown. Chained 
indexes, which link indexes spanning shorter periods together to form indexes spanning longer 
periods, were examined in chapter 3. The BEA’s table 1.2.5. (line 17), entitled “Gross domestic 
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product by major type of product” and table 1.2.6. (line 19), entitled “Real gross domestic product 
by major type of product, chained dollars” are shown. 
The second measurement is “Private fixed investment in computers, software, and 
communication” from the BEA’s table 5.5.5. (line 4), entitled “Private fixed investment in 
equipment and software by type” and is shown in figure 4.2. The series starts in 1959, but data 
from 1973 are shown graphically. The series is further disaggregated into three subcomponents: 
computers and peripheral equipment, software, and communication equipment. The 
communication equipment data series starts in 1929, whereas the other two series start in 1959.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.13. ICT and capital flow tables  
In its publication, the Survey of Current Business (SCB), the BEA presents capital flow tables 
from time to time, which facilitate analyses that “are not possible using only the I-O table” and are 
supplementary to the I-O table (Meade et al. 2003:18). The I-O tables refer to input-output 
accounts developed by Leontief (Meade et al. 2003:18).  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Final sales of computers: nominal and chained dollars  
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Source: BEA NIPA (2007: tables 1.2.5. & 1.2.6.) 
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Capital flow tables (CFT) have been published (or are available on the BEA’s website) for 
selected years: 1963, 1967, 1972, 1977, 1982, 1992 and 1997.  (The publication of the capital 
flow tables are somewhat delayed; the 1963 table was published in 1971; the 1967 table in 1975; 
the 1972 table in 1980; the 1982 table in 1985; the 1992 table in 1998; and the 1997 table in 
2003.) 
The capital flow table “shows the structure of flows on new capital goods and services for each 
industry” (Meade et al. 2003:18). In particular, the improvements made to the 1997 capital flow 
table provided more information on the services industries and the information sector, a large 
market for IT capital; and software investment (Meade et al. 2003:18). CFTs are consistent with 
the NIPAs: NIPA categories are simply aggregates of the more detailed I-O commodities (Meade 
et al. 2003:19). For example, table 4.5 shows the NIPA tables with line numbers, I-O commodity 
for ICT at producers’ and purchasers’ prices1.  
                                                 
1 Purchasers’ prices = Producers’ prices + Transportation costs + Wholesale and retail margins.  
Figure 4.2: Private fixed investment in computers, software and communication 
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here. 
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CFTs are useful for the analysis of intensity of ICT usage by all industries, where intensity of 
usage is measured by ICT share in total equipment and software investment. Of the top 20 most 
intensive ICT users, only one industry is in the manufacturing sector, namely computer and 
peripheral equipment manufacturing; whereas of the top 10, five are in the information sector and 
four in the financial activities sector (Meade et al. 2003:21 & table D).  
Based on table 4.6 and the I-O industry codes, the first two digits 51 of the I-O codes denote the 
information sector, and 52 and 53 the financial activities sector.  
Table 4.6 shows the top 10 users and ICT shares. 
However, for the first time, the 1997 CFTs are based on NAICS, not SIC (see section 4.2), thus 
limiting comparability with earlier tables (Meade et al. 2003:25).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: I-O commodity composition for computers (US$ millions) 
NIPA line I-O commodity Producers’ prices Purchasers’ prices 
4 Computers and peripheral 
equipment (total) 
$63,281 $81,850 
6 Communication equipment (total) $72,908 $80,107 
Source: Meade et al. (2003:19, table A) 
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4.14. Productivity growth trends in the USA from 1948 to 2002 
Figure 4.3 shows labour productivity growth trends from 1948 to 2002. The average LP growth 
over the period is 2.3%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6: Top 10 ICT-intensive industries ranked by 1997 ICT share in total equipment 
and software investment 
I-O code Industry ICT share 
5132* Cable networks and program distribution 91% 
5415 Computers systems design and related services 89% 
5112* Software publishers 88% 
5250** Funds, trusts and other financial vehicles 88% 
5142* Data processing services 87% 
5330** Lessors of nonfinancial intangible assets 84% 
5133* Telecommunications 82% 
52A0** Monetary authorities, credit intermediation and related 80% 
5131* Radio and television broadcasting 77% 
5230** Securities, commodity contracts, investments 76% 
Source: Meade et al. (2003: 21, table D); Notes: * = information sector; ** = financial sector.  
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Figure 4.4 shows MFP growth trends from 1949 to 2002. MFP growth averaged 1.1% over the 
period.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Labour productivity growth trends, private nonfarm business sector 
(1948 to 2002) (% change) 
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A summary in table format of the productivity growth figures is also reproduced here to illustrate 
the growth trends. Table 4.7 refers to the private nonfarm business and excludes government 
enterprises.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Multifactor productivity growth trends, private nonfarm business 
sector (1948 to 2002) (% change) 
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The additions may not add up exactly because of independent rounding. Line 1 is simply labour 
productivity (LP). Line 2, the contribution of capital intensity, refers to the growth rate in capital 
services per hour multiplied by capital’s share of current dollar costs. Line 2.1, the contribution of 
information processing equipment and software, refers to the growth rate of information 
processing equipment and software multiplied by its share of total costs. Line 3, the contribution 
of labour composition, refers to the growth rate of labour composition multiplied by labour’s share 
of current dollar costs and labour composition refers to the growth rate of labour input less the 
growth rate of the hours of all persons. Line 4, Multifactor productivity, refers to the output per unit 
of combined labour and capital inputs (BLS News 2005:6).  
 
Table 4.7: Productivity growth trends, private nonfarm business (1948 to 2002) 
 1948 -
2002 
1948 -
1973 
1973 -
1990 
1990 - 
1995 
1995 - 
2000 
2000 - 
2002 
2001 - 
2002 
1 Output per hour of all 
persons 
2.2 2.9 1.4 1.6 2.5 3.6 4.5 
2 Contribution of capacity 
intensity 
0.9 0.8 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.8 1.7 
 2.1 Contribution of 
information processing 
equipment and software 
0.3 0.1 0.4 0.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 
 2.2 Contribution of all 
other capital services 
0.5 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.9 0.9 
3 Contribution of labour 
composition 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.8 
4 Multifactor productivity 1.2 1.9 0.4 0.7 1.1 1.0 2.0 
 4.1 Contribution of R&D 
to multifactor productivity 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Source: BLS News (2005:6, table B) 
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4.15. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to reconcile the gap between theoretical and academic studies with 
the productivity statistics as calculated by the official US government agencies. The statistical 
agencies respond to the criticisms and comments by academic researchers on improving the 
productivity statistics. 
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5. CHAPTER 5: ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY  
 
5.1. Overview 
The chapter deals with the following: a brief history of computing; a short discussion on three 
interpretations of IT value; the relationship between computers and economic growth; the 
distinction between computer-using and computer-manufacturing industries; productivity at 
various economic levels (aggregate, industry and firm levels); computerisation and the services 
sector; productivity, technical change and the residual; the computer prices and investment; and 
the internet and the new economy.  
The starting point of this chapter is the methodology adopted and many of the issues raised in 
Sichel’s seminal book, The computer revolution: an economic perspective, published in 1997, 
because it aims to provide “an economic perspective on the principal issues.” (Sichel 1997a:7).  
Sichel’s book is based on the economic theory of computerisation developed in an earlier paper 
by Oliner and Sichel (1994), entitled Computers and output growth revisited: how big is the 
puzzle? In reviewing the book, Solow (1998:120), remarked that “He tells the best story you are 
likely to hear” regarding the productivity paradox. Madrick (1998:53) believes that Sichel “sets a 
standard for rational discussion that has largely been missing to date”.   
For conceptual clarification, it is imperative at the outset to nail down what computer productivity 
is not, to eliminate confusion over the scope of the economics of computerisation. Many 
discussions on computers focus on their perceived value or usefulness to consumers and 
business, as well as ubiquity, which is indicative of computer output only rather than productivity 
as a ratio of output and input. These discussions do not consider the relevant productivity puzzle: 
namely the relationship (or ratio) between computer output and computer input.  
 
5.2. Highlights of computing history 
Information technology and processing have a long history and preceded the invention of the 
modern computer. Typewriters, telegraphs, telephones and office calculating machines have 
been used by businesses for an extended period (Sichel 1997a:12). The purpose of this brief 
overview is to stress the continuity of current and past developments in computing, where 
computing is understood in a wider sense.  
It is not necessary to discuss the history of the computer and the microchip in detail here. For a 
half-century history of computing see the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers’ Timeline 
of computing history (IEEE 1996). The publication marks the 50th anniversary of the invention of 
modern computing. However, the IEEE dates the advent of computing generally at about 4 000 to 
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12 000 BC with the Sumerian’s use of the clay tablet to capture commercial transactions, followed 
by the invention of the abacus in Babylonia in 3 000 BC.  
More recently, the vacuum tube was invented in 1904 (IEEE 1996). Modern information 
technology, however, commences with the invention of the transistor at the Bell Labs in 1947 
(Jorgenson 2001:2). A transistor is a type of semiconductor which is an electronic component 
made from semiconductor materials such as silicone or germanium (Microsoft computer 
dictionary 2002:”transistor”). The three inventors of the transistor won the Noble Prize for Physics 
in 1956.  
The integrated circuit, which consists of many interconnected transistors, resistors and other 
circuit elements placed on a single chip (Microsoft computer dictionary 2002:”integrated circuit”), 
was coinvented in 1958 and 1959. In 2000, one of the inventors won the Nobel Prize for Physics 
for the integrated circuit.  
In 1956 Gordon Moore made the prescient observation that chip capacity (the number of 
transistors on a computer chip) rose exponentially, doubling every year. A decade later he 
predicted it would double every two years. Subsequently, the actual capacity doubling was found 
to take 18 months (Microsoft … 2002:”Moore’s law”). This prediction, the actual doubling of 
capacity every 18 months, became known as Moore’s law. This law is often referred to in the 
context of the rapid progress in computer technology.  
The first electronic computer, the ENIAC, containing 18 000 vacuum tubes and programmed with 
thousands of switches set by hand, was developed during World War II. Its successor the 
UNIVAC I, using stored programs rather than switches, was built for the US government for the 
1950 census. The first commercial UNIVAC machine was purchased in 1954. Before 1965, most 
of the computers sold were mainframes, but subsequently sales of minicomputers and 
microcomputers rose dramatically (Gordon 1989:79-81).  
The first microchip, a microprocessor with the capacity to execute software programs or logic 
chip, was developed by Intel Corporation in 1971. The first “computer on a chip” made in 1971 
had 2 300 transistors compared to the 42 million transistors on the Pentium 4 made in 2000 - 
implying an exponential growth rate of 34% per year over the three decades (Jorgenson 2001:3). 
In 1971, the first e-mail was sent on a network.  
IBM launched the first personal computer (PC) in 1981. The PC incorporated the Intel 8086-8088 
microprocessor and the Microsoft MS-DOS operating system, cementing a business relationship 
still in operation today. With the release of the Microsoft Windows operating system in 1985, the 
Wintel (Window-Intel) ties were further strengthened (Jorgenson 2001:5).  
The invention of the global internet dates from 1983 with the creation of TCP/IP. The acronym 
stands for Transmission control protocol/internet protocol, which is a set of rules or standards for 
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data transmission over interconnected networks (such as the internet) developed by the US 
Department of Defense (Microsoft computer dictionary 2002:”TCP/IP”).  
The first mention of the word “software” was in 1962 in relation to the development of synthesised 
music. In 1968 (the second mention) the term “software engineering” was introduced at a NATO 
Science Committee conference to address the “software crisis”. 
It is evident that the measurement problems associated with computers emerged during the early 
days of computing history, that is in the 1950s.  
 
5.3. Moore’s law and semiconductor prices 
Moore’s Law, outlined above, has an enormous influence on quality-adjusted computer prices 
and hence the computer productivity paradox. Jorgenson (2001:3) opines that as new 
generations of these devices improve in quality and speed: 
The economics of semiconductors begins with the closely related observation that 
semiconductors have become cheaper at a truly staggering rate! … The behaviour of 
semiconductor prices is a severe test for the methods used in official price statistics. The 
challenge is to separate observed price changes between changes in semiconductor 
performance and changes in price that hold performance constant. 
The previous chapter outlined index numbers for this very reason. The problem led to the 
eventual replacement of the matched-model method with the hedonic method for computer 
prices.  
The rapidity of price declines is evident in figure 5.1, based on research conducted by Grimm 
(1998). His research showed that the price index of memory chips fell by an annual average of 
36.9% between 1975 and 1985 and by an annual average of 20.1% between 1985 and 1996 
(Grimm 1998:8 & 12); and that the price index of microprocessors decreased by an annual 
average of 35.3% between 1985 and 1996 (Grimm 1998:8 & 23).  
Moore’s Law could be cited as a cause of productivity growth acceleration in microprocessors in 
1995; however, it “predicts a constant rate of growth of capability, not an accelerating rate of 
growth” and the assumption is therefore problematic (Lewis 2004:90).  
The impact of declining computer prices is further discussed below (table 5.1). 
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5.4. “Three faces of IT value”  
To fix ideas, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1994:263-4) note that three separate questions, based on 
three logically distinct concepts, need to be asked in relation to IT value. The relevant questions 
are: 
(1) whether investments in computers have increased productivity;  
(2) whether investments in computers have improved business performance; and  
(3) whether investments in computers have created value for consumers (this refers to the 
welfare effects of computers).  
Brynjolfsson (1996:285-287) also provides the theoretical background to consumer welfare, 
including four basic approaches to consumer surplus. Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s table, reproduced in 
table 5.1, shows the “three faces of IT value” and the framework within which each value should 
be examined. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Falling prices of memory chips and microprocessors 
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Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1994:274), in their firm-level study of 367 large firms over the period 1988 
to 1992, concluded that IT increases productivity and the consumer surplus, but does not 
increase business profits. They found that there is no contradiction in these results and that they 
are consistent with economic theory.  
Brynjolfsson (1996:281 & 297) estimated the contribution of IT to consumer welfare and found 
that IT investments “generate approximately three times their cost in value for consumers”, which 
amounted to between $50 billion and $70 billion in 1987, and which is growing steadily. 
Sichel (1997a:30-32) also discusses the welfare effects of computers, under two headings: (1) 
net output, and (2) the consumer surplus. Net output will be further discussed in chapter 6, where 
the major explanations of the productivity paradox will be evaluated. This key issue revolves 
around whether gross or net output is the correct measure, the subject of a heated debate in the 
Survey of Current Business between Denison (1969; 1972) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1972).  
Briefly, because computers depreciate and become obsolete so quickly, the net measure of 
computer output (i.e. net of depreciation) greatly reduces the contribution of computers to output 
growth. According to Sichel (1997a:31), two-thirds of the gross rate of return to computers is 
accounted for by the costs of depreciation and obsolescence alone. The consumer surplus refers 
to the familiar idea that the consumer derives surplus satisfaction, utility, or extra benefits 
exceeding the actual price paid for a good or service. Sichel (1997a:31) argues that the consumer 
receives a bonus, the consumer surplus, as computer prices fall rapidly over time. The surplus, 
however, is difficult to measure and is not included in measurement of output growth (Sichel 
1997:84). A graphic depiction of the consumer surplus is shown below (the shaded area P1ABP2 
in figure 5.4 on page 104 below).  
This dissertation will deal mainly with computer productivity and the associated theory of 
production (i.e. the production function approach outlined in chapter 2). 
Table 5.1: “Three faces of IT value” 
Issue Framework 
Productivity Theory of production 
Business performance Theories of competitive strategy 
Consumer value Theory of the consumer 
Source: Brynjolfsson & Hitt (1994:264) 
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5.5. Computers and economic growth 
Jorgenson and Stiroh (1995:109) examined the impact of computers on economic growth and 
found that IT investment “generates substantial returns for the economic agents who undertake IT 
investments and restructure their activities in order to increase the role of IT”. This is mainly 
because of falling IT prices and substitutions of IT capital and equipment for other types of capital 
and labour.  
IT contributes to economic growth through two channels: firstly, by raising overall investment and 
hence capital deepening; and, secondly, by raising MFP. However, whereas the first channel has 
been accepted generally, the second is more controversial (Pilat, Lee & van Ark 2002:48). In this 
regard, Gordon (2000b) argued that MFP – technical progress – has been achieved primarily in 
the production of ICT goods and services.  
This section is based on Sichel’s important contribution The computer revolution: an economic 
perspective (1997a) as mentioned earlier, particularly pages 19 to 21 and 36 to 38. Generally, the 
contribution of computers to growth is a function of the quantity of computers that is in use and 
the average return earned by them (Sichel 1997a:15).  
In the neoclassical framework, the contribution of computers to real output growth ( cY& ) can be 
calculated as the product of the share of total income generated by computers (sc) and the growth 
rate of the stock of computer capital ( cK& ), that is  
ccc KsY && =   
The share of computer income (sc) is calculated as follows (Sichel 1997a:19): 
sc = (nominal income flow) / (total income)  
    =  [(gross rate of return) x (nominal stock of computers)] / (total income) 
The income share of computers is related to the competitive rate of return of other investments. 
To calculate the gross rate of return on computers, the competitive rate of return earned on other 
investments is adjusted for depreciation, as follows:  
     (gross rate of return) = (competitive net return) + depreciation 
          = drcomp +  
The value of the nominal competitive net return to all nonresidential equipment and structures 
averaged 12% between 1970 and 1992; and the rate of depreciation of computers averaged 25% 
per annum over the same period. (These two calculations are based on the earlier paper by 
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Oliner & Sichel (1994:283-85)). Hence, adding these rates together gives the large gross rate of 
return of 37% for computers.  
The rapid rate of computer depreciation requires a large gross return, net of depreciation. If 
computers did not earn such large returns, their owners would lose money after taking into 
account the rapid rate at which computers become obsolete (Sichel 1997a:20).  
The nominal stock of computers and peripheral equipment amounted to US$95.9 billion in 1992. 
The nominal income flow was therefore about US$35.5 billion (US$95.9 billion x 0.37).  
Nominal total income was US$4 494.4 billion in 1992; and US$35.5 billion as percentage of this 
total income amounted to 0.8% (i.e. sc = 0.8%). Hence, assuming that computer hardware earned 
a competitive return, computers generated only 0.8% of total income in the whole economy in the 
US in 1992.  
The next section looks at the above calculations in more detail.  
5.6. Accounting for the contribution of computing services to output 
Oliner and Sichel (1994:281) and Sichel (1997a:111-112) use the BLS (1983:33-34) methodology 
to include computers in the baseline production function approach and growth accounting 
framework to assess the contribution of computing equipment to output by separating out 
computing equipment from all other forms of capital. Sichel (1997a:79) argues that “hardware 
cannot be used in isolation … businesses are interested in the “computing services” flowing from 
their information technology, and … are the joint product of hardware, software and labour input.”  
Sichel therefore goes further by separating out two additional components that make up 
computing services generally, namely software and computer-services labour.  
Based on Oliner and Sichel (1994:281, equation (3)), from equation (2) in chapter 2, yields  
LKAQ lnlnlnln βα ++=  
where K is capital, L is labour and A is technical progress.  
When computing equipment CK  is separated out from total capital K, equation (2) becomes 
LKKAQ OOCC lnlnlnlnln βαα +++=   (5) 
where Cα is the share of computing capital in total income, CC Klnα  is the contribution of 
computer capital to growth and OO Klnα  is the contribution of noncomputer capital (i.e. all 
capital other than computers) to growth. (Equation (5) is based on Sichel (1997a:111), equation 
(4A-6)). The share of computer income Cα  cannot be observed and the user cost of capital is 
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used as a proxy (Oliner & Sichel 1994:282). Sichel (1997a:111-112) bases his calculations on 
this method as well.  
When computing services are introduced fully into the calculations – that is, not only is the 
contribution of computer capital (hardware) separated from noncomputer capital, but the 
contributions of computer software ( CSCS Klnα ) and computer-services labour ( CC Llnβ ) are 
also incorporated – equation (5) can be extended as follows: 
ALL
KLKKQ
CC
OOCCCSCSCC
ln)lnln(
ln]lnlnln[ln
+−+
+++=
ββ
αβαα
  (6) 
where )lnln( CC LL ββ −  is the term for total labour other than computer-services labour (Sichel 
1997:111-112). The first three terms [in square brackets] describe the neoclassical contribution of 
computing services to output growth. These equations are all based on neoclassical assumptions 
(see Sichel 1997:18-21; 2002:16-17), which will be further explored in chapter 6.  
In a later paper, Oliner and Sichel (2002b:16) extend the above analytical framework to include 
semiconductors. Whereas computer hardware, software and communications equipment are final 
goods and services, semiconductors are intermediate inputs. 
We can thus observe that the contribution of IT to growth is measured from the input side rather 
than the output side (Sichel 1997a:91). This implies – the issue is taken up in chapter 6 – that the 
mismeasurement of output cannot affect the neoclassical calculation of IT’s contribution to 
productivity growth. The contribution of IT to output is a function of the stock of computers and the 
return earned by IT.  
The implication is that the mismeasurement of the contribution of computers to output could be 
captured by the MFP residual rather than computer capital and labour (as calculated by the 
above equations), thus understating computer productivity but at the same time overstating MFP. 
This is so because productivity changes must be captured somewhere. As Norsworthy 
(1984:327) notes: the growth accounting framework is a “filing system that is complete, in the 
sense that all phenomena that affect economic growth must do so through input factor quantities, 
relative factor intensities or total factor productivity growth, either simply or in combination.” 
Stiroh (2001e) also examines the economic impact of IT on growth and adopts an approach 
similar to that of Oliner and Sichel (1994) and Sichel (1997a). However, in contrast to the above 
approach, Stiroh points out that in the production function approach, IT is both an input and an 
output. IT is an output of firms and industries that produce IT goods and is thus part of Y in the 
national accounts. IT output can be separated from non-IT output. IT is also an input into the 
production process of other IT-using firms and industries which adds to the stock of productive 
capital of those industries and firms that uses IT. IT input can be separated from non-IT input 
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(Stiroh 2001e:5 & 13). According to Stiroh (2001e:5), IT investment goods include computer 
hardware, computer software and telecommunications equipment.  
Higher production of IT goods should raise output. An improvement in the production of IT should 
raise MFP growth since it should be counted as technological change. However, investment in IT 
should raise the IT capital stock and thus add to IT input, but IT investment does not raise MFP or 
technological progress. Higher IT investment raises the amount of capital per worker, and hence 
capital deepening, which raises labour productivity (Stiroh 2001e:15-16.) 
Taking the above into account, one can write 
),,,,(),,,( LKKKKfAIIIYY mscnmscn ⋅=  
where the subscript n denotes non-IT investment and input, the subscript c real computer 
hardware and capital services, the subscript s software investment and capital services and the 
subscript m telecommunications equipment investment and capital services (Stiroh 2001e:13). 
The above equation can be restated as a growth rate equation with the appropriate weights, 
which is a standard growth accounting equation (see Stiroh 2001e:13-14).  
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000b:142) adopt a similar methodology as Stiroh (2001e), but further 
separate out “computer and software consumption” and “services of consumers’ computers and 
software”. The results of such a growth accounting exercise are given in the table 4.2.  
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Table 5.2: Sources of GDP growth (annual average percentage growth rates) 
  Outputs 
  
1948-
2002 
1948-
1973 
1973-
1989 
1989-
1995 
1995-
2002 
Gross Domestic Product 3.36 3.99 2.97 2.43 3.59
   A. Contribution of IT 0.28 0.11 0.35 0.37 0.64
      1. Computers 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.15 0.34
      2. Software 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.19
      3. Communication equipment 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.11
   B. Contribution of non-IT 3.18 3.88 2.62 2.05 2.95
      1. Contribution of non-IT Investment 0.69 1.05 0.44 0.21 0.41
      2. Contribution of non-IT Consumption 2.49 2.82 2.18 1.85 2.54
  Inputs 
  
1948-
2002 
1948-
1973 
1973-
1989 
1989-
1995 
1995-
2002 
Gross Domestic Income 2.79 2.99 2.68 2.17 2.88
   A. Contribution of IT capital services 0.36 0.15 0.38 0.49 0.93
      1. Computers 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.52
      2. Software 0.08 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.23
      3. Communication equipment 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.18
   B. Contribution of non-IT Capital Services 1.39 1.79 1.15 0.71 1.07
   C. Contribution of Labour Services 1.05 1.04 1.15 0.98 0.88
Total Factor Productivity 0.67 1.00 0.29 0.26 0.71
Note: Contribution of an output or input is the rate of growth multiplied by the average value 
share.  
Source: Jorgenson (2005: table 2.6)
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5.7. Computer-using and computer-producing industries 
The literature distinguishes between industries that manufacture computers and those that use 
computers. The distinction between production and use of IT is important, because greater 
investment in IT can affect either labour productivity or MFP (or both).  
Theoretically, IT contributes to economic growth, firstly, through higher overall investment and 
hence capital deepening, and, secondly, through MFP growth. Whereas there is consensus that 
IT investment has contributed to overall investment growth, it is more controversial whether IT 
has boosted MFP (Pilat et al. 2002:48), as was mentioned in section 5.5. 
Similarly, Jorgenson (2001:26) states that when labour uses more and better machinery and 
equipment, labour productivity will rise through capital deepening – hence TFP will not be 
affected. Thus, “Increasing deployment of IT affects TFP growth only if there are spillovers from 
IT-producing industries to IT-using industries” (Jorgenson 2001:26). 
Baily and Gordon (1988) found productivity gains in the manufacture of computers, but little 
productivity improvement in their use. Similarly, Gordon (2000b:57) found that the revival in MFP 
after 1995 was due to technological progress in the production of IT, but not the use of IT, so that 
“three-quarters of all computer investment has been in industries with no perceptible trend 
increase in productivity”.  
Pilat et al. (2002:50, box1) provide the OECD definition of ICT-producing industries, which include 
seven manufacturing and four services industries (4-digit level). The services sector is the IT-
using sector par excellence and studies found a pick-up in MFP in IT-using sectors, such as 
those by Triplett and Bosworth (2003:24) and Baily (2002). The service sector is discussed in 
more detail below.  
5.8. Spillover effects 
Computer-using industries are able to benefit from the spillover effects from IT investment. The 
IMF (2000b:50) explains that “Spillover effects occur when returns to an investment increase 
because others make similar investments. Some positive effect is plausible with IT investment – 
for example, the return to an internet-capable computer rise as more consumers and businesses 
connect to the internet.”   
Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999:110) identify the Solow residual with the spillover effect – hence the 
residual quantifies the spillover effect. Madrick (1998:59) interprets the spillovers as “social 
returns”, returns or “financial advantages that accrue even to those businesses that do not invest 
in computers”. However, the social return on computers will need to be extremely large to  make 
an impact.  
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However, several considerations contradict the widely held view that computers boost the overall 
efficiency of the economy. According to Maddison (2001:139), spillover effects have not occurred, 
largely because of “the costs of absorbing new technologies which have involved a large input of 
highly trained people, rapid obsolescence of equipment and skills, and some serious blunders, 
such as those connected with the very costly Y2K scare.” 
Similarly, according to Baker (1998b:5), higher productivity growth is accounted for by greater 
productivity in producing computers and there is a lack of evidence that computers enhance 
productivity in the production of other goods.   
 
5.9. Aggregate, industry and firm level studies 
Productivity studies can be calculated at several levels: the aggregate (national or economy-
wide), sectoral, industry and firm (or plant) level. Sectoral productivity analysis can be broken 
down into the familiar primary, secondary and tertiary levels, but these are typically confined to 
and focus on agriculture, manufacturing and the services sectors. These studies do not 
necessarily yield the same results (Brynjolfsson & Yang 1996).  
Pritchard (1994:61) frames the productivity paradox in these terms: “How can improvements in 
performance that occur at one level of analysis seem to disappear when performance is 
measured at broader levels of analysis?”  
Indeed, some firm-level studies (including studies of service and manufacturing firms) have 
shown positive productivity returns. For example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (1994:274), in their firm-
level study of 367 large firms over the period 1988 to 1992, concluded that IT increases 
productivity as well as the consumer surplus, but not business profits, as mentioned above.  
Bartelsman and Doms (2000) discuss the emergence of firm-level studies with the availability of 
longitudinal micro-level data to understand productivity. They found that there were large 
variations in productivity levels between firms, which implies that the assumption of the 
representative firm underlying aggregation is problematic (Jalava 2002:78).  
In terms of measurement issues, Diewert (2000:15) argues that, whereas industry-level studies 
are riddled with measurement problems (at both conceptual and practical level), studies at 
national level are easier to measure and are also less prone to measurement problems. The 
reasons are that the complications arising from the measurement of intermediate inputs are 
reduced and the “hugely complex web of interindustry transactions of goods and services” 
(Diewert 2000:15) is simplified at national level. 
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The main (but not exclusive) focus of the analysis of the productivity paradox takes place at the 
aggregate level. Sichel (1997a:9) adopts this approach as well. This aggregate focus is crucial to 
the credibility of the research results, because 
a full accounting of national productivity cannot be obtained by studying just a few 
different industries … there is more to the macro verdict than a loose collection of micro 
anecdotes. Focusing on breakthroughs in one endeavour may well miss the 
compensating costs borne by other segments of society. Beneficial results may still be 
wanting for the nation as a whole (Roach 1998a:158). 
Many “digirati”, a term referring to IT enthusiasts and fanatics (Roach 1998:154), use anecdotal 
evidence to demonstrate the influence and power of information technology, which is often limited 
to a few industries. 
The above views do not deny that industry-, sector- and firm-level productivity studies are also 
important – they argue that for productivity to be sustainable, aggregate productivity must 
improve as well. 
Baily and Solow (2001) consider international productivity comparisons built from the firm level. 
They conclude that it is difficult to base comparisons on data at firm level, but nevertheless think 
that it is a valuable avenue for future investigation.  
Finally, Oliner and Sichel (1994:286) observe that computers can be productive at firm level, but 
not at aggregate level, because “computers are not everywhere” (referring to Solow’s quip) and 
are a minor factor of production, when judged in terms of their share of current dollar income. 
They state that this is the key to the resolution of the productivity paradox. The claim that 
computers are productive at firm level, but not at aggregate level (because they remain a minor 
factor of production) is not contradictory.  
 
5.10. Computers and the services sector 
Although the productivity slowdown can be observed at an economy-wide level, the slowdown is 
mainly evident in the service sector (Brynjolfsson & Yang 1996). Landauer (1995:76) argues that 
labour productivity in the services sector failed to respond to the adoption of new investment in 
computer technology. The productivity revival in 1995 is mainly a revival in service sector 
productivity. 
The problem of measurement is particularly severe in the service sector – hence these two issues 
are discussed together. In this section the emphasis is on the measurement of services rather 
than the measurement problem generally. The latter issue will be discussed in more depth in 
chapter 6, where the major explanations of the productivity paradox are analysed.  
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Most computers are used in the services sector, because computer equipment is typically 
deployed in office or office settings. Even in the manufacturing sector, which is outside the 
services sector, computers are used in an office setting (Sichel 1997a:9).   
Services are generally characterised as intangible (Inman 1985b:4), so that “Intangibility of 
product” is common to all services (Baumol et al. 1989:117). Hill (1977) argues that the output or 
end product of a service is defined as a change in the condition of a person (resulting in a change 
in his or her physical or mental condition); or of a good (resulting in a change in the state of the 
good). In a service, unlike in a good, nothing tangible is actually exchanged between economic 
agents. Production and consumption of services occur simultaneously and therefore cannot be 
stocked or stored. It is not true to say that services are perishable (i.e. extinguished or 
annihilated). They may be temporary (a haircut) or permanent (a medical operation). Services 
cannot be put in stock or stored, because they are changes in conditions, with varying degrees of 
permanence. 
The service sector has been shown to be a low-productivity sector (in contrast to the high-
productivity manufacturing sector); this phenomenon of differential or unbalanced growth is 
referred to as “Baumol’s disease”, after William Baumol who modelled the result (see Baumol 
1967; Baumol et al. 1985). The research found that technologically stagnant sectors, such as 
personal services, experienced above-average costs and price increases. Baumol, Blackman and 
Wolff (1989), in a comprehensive overview of the US economy, Productivity and American 
leadership: the long view, similarly argued that services, particularly personal services, are 
inherently productivity laggards, owing to their technological nature. Ruth Towse (1997) edited an 
entire volume of studies devoted to Baumol’s model, entitled Baumol’s cost disease: the arts and 
other victims. The literature is briefly reviewed below. 
Measurement problems exist in most service industries, where output is difficult to measure (or 
even unmeasurable), as well as in innovations and new goods and product quality improvements 
(Triplett 1999a:2-4). For example, the numbers for real output and hence productivity increased 
after the Boskin Commission (1996) revised the inflation rate downward by an average of 1.1% 
after the 1970s, when a statistical discrepancy between the product side and income side in the 
national accounts became evident (Baker 1998c:6). The commission argued that quality 
improvements were uncounted in the inflation statistics and the consumer price index (CPI) was 
therefore overstated. Because actual CPI was lower, real GDP growth and productivity were 
higher compared with the unadjusted numbers. However, the overstatement of inflation applies 
equally to the post-1973 period as to pre-1973 period, which leaves the unadjusted productivity 
numbers intact. The commission's work has been criticised and the view adopted that quality 
changes have been overadjusted. In several publications, Baker (1996; 1998a; 1998d) was 
particularly critical of the commission’s findings.  
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Griliches (1994) divides total output into two sectors: “measurable” and “unmeasurable”. 
“Measurable” sectors are agriculture, mining, manufacturing, transportation and utilities. 
“Unmeasurable” sectors are construction and the remaining services: trade (wholesale and retail); 
finance, insurance, and real estate (also known as FIRE); government; and other services. Of 
interest here is that the “unmeasurable” industries are largely service industries. Griliches argues 
that the “unmeasurable” sector grew as a share of GDP between 1947 and 1990. Since over 
three-quarters of computer investment has been in the “unmeasurable” sectors, the productivity 
effects are “largely invisible” (Griliches 1994:11), which explains the computer productivity 
paradox.  
Many research publications have studied the service sector, as highlighted below. Guile and 
Quinn (1988) edited a volume of essays dealing with technology and services, entitled 
Technology in services: policies for growth, trade, and employment. The Canadian Journal of 
Economics devoted a special issue to the productivity paradox and the services sector, entitled 
Service sector productivity and the productivity paradox in April 1999. Zvi Griliches (1992a) edited 
a volume entitled Output measurement in the service sectors. These publications underscore the 
significance of the relationship between productivity and services. In the introduction and 
overview to the special issue, Diewert and Fox (1999:xiv) remark that distortions in the 
measurement of productivity cannot account for the abrupt post-1973 slowdown, despite 
measurement problems.  
Sichel (1997b:370), with particular reference to Griliches’ 1994 paper (see above), argues that it 
is “improbable that mismeasurement of output can explain much of the slowdown (in) aggregate 
productivity”.  
The NRC (1994) examines the impact of IT on the services sector in the USA. The study 
concludes that IT is an essential rather than an optional component of services companies, 
because IT provides the “integral infrastructure on which such organisations depend” (NRC 
1994:4). It alleges that traditional measures of productivity are unable to capture these essential 
performance elements (NRC 1994: 4).  
There is no doubt that measurement of services output is problematic. Denison (1989:60) opines 
that a clear distinction should be drawn between service industries and final products that are 
services. Denison (1989:13-4) proposes that in the analysis of productivity, this distinction must 
be taken into account. This issue will be discussed briefly. The USA (and other) System of 
National Accounts (SNO) classifies output according to industries, that is, primary, secondary and 
tertiary, as well as the respective subdivisions. Denison (1989:14) concludes that “Nearly half the 
output of service industries consists of inputs into the production of goods and structures”. Thus 
many services are not end or final products, which are typically used for consumption instead of 
as intermediate products. In Denison’s calculations services account for only 33% of output if 
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classified in terms of final product, whereas the SNO shows a 59% contribution. Denison argues 
that the national accounts should be supplemented with a classification based on final product. 
Table 4.3 below sets out Denison’s calculations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Baumol’s unbalanced productivity model states, that from a productivity perspective, there are 
generally three types of economic activities: stagnant activities, progressive activities, and a 
combination of these, asymptotically stagnant activities (also referred to as initially progressive 
activities).  
Progressive activities are characterised by “innovations, capital accumulation, and economies of 
scale (which) all make for a cumulative rise in output per man hour” (Baumol & Oates 1975:241). 
Stagnant activities “by their very nature, permit only sporadic increases in productivity.” Their 
output is not standardised and mass production is difficult; and there is an “intimate connection 
between the quantity of labour used in supplying them and the quality of the end product.” 
(Baumol & Oates 1975:241-242). In his initial formulation, Baumol (1967:415) stated that 
regarding economic services, such as municipal government, education, the performing arts, 
restaurants and leisure time activity: “inherent in the technological structure of each of these 
activities are forces working almost unavoidably for progressive and cumulative increases in the 
real costs incurred in supplying them.”  
Stagnant activities often show extremely high productivity increases and falling costs in the initial 
stages of their development, but over time, they “necessarily approach that of the stagnant 
sector” (Baumol et al. 1985:806.). Other examples of stagnant activities are the mass media, 
sound recordings, film, radio, television broadcasting and IT industry (i.e. hardware and software). 
 Table 5.3: “Dividing output”: nonresidential business GNP (1982) 
% Classification of output 
by industry as in the US 
SNO 
Classification of output 
by end (final) product 
Commodity-producing 
industries (goods and 
structures) 
40.6 67.3 
Service industries 59.4 32.7 
Source: Denison (1989:13-14 & 60) 
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To illustrate, one could compare manufacturing to the performing arts (or more generally, 
personal services). The productivity story of the performing arts is thus emblematic of the 
services sector as a whole. Manufacturing, as illustrated by watchmaking, is a technologically 
progressive activity; but the services sector, as illustrated by the performing arts, is a 
technologically stagnant activity (Baumol 1987:842): 
There has been vast and continuing technical progress in watchmaking, but live 
performance benefits from no labor-saving innovations – it is still done in the old-
fashioned way. Toward the end of the 17th century a Swiss craftsman could produce 
about 12 watches per year. Three centuries later that same amount of labour produces 
over 1200 (non-quartz) watches. But a piece of music written three centuries ago by 
Purcell or Scarlatti takes exactly as many person hours to perform today as it did in 1985 
and uses as much equipment. 
Baumol’s model can be applied to computerisation (see figure 5.2). Hardware is classified as a 
progressive activity; software as a stagnant activity; and the computer sector (hardware plus 
software) as an asymptotically stagnant activity.  
Thus the overall costs of computerisation will approach that of the stagnant component, software. 
Rising software costs will eventually overwhelm falling hardware costs, driving up total costs, so 
that the computer industry will become “asymptotically stagnant”. 
A similar argument is applied to an economy as a whole: the stagnant services sector will 
dominate the progressive manufacturing sector and the economy as a whole will become 
asymptotically stagnant over time. Therefore, alarmingly, Baumol’s model, when applied more 
generally, predicts that “the growth rate of the economy will asymptotically approach zero” 
(Baumol 1967:419)! The long run outlook for the economy is dismal: according to the model’s 
founding father, there is no real cure for the disease, only palliatives (Baumol & Oates 1972:52).  
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However, Triplett and Bosworth published a paper in 2003, which announced that “’Baumol’s 
Disease’ has been cured”. They argued that after 1995 labour productivity in many services 
sectors doubled compared to the 1973-1995 period and equalled the economy-wide average 
(Triplett & Bosworth 2003:23). Similarly, Varian (2004) claims that “Baumol’s disease appears to 
be in remission, at least for a significant number of service industries.” 
In a subsequent paper, Nordhaus (2006) finds in favour of Baumol’s view that technologically 
stagnant activities, such as personal services, experienced above-average cost and price 
increases. According to Nordhaus (2006:1), services will represent a growing share of national 
output over time and therefore slow down aggregate productivity growth.  
The service sector contains several subsectors with different productivity profiles. One such 
subsector has shown high productivity growth since 1995. According to Lewis (2004: 91), retailing 
and wholesaling (general merchandise retailing) accounted for half of overall productivity growth 
acceleration in the mid-1990s. This jump in productivity growth is referred to as the “Wal-Mart 
effect”, after innovations (such as barcodes, electronic merchandise tracking and logistics 
management) by Wal-Mart (a large chain of retail stores across the USA) were captured in the 
Figure 5.2: Asymptotically stagnant activities: a simulation* 
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national productivity statistics (Lewis 2004:91). As Rogoff (2006) remarks: “The US productivity 
miracle and the emergence of Wal-Mart-style retailing are virtually synonymous”. Lewis (2004:88) 
concludes that increasing competition in the microprocessor industry rather than Moore’s Law 
underpinned the productivity acceleration: “It is ironic that in perhaps the most ‘new economy’ of 
all sectors the accelerated productivity growth rate for the late 1990s came not from anything new 
but from a straightforward increase in competitive intensity.”   
It was not “new economy” technology that propelled Wal-Mart into the forefront, but old style IT 
applications (Lewis 2004:94). 
 
5.11. Productivity, technical change and the “residual” 
Solow’s ground-breaking work showed that there was an unexplained residual after the growth in 
capital and labour inputs had been accounted for in explaining output growth. The residual 
needed to be explained and technical change or productivity became the prime candidate to 
explain the residual. The two were used almost interchangeably (Mokyr 1990a:7). Thus technical 
change is typically equated with the residual and analysing technical change has become a vital 
subject in economic research.  
The residual, interpreted as TFP growth, can be negative. For example, a growth accounting 
exercise of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, the former Zaire), revealed that the 
residual was negative. Output per worker fell by 3.3%, with the contribution of physical capital 
falling by 1.2% and the contribution of TFP by 2% from 1960 to 2000 (Akitoby, & Cinyabuguma 
2004:21). Similarly, a study by Akinlo (2005:14) found that the average TFP growth rate was 
negative for 17 of the 34 Sub-Saharan African countries included in the study from 1981 to 2002. 
The residual has a history dating back to 1937, but it was codified by Solow (Griliches 1995). 
Research into the residual have been ongoing since the 1950s with similar research conducted 
by Abramowitz (1956), Denison (1962), Kendrick (1961) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). 
Generally, their research argued that modern economic growth in the US economy should mainly 
be attributed to increases in the efficiency and not the quantity of the employment of capital and 
labour resources. 
By the early 1960s, technological change had acquired several synonyms. According to Domar 
(1961:709) these “have ranged from ‘output per unit of input,’ ‘efficiency index,’ ‘total factor 
productivity,’ ‘change in productive efficiency,’ ‘technical change,’ all the way to ‘measure of our 
ignorance’”. Domar (1961: 709 & footnote 7), however, prefers to call it the “residual” for the 
following reason: “It is indeed estimated as a residual after the contribution of other inputs to the 
growth of output has been accounted for.” Technical change is of course Solow’s (1957) term, 
whereas the oft-quoted “measure of our ignorance” was coined by Abramovitz (1956). Jorgenson 
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and Stiroh (1999:110) identify the residual with the quantification of spillovers and believe that 
Solow (1957) “showed that these spillovers appear as residual economic growth after the growth 
of all other inputs, including inputs of IT equipment, are taken into account”.  
Productivity and technical change are not identical concepts, but are closely related (Schreyer & 
Pilat 2001:157-159). Salter (1960) analyses the relationship between productivity and technical 
change. Productivity, being a much broader concept and having a multitude of meanings, 
comprises all the dynamic forces of economic life, such as “technical progress, accumulation, 
enterprise, and the institutional patterns of society” (Salter 1960:1). Salter (1960:26) argues that 
“technological advances make possible new levels of productivity”.  
Basu and Fernald (1997:1) point out that the productivity residual and technical change are 
distinct, not identical concepts; and only in an economy without distortions does the productivity 
residual index accurately reflect technological change. 
According to Maddison (1995:33), “technological progress has been the most fundamental 
element of change” compared to the other major factors of growth performance in the world 
economy from 1820 to 1992: accumulation of physical capital with embodied technical progress; 
improvement in human capital; and integration with the world economy through trade in “goods 
and services, investment, and intellectual and entrepreneurial interaction”. He argues that 
although technological progress is difficult to measure, its long-term impact can easily be 
illustrated. 
Since the residual is thus largely that part of economic growth left unexplained by employing 
more labour or capital, it can be regarded as a “free lunch” (Mokyr 1990a:7).  
In 1981, before his famous quip, Solow made the following remarks about the residual (Baily 
1981a:58): 
A productivity puzzle is said to exist when all the measurable causal factors that can be 
mustered are only able to account for a fraction, say half, of the observed deceleration in 
labour productivity. The rest is left as an unexplained deceleration of the growth of the 
residual. To solve the productivity puzzle is to explain in some other way that remaining 
half of the deceleration. … My impression is that the residual moves with some 
irregularity. Almost the only constant growth rate one could imagine for it is zero: a 
number growing like a pure exponential could hardly be called a residual, except for the 
limiting case that there is no residual. 
 
5.12. Diminishing returns 
A further complication has often been raised: diminishing marginal benefits of IT investment.  
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Diminishing returns are not uniquely linked to computers, but are a general characteristic of all 
capital. Solow (1994:48) argues as follows: “Diminishing returns to capital implies that the long-
run rate of growth is completely independent of the savings-investment quota.”  
Gordon (2000b:60-63) contends that diminishing returns are pervasive and thus necessay for 
understanding the productivity paradox because of the “unprecedented speed with which 
diminishing returns have set in” and “sheer pace at which computer users are sliding down the 
computer demand curve to ever-lower marginal utility uses”. Gordon (2000b: 65) also argues that 
diminishing returns to IT investment may have already started and that the “productivity gains of 
computers have already been achieved”.   
Similarly, Stiroh (2001e:21) argued that since computer prices have declined at such a rapid 
pace, computers can be used for pursuits characterised by low productivity and low efficiency. 
 
5.13. Declining prices and rising investment 
An important economic factor influencing IT investment is the steep decline in computer and 
peripheral equipment prices. This decline is mostly accounted for by the combination of a rise in 
demand and a fall in costs of IT devices (Jonscher 1994:23).  
Falling computer prices have presented the national statistical agencies with a new problem. 
Young (1989:115) sums up the problem as follows: “The computer represents a rate of 
technological change that, compared with the past, is unusual and that, more importantly, has not 
previously been faced fully either by the GNP estimator or by the productivity analyst.”  
According to Denison (1989:15-17), as a result of the improvements in the design of computers 
and their components, their power has risen greatly “without a corresponding increase in the 
labor and capital required to produce them.” Therefore productivity in the production of computers 
has increased vastly. 
Table 5.4: Business purchases of computers (inflation adjusted) 
Year Amount invested (US$) 
1960 0 
1969 $100 million 
1972 $200 million 
1973 $200 million 
1976 $300 million 
1979 $1.5 billion 
1980 $2.4 billion 
1990 $29.4 billion 
1997 $224.7 billion 
Source: Madrick (1998:56, table 3) 
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The steep decline in computer prices thus resulted in a large increase in spending on 
computerisation. Expenditure on computers and peripheral equipment by businesses has soared, 
particularly since the 1960s. According to Madrick (1998:56), inflation-adjusted purchases of 
computers, which amounted to only US$100 million in 1969, rose to US$224.7 billion in 1997. 
Table 5.4 gives a more complete picture. 
Despite the rapid growth in investment spending on computerisation, there are two opposing 
views of the IT revolution: the one view sees IT as having a revolutionary impact, changing the 
shape of things to come; whereas the other view regards IT largely as a huge letdown, whose 
actual performance has been disappointing and does not measure up to the great inventions of 
the past (Gordon 2000b). 
A decrease in computer prices – as usually referred to in the productivity literature – does not 
mean that the prices actually paid for computers in shops have fallen; because prices are hedonic 
prices, it means that prices of “computer attributes like a given level of speed, memory, disk drive 
access speed and capacity, presence and speed of a CD-ROM, and so on” have declined 
(Gordon 2000b:50).  
Declining ICT prices have played a decisive role in investment decisions. Jorgenson and Stiroh 
(1999:109) argue that the quick adoption of ICT technology is a result of the rapidly falling prices 
of ICT capital, so that ICT capital is substituted for other more “expensive” forms of capital and 
labour.  
Substitution should be placed in a broader economic context of investor and consumer behaviour 
(Survey of Current Business 1985:14): 
Typically the effect of shifting to a recent base period is to reduce the rate of growth. … It 
is true generally … that a recent base period produces lower growth in real GDP than an 
early base period, if there is a tendency for slow-growing quantities to be associated with 
relatively fast-growing prices and for fast-growing quantities to be associated with 
relatively slow-growing prices. 
Over long timespans, such inverse relationships tend to be the rule. As changes in 
technology or in market structure lower some relative prices and raise others, buyers 
respond by demanding relatively more of the low-priced goods and relatively less of the 
high-priced ones. Computers provide a dramatic example of technological change that 
lowers a relative price and leads to rapid growth in demand (Italics added). It is possible 
for shifts in demand due to changes in taste or in income levels to have a contrary effect, 
driving both prices and quantities up for some commodities more than for others. 
Apparently such shifts have tended to be less important over long timespans than the 
factors producing the inverse relationships of price and quality changes.  
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The above quote refers to the importance of index numbers – the base year effects - discussed in 
chapter 3 under the heading “Index number bias”. 
Bresnahan and Gordon (1997:23) note that computers are characterised by “a continuing decline 
in the price-performance ratio”. Just how fast computer hardware prices have declined can be 
gleaned from figure 5.3 below. Calculations by Jorgenson (2005: table 2.1) show that computer 
prices (normalised to 1 in 2000) declined from 1,635.06 in 1959 to 0.64 in 2002.  
 
 
Software prices for PCs, like hardware prices, also declined when adjusted for quality changes, 
and by 2.7% per year between 1987 and 1993. Over this period the GDP deflator increased by 
3.5%, which implies that PC software prices fell by 6.2% in real terms (Sichel 1997a:56-57).  
According to Sichel (1997a:57) other authors found similar declines in PC software prices.  
The computer supply and demand curve, based on Sichel (1997a:16-17) and Gordon (2000b:60-
62), is shown below (figure 5.4). Declines in computer prices are mainly driven on the supply 
side (Sichel 1997a:17), so that a downward-sloping demand curve based on falling computer 
prices (the blue solid line in figure 5.3) can plausibly be drawn. Brynjolfsson (1996:289-290) 
believes that technological advance suggests outward shifts in the supply curve year after year 
(e.g. Supply 1 to Supply 2 in small increments over time in figure 5.4). This maps out or reveals 
the underlying demand curve (see Brynjolfsson 1996:289, figure 7). The demand curve does not 
Figure 5.3: Declining computer hardware and software prices 
0.1
1
10
100
1000
10000
19
59
19
62
19
65
19
68
19
71
19
74
19
77
19
80
19
83
19
86
19
89
19
92
19
95
19
98
20
01
Lo
g 
sc
al
e 
(2
00
0=
1)
Computer prices Software prices
 
Source: Jorgenson (2005: table 2.1) 
 104
shift at all. Brynjolfsson (1996:291) estimated the price elasticity of demand for computers 
economy-wide at –1.33 (and income elasticity at 3.45) for the 1970 to 1989 period.   
The consumer surplus is shown as the shaded area P1ABP2 (Sichel 1997a:31).  
The declining cost of computer power has been cited as a factor in the explanation of the 
paradox; however, this has been debunked because diminishing returns (discussed above) and 
declining marginal utility of computing power cancel out price benefits (Gordon 2000b:62).  
 
 
Also, declining computing prices have led to the substitution of IT equipment for other more 
expensive forms of capital and labour. According to Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999:109), this 
process of substitution has not resulted in “technical change” as defined economically, because 
“substitution represents movement along a given production function, while technical change 
corresponds to a shift in the production function … Technical change occurs only if more output is 
produced from the same inputs”. These authors believe that this explanation provides a 
straightforward solution to the productivity, accounting for the high levels of IT investment but 
slow productivity growth. This interpretation also prompted Triplett (1999b:314) to state that “the 
economic impact of the computer is not a productivity story at all”.  
Falling computer prices, which is based on quality adjustments, introduce “non-sense” into the 
GDP numbers. Baker (1998b:7) is in complete disagreement with quality adjustments and argues 
Figure 5.4: Supply and demand for computers: a conceptual view 
 
Source: Reproduced from Sichel (1997a:17, figure 2-2) 
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that “The only measure of the quality of an investment good is its ability to produce revenue. 
Whatever else it can or cannot do is irrelevant from an economic perspective.”  
 
5.14. Software reclassified 
One weakness of the studies on the productivity paradox is that they sometimes ignore or 
underestimate the role played by software, as well as labour inputs. The omission of some IT 
inputs could distort the productivity measurement, because an understatement of inputs will result 
in an overstatement of productivity (NRC 1994:35).  
An analysis of the computer revolution should include software and computer-related labour 
inputs as well as hardware. Sichel (1997a:10 & 65) points out that “all tasks done with a computer 
require a combination of hardware, software, and labour inputs”. The combination of hardware, 
software and other expenses, including labour, is referred to as computing services (Sichel 
1997a: 65).  
Lichtenberg (1993:8) states that labour costs make up over 40% of IT budgets. It is necessary to 
include all the factors that computers require to function in the study of the computer revolution: 
hardware, software and computer-related labour inputs (Sichel 1997a:10). Obviously, computer 
software enables hardware to produce useful output (McCarthy 1997:5). 
Sichel (1997a: 65) reports that surveys of ICT departments of large US companies (from 1976 to 
1984) showed that the spending on hardware accounted for 38% of their budgets, whereas 
software accounted for 28% and labour and other expenses for 34%. Generally, software is 
extremely expensive to develop but costs almost nothing to produce (Krugman 2000:F-16). 
In a major change in the US NIPAs in 1999, computer software was reclassified in the national 
accounts. Previously, computer software purchases had been classified as intermediate inputs 
(CBO 1998:v). After the October 1999 comprehensive national accounts revision, software was 
classified as fixed investments (Grimm et al. 2002:11). The US Congressional Budget Office 
(CBO 1998:v) argues that “software spending generally fits the definition of an investment”, 
because software “like other capital expenditures, provides a flow of services that lasts more than 
a year” (Kliesen 1999:1). According to Spant (2003:41): “This had the effect of increasing total 
nominal investment in current dollars in 1999 by an estimated 95 billion dollars in the private 
sector and by 20 billion dollars in the public sector. Taken together, it increased recorded nominal 
and real GDP by around 1.5 per cent.” 
Thomas (2003:48-49) comments that reclassifying software shifted it from the income statement 
to the balance sheet, resulting in: (1) software no longer being a business expense, thus lowering 
operating costs and raising profits, but (2) also raising investment levels, real GDP growth and 
total assets.  
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It is important to note that this change had an asymmetrical impact on gross domestic product 
(GDP) compared to net domestic product (NDP), raising NDP only marginally because of 
increased depreciation. Depreciation of computers will be further discussed in the context of 
gross versus net measures of national output or product in chapter 6.  
Anselmo and Ledgard (2003:125) argue that software productivity is measured by functionality, 
complexity and quality. They also note that (Anselmo & Ledgard 2003:121): “software productivity 
has been dropping more rapidly than any other industry. The semiconductor industry had the 
most productivity growth (86%) from 1990 to 1995. In that same period, productivity for the 
software industry decreased by 10%, indeed, the worst decline of all industries.”  
The treatment of software as investment is controversial. Denison (1989:10) emphasises that 
there should be a clear distinction between the determinants of the advances in knowledge and 
the determinants of saving and investment; the “effect of the misclassification is to make growth 
analysis chaotic”. Denison was therefore opposed to “changes in national accounting which treat 
accretions of knowledge as investment” (Maddison 2005:4). 
Maddison (2005:4), adopting Denison’s view, argues that: “the only form of knowledge which is 
now treated as investment is computer software. It is odd to treat this rapidly depreciating 
knowledge as investment, whilst ignoring the more durable influence of books and education”. 
 
5.15. The internet and the “new economy” 
The rise of the internet therefore coincides with productivity acceleration in 1995. It is therefore 
worth considering the internet briefly in relation to productivity, because computers and peripheral 
equipment, software and communications equipment comprise the basic internet infrastructure. 
There is a wealth of literature on the economics of the internet. 
The internet is regarded as the main but not the only embodiment of the so-called “new 
economy”. The term “new economy” has several synonyms; the “internet superhighway”; the 
“new era economy”; the “network economy”; the “knowledge or information economy”; the “digital 
economy”; etc. The new economy – based on ICT and the internet – has been compared to the 
Industrial Revolution and referred to as the third industrial revolution (also the digital or IT 
revolution), thus underscoring its significance and widespread impact on how business is 
conducted (Mahadevan 2002:60). Some authors thought that a frictionless economy would 
evolve in which inflation would disappear and business cycles would end (Shiller 2005:119). 
The new economy started to flourish in about 1995 (Spant 2003:41) and its mantra, according to 
Jorgenson (2001:2), is “faster, better, cheaper”. It was claimed that a new economic paradigm 
was emerging, which would radically and qualitatively change the rules of the game (Krugman 
1997a:124). 
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The influential new economy magazine Wired published “New rules for the new economy”, which 
captures the spirit of the network economy: “This emerging new economy represents a tectonic 
upheaval in our commonwealth, a social shift that reorders our lives more than mere hardware or 
software ever can” (Kelly 1997:141). Kelly lays down 12 principles for surviving in this new and 
turbulent world.  
The subcomponents of the new economy are e-commerce; e-business; business-to-business e-
commerce (B2B); business-to-consumer e-commerce (B2C); and others. E-commerce is largely 
characterised by business-to-business or intermediate transactions in consumer spending on 
services and hence little of the new economy shows up as final demand (Landefeld & Fraumeni 
2001:28). The internet’s actual size is still relatively small. In 1998 it contributed some US$159 
billion or 1.8% to GDP and e-commerce sales were estimated at 1.01% of retail sales (Landefeld 
& Fraumeni 2001:26). 
In an important paper, Landefeld and Fraumeni (2001) provide guidelines on the measurement of 
the new economy. The issues raised are beyond the scope of this study, but the authors provide 
an estimate of the size of the internet economy for 1998 (table 5.5). 
Litan and Rivlin (2001) projected the economic impact of the internet and found that: (1) it has a 
real potential to raise productivity growth; (2) its impact is likely to be felt in “old economy” areas 
(health care, government); (3) it could expand the scope of management efficiencies; and (4) the 
bulk of the internet’s benefits will accrue to consumers in the form of greater convenience and 
more choice.  
The optimism sparked by the new economy gave rise to the stock market boom, especially on the 
technology-intensive Nasdaq exchange, which eventually collapsed in 2000. Many of the new 
principles adopted by investors led to the overvaluation of stock prices (in terms of P/E ratios), 
which ultimately reverted to valuations more in line with historical valuations when the speculative 
bubble burst. Investors were encouraged by publications such as Dow 36,000 by Glassman and 
Hassett (1999), which proposed a new theory of stock evaluation and claimed that stock prices 
would rise dramatically in the ensuing years. However, many new economy listings disappeared 
entirely after the market crashed. The “dot com bubble”, as it was dubbed, inspired a wealth of 
literature: see for example Robert Shiller’s Irrational exuberance (2005). Irrational exuberance – a 
phrase made famous by Alan Greenspan (1996) in a televised speech – was partly based on the 
labour productivity gains that started in the late 1990s (Shiller 2005:119).  
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Stiroh (1999), however, contends that the new economy, based on increasing globalisation and 
an expanding information technology, can adequately be explained by the principles of old 
economics. In an influential article published in the Harvard Business Review,  “How fast can the 
U.S. economy grow?”, Paul Krugman (1997b:123-129) criticised new era economics, stating that 
“the new paradigm simply does not make sense” (Krugman 1997b:124).  
New era thinking has many historical precedents and is typically inspired by a new technological 
breakthrough. The same clichés seem to be repeated over and over (Bernstein 1992:159): “In the 
new economy, many of the old classical rules of economics no longer apply; over the years the 
U.S. has made and learned new rules all its own.” This quote is taken from Time magazine 
published on 31 December 1958! The idea of a new economy is certainly not a modern concept 
and new era economic thinking has recurred frequently (Shiller 2005:106-143). Sornette 
(2003:267) discusses the similarity between various stock market crashes and found that a 
number of crashes had common characteristics: in 1962  “The ‘tronics boom,’ as it was called, 
actually has remarkably similar features to the New Economy boom preceding the October 1929 
crash or the New Economy boom of the late 1990s, ending in the April 2000 crash on the Nasdaq 
index”.  
Sornette (2003:270) also found that the average investor is motivated by future expected 
earnings and capital gains, whereas actual economic conditions play a secondary role, an 
attitude that can easily lead to speculative bubbles. New era thinking – inspired by the 
productivity acceleration in the mid-1990s - played some part in raising expectations of higher 
future earnings and capital growth. The optimism turned negative when, like all speculative 
manias, the bubble burst, financially devastating many investors and firms.  
 
Table 5.5: Estimates of the internet economy (1998) 
Layer Description Internet revenues 
(billions) (est.) 
GDP share Contribution to 
GDP (billions) 
One Infrastructure $115.0 0.37 $43.1 
Two Applications $56.3 0.60 $34.0 
Three Intermediary $58.2 0.18 $10.3 
Four Commerce $101.9 0.70 $71.4 
      Total $331.4 ………. $158.8 
Source:  Landefeld & Fraumeni (2001:26, table 1)
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5.16. Conclusion 
This chapter provided an overview of the many facets of the economics of productivity. Despite 
the different approaches to productivity analysis, which this chapter aimed to discuss, and despite 
the data revisions, investors interpreted the 1995 productivity revival as heralding a new 
economic era, but which ultimately led to irrational exuberance in stock valuations and the stock 
markets’ collapse in 2000.  
The next chapter looks at how productivity and computerisation are captured in the national 
income and product accounts (NIPAs). 
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6. CHAPTER 6: MAJOR EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX 
6.1. Overview 
Previous chapters provided background information on and discussed conceptual tools on 
various productivity-related topics, index numbers, ICT in the US national accounts and the 
economics of ICT and productivity. This chapter examines the principal explanations of the 
productivity paradox. The secondary explanations are examined in Chapter 7. The Solow 
computer paradox studies the apparent conflict between the sudden decline in measured 
productivity growth and the coincident rise in ICT investment in the 1970s. The principal 
explanations can loosely be grouped together, firstly, into the philosophical or methodological 
hypothesis and, secondly, into the mismeasurement hypothesis. 
These explanations may overlap to some extent. For example, quality change issues and the 
intensive employment of computers in services are closely related, because ICT is used 
intensively in the services sector where quality change is difficult to measure. In the literature, 
however, these two aspects are often treated separately, depending on the focus of the research. 
 
6.2. Principal explanations of the productivity paradox 
Significant papers by Baily and Gordon (1988) and Gordon (1996) on measurement issues and 
computer power, and performance of the service sector in the USA, provide a conceptual 
framework to analyse the possible candidates for the computer-related slowdown in productivity 
growth. The classification in table 6.1 is based on:  
(1) whether the explanation can account for the impact on an aggregate or sectoral level;  
(2) whether the explanation applies to the post-1973 period only or the pre-1973 as well as post-
1973 periods.  
These papers argue that only explanations consistent with quadrant A (see table 6.1) are 
candidates that can help to explain the productivity slowdown (Baily & Gordon 1988:349; Gordon 
1996:18). Issues that are raised in quadrant C merely "reshuffle the industry allocation of 
productivity change" (Gordon 1996:18). Explanations in quadrants B and D are not candidates for 
the productivity slowdown either, but they may be of interest to the calculation of the inflation rate. 
The Boskin Commission (1996) dealt with the problem of the accuracy of the calculation of 
consumer inflation in detail, which is discussed in more detail below. 
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The slowdown in productivity is not restricted to the USA: many other developed countries, mainly 
OECD members, also experienced a productivity slowdown after 1973. According to Arnold and 
Dennis (1999:9), "productivity growth slowed in virtually all advanced countries at about the same 
time and was generally more severe in countries other than the United States".   
The productivity slowdown in several countries after 1973 could mean that a common factor is 
responsible. Nordhaus (1982:140) asks whether an explanation should incorporate such a 
pervasive factor: “Given the universality, simultaneity, and depth of the productivity slowdown, it 
seems that we should look first for common explanations.” 
Another possible factor is the sectoral shift from the manufacturing sector (characterised by 
"tangible" output) to the services sector (characterised by "intangible" output). The stylised facts 
are that the manufacturing sector is typically a high productivity sector, whereas the services 
sector is a low productivity sector. Most OECD countries experienced such a shift during the 
period under discussion.  
To extend Gordon’s and Baily and Gordon’s arguments (see table 6.1), any credible explanation 
should account for the “clean break” of lower productivity growth in 1973, as well as the sudden 
upward surge in 1995. Thus any parameter that may have been mismeasured or otherwise 
influenced the productivity numbers, must be shown to have undergone a sudden change. The 
clean break is evident from the post-war figures, which were shown in chapter 4.  
One problem with many explanatory hypotheses is that the reasons provided are much more 
likely to take effect gradually than to cause a sudden reversal (Denison 1979a:122). Indeed, why 
should economic growth proceed smoothly, without being uninterrupted? According to Metcalfe 
(1987:617): “Knowledge-driven economic growth is not a smooth affair with each activity 
advancing in step. Rather, as Schumpeter insisted, it involves disharmony and fierce competition 
between the new and old, a diversity of sectoral growth rates and profit rates and continual 
reallocation of labour and capital between activities.”  
Table 6.1: Classification of measurement error candidates 
A    Affects aggregate economy, contributes 
to post-1973 slowdown 
B  Affects aggregate economy, but same 
effect pre-1973 and post-1973 
C   Contributes to post-1973 slowdown for an 
industry, no aggregate impact 
D   Measurement error that applies pre-1973 
and post-1973, no aggregate impact 
Source: Gordon (1996:18); Baily & Gordon (1988: 349) 
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6.3. The philosophical hypothesis 
The philosophical or methodological hypothesis is the general, meta-level and theoretical critique 
of productivity analysis in the context of the neoclassical paradigm. The main explanation of the 
paradox in the neoclassical framework is the mismeasurement hypothesis, which is examined 
below. 
The philosophical critique states that the neoclassical research programme is flawed because 
neo-classical assumptions are unrealistic. The neoclassical framework has been much criticised. 
The framework’s assumptions, such as perfect competition, constant returns to scale, etc. have 
been rejected by many economists. Indeed, many analytical models are based on neoclassical 
assumptions (see, for example, Oliner & Sichel 2002b:16).  
Generally, Blaug in his Economic theory in retrospect (1996: 693) argues as follows:  
The besetting methodological vice of neo-classical economics was the illegitimate use of 
microstatic theorems, derived from ‘timeless’ models that excluded technical change and 
the growth of resources, to predict the historical sequence of events in the real world.  A 
leading example of this vice was the explanation of the alleged constancy of the relative 
shares of labour and capital by the claim that the aggregate production function of the 
economy is of the Cobb-Douglas type, although the theory in question referred to 
microeconomic production functions and no reasons were given for believing that Cobb-
Douglas microfunctions could be neatly aggregated to form a Cobb-Douglas 
macrofunction. 
We saw that the production function approach is largely based on neoclassical assumptions. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995:11) argue as follows: 
The inclusion of technological change in the neoclassical framework is difficult, because 
the standard competitive assumptions cannot be maintained. Technological advance 
involves the creation of new ideas, which are partially nonrival and therefore have 
aspects of public goods. For a given technology … it is reasonable to assume constant 
returns to scale in the standard, rival factors of production … But then, the returns to 
scale tend to be increasing if the nonrival ideas are included as factors of production. 
These increasing returns are in conflict with perfect competition. 
At the most fundamental level, the production function and growth accounting approach have one 
thing in common: they are supply-side approaches, with no reference to the demand side. In a 
review of Denison’s 1967 work, Why Growth Rates Differ, Harrod (1969:324-25) commented as 
follows:  
In my opinion the course of demand has been much the most important determinant of 
growth … the point is that producers will not take the trouble to increase their supply 
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potential, whether by capital investment, or by managerial reorganisation … if they see 
no prospect of selling the extra output from their doing so. 
Nelson (1973) criticises the growth accounting framework and argues that it may be impossible to 
distinguish between a movement along the production function and a shift in the function, which is 
an essential feature of the Solow analysis of technical change (see Solow 1957:320). Rymes 
(1972, 1983) contends that the Solow model is flawed and the distinction between technical 
change (shift in the production function) and capital accumulation (movement along production 
function) cannot be used.  
Denison (1987:574) countered the objection of economic interaction between determinants by 
saying that it poses no serious threat to growth accounting and to abandon the analysis would be 
tantamount to abandoning quantitative analysis of growth and growth policy.  
In practice, it is difficult to distinguish between capital accumulation and productivity growth for 
the following reasons: “First, technical advances might be embodied in new capital. Second, by 
raising the returns to capital, increased TFP might induce greater capital accumulation. Thus as a 
point of departure, it is worth asking whether the growth accounting exercise actually yields a 
meaningful decomposition” (Collins & Bosworth 1996:164). 
Romer (1987) argues against the theoretical foundations of growth accounting and attacks the 
constant returns to scale assumption. Instead, he introduces a growth accounting model with 
increasing returns to scale.  
The story of productivity and of the computer paradox as reflected in the official statistics is 
coherent, but if tested against ultimate (rather than proximate) foundations, faces serious 
philosophical and methodological challenges. This argument reduces to “coherentism” versus 
“foundationalism” (see Blackburn 1996:67 & 145). Blackburn (1996:145) defines coherentism as 
the view that “a body of propositions may be known without a foundation in certainty, but by their 
interlocking strength, rather as a crossword puzzle may be known to have been solved correctly 
even if each answer, taken individually, admits of uncertainty”.  
Despite philosophical challenges, the NIPAs and their methodological building blocks provide a 
coherent picture, albeit grounded on several contestable foundations. 
 
6.4. The Cambridge Controversy 
The aggregation problem discussed here is the production function aggregation problem. The 
sectoral aggregation problem will be considered in a later section.  
The production function aggregation problem is also known as the Cambridge Controversy, which 
raged in the 1930s between the Cambridge School of Economics (CSE) in the UK and the 
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Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) at Cambridge in the USA. The former school, which 
included Joan Robinson (see quote below) and Kaldor, was highly critical of the MIT school, 
represented, among other, by Solow and Samuelson.  
The main focus of the CSE’s attack was on growth theory based on the aggregate production 
function. According to the CSE, reswitching of production techniques rendered the neoclassical 
approach invalid. Briefly, reswitching means “the possibility that the same capital to labour ratio 
can be associated with two relative prices of capital to labour (Pearce 1992:301). MIT thought 
that although reswitching weakened neoclassical theory, it did not invalidate all neoclassical 
theory. The CSE school of thought doubted whether the aggregate function existed at all (Pearce 
1992: 49, 51 & 375). Blaug (1992:171) summarises the problem and argues that the neoclassical 
productivity analysis was nothing more than “measurement without theory”, which is based on the 
following: “The notion that the functional distribution of income may be explained simply by 
invoking the principles of marginal productivity, as enshrined in an aggregate production function 
of the simple Cobb-Douglas variety.” 
Furthermore (Blaug 1992:171): 
After Solow’s seminal article of 1957, estimation of aggregate production functions for 
purposes of measuring the sources of growth and drawing inferences about the nature of 
technical change became a widespread practice in economic research, ignoring the 
profound difficulties that surround the entire concept of an aggregate production function. 
However, Grunfeld and Griliches (1960) examine the “micro” versus the “macro” issues and claim 
that there could be an aggregation gain rather than an aggregation error. The authors argue that 
aggregation of economic variables can reduce specification errors that occur in empirically-
estimated microeconomic relations of individual consumer or producers. 
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid some use of aggregate methods. As Hahn and 
Matthews (1964:888) argue in a major survey of the theory of economic growth: “For it seems 
fairly clear that any confrontation of theory with fact will have to proceed by the use of some 
aggregative methods.” They argue that crude theoretical constructs should be found that can 
adequately deal with the crude evidence, rather like “plumbers use a spanner”. 
Indeed, a practical orientation to find usable solutions has been adopted instead of abandoning 
the research project in the light of abstract objections.  
In a review of the literature on production functions, Griliches and Mairesse (1995:2) contend that 
the production function “is a tool, a framework for answering other questions, only partially related 
to the ‘production function’ itself”. They focus on the “identification problem” associated with Cobb 
and Douglas’s (1928) work on the production function. The Cobb-Douglas function is examined in 
more detail below.  
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6.5. The Cobb-Douglas production function 
The Cobb-Douglas function makes the following assumptions: competitive markets, constant 
returns to scale, neutral technological change, and constant shares of the factors in national 
income (NRC 1979:44).  
Of course these are extremely restrictive assumptions. However, other functional forms of the 
production function, such as the translog function, are more flexible and 
allow for economies of scale, variable elasticities of substitution between the factors, and 
“biased technological change,” which means that changing technology may increase the 
demand for one factor relative to another. Under the latter assumptions, the shares of the 
factors in national income (factor cost) may be changing over time. This implies either a 
constant elasticity of substitution that differs from unity or a variable elasticity of 
substitution. (NRC 1979:44).  
The Cobb-Douglas function has not only been criticised but indeed ridiculed. Robinson (1955:71) 
states the following:  
The fallacy at the root of the production function is the idea that it is possible to specify 
purely technical relations, not involving prices, in a human economy. Even Robinson 
Crusoe does not provide an example of an economy for which this is valid. … Only … 
living in a timeless present, satisfy the conditions required for the neo-classical analysis 
of production to make sense.   
Another instance is the invective directed against the production function by Shaikh (1987:690-
691) where he refers to the “humbug production function” in an article in the authoritative New 
Palgrave dictionary of economics (Eatwell et al. 1987). Although Solow (1974:121) replied to an 
earlier version (Shaikh 1974) of this critique, the criticism has sometimes been repeated.  
Griliches and Mairesse (1995:2) examine the objections to the Cobb-Douglas function, in 
particular the argument that the production function is not “identifiable” – that is, the right-hand 
side variables (the explanatory variables) are not independent variables but are highly correlated 
with one another. This statistical problem is known as multicollinearity, which implies that the 
regression model has difficulty isolating which explanatory variable influences the dependent 
variable (Koop 2000:88). The issue of multicollinearity is also part of the hedonic regression 
techniques discussed below (Triplett 2004: chapter VI). 
Phelps Brown (1957:551) analyses the Cobb-Douglas production function and concludes that 
fitting the function to a time series “has not yielded, and cannot yield, the statistical realization of a 
production function”.  
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Solow (1960:90) too had his doubts and said “that it may be argued that the aggregate production 
function is itself a dubious tool”. 
 
6.6. What does total factor productivity measure? 
Prescott (1997) makes the case that a theory of TFP is needed. Prescott argues that TFP is the 
all-important factor to account for extremely large international income differences; whereas 
differences in physical and intangible capital (higher capital per worker), or differences in national 
savings cannot account for international income disparities. A theory of TFP should include 
additional factors, not only the growth in technical knowledge, to account for international income 
differences, so that a theory of TFP is needed. The author argues that society’s policy 
arrangements cause resistance to the adoption of new technologies and to the efficient use of 
existing technologies (Prescott 1997:33).  
In an overview of the TFP literature (Lipsey & Carlaw 2001:3), three main interpretations emerge: 
(1) TFP measures the rate of technical change; (2) TFP measures “only the free lunches of 
technical change, which are mainly associated with externalities and scale effects”; and (3) TFP 
does not measure anything useful. Lipsey and Carlaw (2001: 4) ask what TFP measures and 
conclude that “TFP does not measure technological change”. There is, however, the implicit 
assumption that in the long run, technological change is extremely important as the main 
determinant of economic growth. The authors’ study is consistent with Prescott’s, but adds to the 
list of additional factors.  
In a subsequent paper, Carlaw and Lipsey (2003) examined the relationship between 
productivity, technology and growth in a survey of the TFP literature and drew the same 
conclusion, that is, TFP is not a measure of technological change. 
The methodological issues are vital critiques of the philosophical underpinnings of productivity 
measurement, but it appears from the responses to these critiques that they are not fatal. 
Productivity measurement is feasible and credible despite these objections. However, less 
philosophical and more technical issues are also under attack. The rest of this chapter looks at 
these issues.  
  
6.7. The mismeasurement hypothesis 
Several aspects of this are examined and it is reiterated that there is often an overlap between 
different explanations. It is possible that Solow could have had the mismeasurement hypothesis 
in mind (that the official statistics understate true productivity) when he observed that computers 
are everywhere except in the productivity statistics (Kettell 2001:248).  
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Webb (1998:47-50) provides a general summary of the pitfalls in the measurement of 
productivity. The following three issues are highlighted: (1) the level and rate of growth of 
productivity is understated, emanating from the difficulties encountered in estimating real output 
(which relates largely to the accuracy of the CPI and price deflators discussed elsewhere in this 
dissertation); (2) over short periods of time, productivity growth rates are extremely volatile, 
whereas over long periods productivity follows the business cycle in a predictable way, possibly 
creating the false impression that a new trend has emerged; and (3) disaggregating the economy 
into sectors can introduce additional errors into the calculations because it is difficult to accurately 
allocate input or output to particular sectors.  
 
6.8. Measurement of quality change  
Although there are several explanations of the productivity paradox, the main arguments focus on 
measurement issues. Because quality change is believed to be measured inaccurately in the 
official statistics, the productivity paradox of information technology is regarded as a statistical 
deception. In particular, it is argued that the output of the ICT industry is difficult to measure (see, 
for example, Baily & Gordon 1988) and actual quality improvements achieved in the computer 
hardware and software industries are not adequately captured, or not captured at all, in the 
NIPAs. The BLS, however, does make adjustments for quality change in the national accounts 
(see, for example, Dean & Harper 1988). However, these adjustments are biased according to 
the Advisory commission to study the consumer price index (1996:53-56), also known as the 
Boskin Commission, and other researchers. 
The quality change bias is found to be particularly pronounced with computers, and actual quality 
improvements are greater than those captured in the official data.  
The problem of new product bias is examined in conjunction with or as a component of the quality 
change bias (Advisory Commission … 1996:47). Improvements in product quality refer to 
characteristics such as greater durability and better energy efficiency, less need for repair, lighter 
and safer products, etc. (Advisory Commission … 1996:13). The new product bias refers to the 
failure to include new products, or the delay in the introduction of new products into the CPI (see 
Advisory Commission … 1996:56-57). For example, the personal computer was only introduced 
in the CPI in 1987 (Advisory Commission … 1996:56).  
The mismeasurement of quality change can have an enormous impact on the standard of living. 
For example, Fogel (2004:9-10), in an extreme view, states that his own rough estimates show 
that taking into account more leisure time, better health care and education would increase the 
growth rate of per capita income from 2.0 to 3.6% per annum over the past century in the USA, 
greatly improving the average citizen’s standard of living. Conventional growth measurements 
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estimate real incomes to have risen sevenfold, whereas the adjusted measurements estimate 
incomes to have risen 34 times between 1900 and 2000. Consequently, Fogel (2004:10) reckons 
that “80 percent of the goods and services that Americans enjoy today are outside of the 
measured economy”.  
Diewert and Fox (1999:274) argue that mismeasurement can explain the productivity paradox 
and, moreover, can account for the abrupt productivity growth collapse in the 1970s, for two main 
reasons:  
(1) the lack of adjustment for inflation in calculating business income, particularly during 
periods of high inflation when accounting of costs (such as interest and depreciation) can 
fail, leading to inaccurate product pricing and causing a loss of efficiency in the economy; 
and 
(2) the failure of traditional cost accounting, resulting in higher tax payments and lower 
productivity of an economy under conditions of high inflation and the current system of 
business income taxation.   
Diewert and Fox (1999:252-263) also discuss other aspects of the mismeasurement hypothesis 
which can account for the slowdown, but cannot account for the abruptness of the slowdown in 
the 1970s. These are the measurement problems associated with the failure of the under-
resourced statistical agencies to measure the costs and benefits of new goods and products; the 
misclassification of final demand as intermediate business expenditures; and the 
mismeasurement of services industries’ outputs. A subsequent paper by Diewert and Fox (2001) 
drew similar conclusions. 
In contrast, Gilbert (1961:291) does not believe that quality improvements are measurable – 
hence quality improvements should be construed as an “unmeasurable benefit that is derived 
from cost-free progress in the arts of production”. Thus, quality change should be reflected in the 
production index, not the price index (Gilbert 1961:291) (italics added). The confusion is between 
enforcing either a price or a quantity change; for example, the introduction of a more compact 
motorcar does not mean deflation (lower price) – it means a decrease in the amount of production 
per motorcar (lower quantity). The consumer is demanding less output because his/her tastes 
have changed. According to Gilbert (1961:294), quality changes are like changes in taste: they 
cannot be captured by indexes. Indexes should not be concerned with the consumers’ level of 
satisfaction (Gilbert 1961:291). Consumer satisfaction is not a measurable concept.  
According to Baumol et al. (1989:239-240), there is no need to explore the complex set of 
characteristics of a product to measure quality improvements, because the price mechanism 
(through relative price adjustments) is a transmitter of information about product characteristics 
and unambiguously conveys the product’s utility to the consumer.  
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The mismeasurement hypothesis is itself under attack. Baker (1998a) interprets some of the 
problems with this hypothesis. He argues that the costs of adopting new technologies are not 
generally incorporated in the CPI analysis. A far greater effort is made to assess the benefits, but 
little effort is made to quantify the costs of new technologies. For example, Baker (1998a:7) 
argues that it is an addition to the cost of living to own, say, a telephone, a computer or the 
internet (in order not to lag behind other users). A further example is that an improvement in the 
treatment of Aids (e.g. a longer life expectancy) cannot be accounted for as an improvement in 
the standard of living unless a downward adjustment in living standards was made at the onset of 
the pandemic (e.g. a shortened life expectancy).  
In an early paper on services measurement, Hill (1977:333) denies that nonmarket services, such 
as some educational services for which output values have to be imputed, are more difficult to 
measure than manufactured goods. In fact he believes that mismeasurement problems are 
probably less severe in services than in some manufactured goods, particularly those undergoing 
rapid technological progress!  
Similarly, the OECD (1991:8) study, Technology and productivity: the challenge for economic 
policy, concludes that “measurement errors can account for only a small share of the slowdown in 
productivity”. Also, Pakko (2002) examines the high-tech (that is, information processing and 
communications technologies) investment boom and economic growth in the 1990s in terms of 
quality changes affecting the sector. He finds that quality adjustment in the various high-tech 
sectors affecting the measurement of investment in the NIPAs do not account for the rapid growth 
rates in investment rates in the 1990s, because variances of investment growth in some sectors 
overwhelm the actual investment growth rates (Pakko 2002:16). 
Sichel (1997a:11) contends that despite the increased use of computers, it is unlikely that the 
mismeasurement gap has widened in recent decades. In terms of Gordon’s earlier classification 
(see table 6.1 above), Sichel does not believe that mismeasurement qualifies as an explanatory 
candidate.  
 
6.9. Quality change and hedonic methods 
Hedonic indexes were discussed in chapter 3. They are applied here to the issue of quality 
changes and measurement of productivity.  
The BLS uses five methods to adjust for quality change for an existing product, several of which 
are biased (see Advisory Commission … 1996:53-56). To rectify these biases, hedonic indexes 
are the main tools for adjusting for quality changes in the national accounts. As stated in chapter 
3, in 2001, hedonic techniques were applied to NIPA components which amounted to 22.3% of 
GDP. Hedonic methods have spawned a large body of literature and a brief overview is provided 
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here. See for example, Triplett’s (2004) Handbook on hedonic indexes and quality adjustments in 
price indexes: special application to information technology products and the US National 
Research Council (NRC 2002), At what price? conceptualizing and measuring cost-of-living and 
price indexes. Triplett is one of the leading experts and practitioners in price hedonics (Hulten 
2003:6). The NRC (2002:122-146) also provides an excellent overview of hedonic methods 
(Hulten 2003:9).  
Diewert and Fox (2005:3) find that the use of hedonic methods “has lead to substantial declines 
in investment deflators, relative to the unadjusted price indexes…. The lower deflators lead to 
higher real investment, and hence higher output levels. The more accelerated the fall in prices, 
the higher the rates of real GDP growth. This can, in turn, impact on productivity growth 
estimates.” 
Maddison and Denison, however, are two economists who regard hedonic methods with great 
suspicion, if not outright contempt. Maddison (2005:28-29, appendix 3) characterises the work by 
Nordhaus (1997a), a paper dealing with the application of hedonic methods to the history of the 
price of light from 1800 to 1992, and DeLong (1998), on the estimation of world GDP from one 
million BC to the present, as “hallucigenic history”. Maddison (2005:4) believes that the over-use 
(“an overdose”) of hedonic methods renders the national accounts chaotic; he remains sceptical 
that “quality changes have been so large and monotonically positive”.  
Denison (1989:15-38) critically examines the hedonic method developed for quality measurement 
of computers introduced and developed by Cole et al. (1986) and Cartright (1986) and adopted 
by the BEA. His comprehensive critique is further discussed below (see sections 6.16 & 6.17).  
As long ago as 1961, Gilbert (1961: 287) stated that the quality adjustments that can be captured 
by index numbers are limited and therefore should be avoided, because “these challenges are 
conceptually wrong; they rest on the assumption that intangible quality improvements can be 
brought into the sphere of quantitative measurement. In the end, they would make it impossible to 
construct measures of output and price changes that are useful to the study of economic growth”.  
In a critical review of price hedonics, Hulten (2003:12) assesses the “pathology of the hedonic 
technique” and provides a brief summary of the hedonic method. He finds three general problems 
with hedonic regression models. The first problem is product differentiation: “where does a good 
stop being a variety of a given product class and become a product on its own” (Hulten 2003:9). 
The second refers to the selection of product characteristics: characteristics influencing producer 
as well as consumer behaviour should be included in the regression analysis, which 
unrealistically assumes that producers and consumers share the same set of product attributes. 
For example, consumers may value a motorcar’s maximum speed and acceleration, whereas 
producers may value engine power and safety. Also, different consumers may not use the same 
set of product characteristics on which they base their spending decisions or value them 
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differently. There are other problems as well (Hulten 2003:10). The third problem refers to the 
choice of functional form of the production function. Functional forms were discussed in chapter 2 
and earlier in this chapter.  
The multicollinearity problem (discussed above) rears its ugly head in hedonic techniques and 
has become a “red flag” against its use, although Triplett (2004: chapter VI) believes that the 
problem is not unmanageable if the data are thoroughly cleaned. Triplett’s Handbook (2004) also 
devotes chapter VII to objections to the hedonic indexes, in particular, to the view that hedonic 
indexes fall too fast.  
According to the NRC (2002:140), hedonic regression techniques are therefore not a cure all for 
quality measurement problems because they do not capture increases in product variety or solve 
the problem of the introduction of new goods. The NRC (2002:140), however, states that “there is 
nothing better for dealing with certain aspects of the quality change problem”. Also, the NRC 
(2002:141) recommended that the BLS adopt “a more cautious integration of hedonically adjusted 
price change estimates into the CPI”.  
 
6.10. Intangible capital  
The quality measurement issue is related to the concept of intangibles, that is, intangible 
investment and intangible assets. There is now a growing interest in intangibles and this is 
reflected in more research papers being devoted to the issue (for a list see Corrado et al. 2006:2, 
footnote 2). Certain “intangible” factors, such as quality changes, are difficult to measure and 
capture in the indexes. The service sector in particular poses a measurement problem and a 
large body of research has been devoted to analysing the difficulty of measuring the output of the 
service sector (see Griliches 1992a; Guile & Quinn 1988; Hill 1977; Howitt 1998; Sherwood 
1994). The services sector was discussed in chapter 5 and is elaborated on below.  
The OECD’s manual (2001:93), defines “intangible fixed assets” as “non-financial produced fixed 
assets that consist of mineral exploration, computer software, entertainment, literary or artistic 
originals and other intangible fixed assets intended to be used for more than one year”. 
Nakamura (1999:3-4) classifies new product developments, copyrights, patents, new processes 
for making existing goods, brand names and trademarks as intangibles. These intangibles are 
typically the result of R&D investments. Corrado et al. (2006) provide a similar list of intangibles. 
Prescott (1997:4) includes human capital as an intangible. Because intangibles are not counted in 
the NIPAs, investment as well as national income and national saving are understated 
(Nakamura 1999:10). 
Nakamura (1999) claims that intangibles “Put the new in the new economy”. In a subsequent 
study, Nakamura (2001) quantified the US gross investment in intangibles and found that it was 
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(at least) one trillion dollars a year. This amount of intangible investment is almost on a par with 
investment in fixed nonresidential plant and equipment of $1.1 trillion in 2000 (Nakamura 2001:2). 
Similarly, Corrado et al. (2006) examined intangible capital and economic growth. In their study 
they found that from 2003 as much as $800 billion of intangible investment was still excluded 
from the published data, the inclusion of which would drastically alter the observed pattern of 
GDP growth. The authors conclude that if intangibles are counted as capital, the role of MFP in 
economic growth is reduced and capital deepening becomes the dominant cause of economic 
growth (Corrado et al. 2006: “abstract”).  
Only in 1999 did the BEA start to include software investment in the NIPAs, “so US measured 
gross domestic product is nearly 2 percent higher that it would be if intangibles weren’t counted at 
all” (Nakamura 2001:2). As stated by Oliner et al. (2007:87) “The NIPAs omit production of 
virtually all intangible capital other than software.”  
According to Madrick (1998:55-58), Sichel’s 1997 study finds that if software investment were 
included, computers would boost productivity by only 0.75% per year; and if computer 
depreciation were included, the productivity boost would be reduced to 0.15% per year.  
Yang and Brynjolfsson (2001) rework the standard growth accounting methodology to include 
intangible computer investments. Computer-related investments form part of unmeasured 
intangible assets and the authors find that complementary (to computer hardware) but intangible 
computer investments are far larger than the direct investments in computers. They report that 
TFP in the USA grew as much as 1% per annum faster in the 1990s compared to the official 
estimates. They find that “computers are everywhere” when intangibles are included: “Even back 
in 1987, the years of Solow’s famous quip, we estimate that computer hardware and its 
complementary intangible investments may have been equal to about 7.5% of GDP, if the 10  to 1 
ratio … for a sample of 753 large firms held throughout the economy” (Yang & Brynjolfsson 
2001:21).  
An earlier paper also found a 10 to 1 ratio (Brynjolfsson & Yang 1999), which uses financial 
market valuations of firms to estimate intangible costs. (Their actual results are not reported in 
detail here because they regard the paper as preliminary and incomplete.)  
Gordon (2004b:123) takes up the intangible problem but dismisses the 10 to 1 ratio as greatly 
exaggerated. He opines that hidden intangible capital is more likely to be reduced to a ratio of 1 
to 1 if communications hardware is taken into account. Pertinently, Gordon argues that Yang and 
Brynjolfsson should explain why intangible capital did not produce a productivity growth revival 
during the 1972 to 1987 period, during which ICT investment rose rapidly. Solow referred to this 
in his famous quip (Gordon 2004b: 124).  
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6.11. Problems with index numbers 
Because index numbers are the main tools for productivity analysis, this account of the 
productivity paradox has focused on index number theory and its application in practice. Sichel 
(1997a:91, footnote 33) remarks that whereas it is generally agreed that nominal output is well 
measured, “the problems lie in the price indexes used to translate nominal output to real output”.   
Diewert (1987) provides a general overview of index numbers and his entry in The new Palgrave 
dictionary of economics commences with an account of the index number problem, thus showing 
its relevance. But just how controversial index numbers can be is shown in the opening quote in 
the preface to a standard text on index numbers by Allen 1975:ix): “Index numbers are a 
widespread disease of modern life … It is really questionable … whether we would be any worse 
off if the whole bag of tricks were scrapped. So many of these index numbers are so ancient and 
so out of date, so out of touch with reality, so devoid of practical value when they have been 
computed, that their regular calculation must be regarded as a widespread compulsion neurosis” 
(Moroney 1956:48-49). 
In his popular tract, Facts from figures, Moroney (1956:50) cynically dismissed indexes as 
“academic tomfoolery of telling us what we already know from hard experience”. 
Wynne and Sigalla (1996) provide a comprehensive survey of measurement biases in price 
indexes and the index number problems. A brief summary, based on their paper, is provided here 
(Wynne & Sigalla 1996: 56-58): 
(1) The first set of problems arises with the measurement of the individual prices of the 
goods and services that comprise an overall price index. Several issues emerge: 
(a) Quality changes. 
(b) Measurement of services. 
(c) Measurement of the flow of services from a durable good, such as a house or a 
motorcar. See services below. 
(d) Representativity of sampled prices. 
(e) List prices versus actual prices. 
(2) The second set of problems is how to aggregate individual prices of goods and services 
into a single measure of the overall price level. This is known as the index number 
problem.  
The index number problem seriously affects the computation of the share of the computer 
industry in investment and the capital stock in the overall economy. Sichel (1997a:41) and Oliner 
and Sichel (1994:278) argue that nominal rather than real magnitudes are appropriate for 
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calculating these variables, since “these real shares … have little meaning and can be made to 
take on almost any value depending on the base year chosen” (Sichel 1997a:41).  
The use of hedonic methods and chain indexes involves two methods of approaching the 
problem. Neither solutions are fully satisfactory and have been criticised in the literature, 
particularly hedonic methods.  
Generally, index numbers, for all their sophistication, are blunt instruments and may fail to 
adequately capture the true values of the variables they measure. As standards of measurement, 
index numbers could fall short of the ideal and could be inaccurate – despite the sophistication of 
methodology and econometric tools –  and should be used with caution.  
 
6.12. Factor income shares 
Factor income shares were discussed in chapters 2 and 5. The measurement of factor income 
shares is also considered controversial and difficult to pin down precisely. Generally, researchers 
have estimated the proportion to be between 70 and 75% for labour and 30 and 25% for capital.  
A key property of the Cobb-Douglas function is the behaviour of factor income shares, because 
“in a competitive economy … capital and labour are each paid their marginal products; that is, the 
marginal product of capital equals the rental price … and the marginal product of labour equals 
the wage rate” (Barro & Sala-i-Martin 2004:30). According to Cornwall (1987:661), the 
justifications for the weighting scheme in the Cobb-Douglas production function are neither 
convincing nor well-defended, and what type of bias could result has not been clarified. The 
values chosen for weights are based on the share of output or income accruing to the primary 
factor inputs, capital and labour, in any particular country. Although factor shares do measure 
each input’s contribution under perfect competition, the real world does not conform to perfect 
competition, irrespective of equilibrium conditions (Cornwall 1987:661). Indeed, perfect 
competition is a necessary assumption for the marginal productivity theory of distribution to 
account for the share of income (Pearce 1992:10).  
Prescott (1997:11-12), however, states that there is a constancy of factor income shares over 
time and across countries and that the income share of labour does not vary with income levels, 
and has fluctuated at around 70%. For most countries, labour shares are in the range of 0.65 to 
0.80. Thus factor shares are approximately constant across time and space. 
Cornwall’s article (1987:661) in The new Palgrave: a dictionary of economics highlights several of 
the weighting scheme concerns: “the justification of the weighing schemes in growth accounting 
have never been convincing nor have they been well defended”. Because the weighting scheme 
of capital and labour is flawed, in that it assumes constant returns to scale, several important 
issues emerge: 
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(1) It reduced the share of capital to insignificance thus highlighting the unimportance of 
capital for economic growth. This view is reflected in the work of Denison (1980a:220), 
which concluded that “capital is one of several important sources of output growth … 
capital is not the source of growth” (italics in original). 
(2) There were concerns about the unusually large size of the residual, which indicated that 
there was something amiss with the analysis, irrespective of whether the residual was 
referred to as efficiency, technical progress or TFP.  
(3) If scale economies are introduced as an explanatory variable (to explain the residual) 
constant returns to scale are violated.  
(4) There may be interactions between the factor inputs and TFP and it might be impossible 
to separate such inputs, especially capital, from the components of the residual.  
Romer (1987:165) argues in favour of increasing returns to scale and finds that the “conventional 
growth accounting analysis substantially underestimates the role of capital accumulation in 
growth. The correct weight on the rate of growth of capital … may be closer to 1 than to 0.25.” 
Over the long run, labour’s exponent of 0.1 to 0.2 is smaller than its share of income (Romer 
1987:166). Labour’s trivial share, if interpreted literally, implies that output is almost independent 
of labour input (Bernanke 1987:204), which seems to be an absurd conclusion.  
Sarel (1997) argues that the calculation of factor shares is crucial to the accuracy of the relative 
contribution of accumulation versus TFP. He provides an alternative method to the national 
accounts and regression approaches for calculating factor shares. His results contradict previous 
studies of growth and productivity in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and the 
Philippines. The precise determination of factor income shares is therefore crucial. As mentioned 
in chapter 2, Senhadji (2000:152) and Sarel (1997:14) have shown that TFP’s contribution to 
output is highly sensitive to the share of capital: a higher share of capital implies a lower 
contribution of TFP to growth. 
 
6.13. ICT and the services sector 
Many economists have argued that the output of the services sector is particularly difficult to 
measure. Significant ICT investment has gone into service industries, which are the most 
intensive users of ICT (Bosworth & Triplett 2003:2).   
As discussed in chapter 5, Griliches (1994) divides total output into the “measurable” and 
“unmeasurable” sectors. The “unmeasurable” industries, largely the service industries, grew as a 
share of GDP between 1947 and 1990. Since over three-quarters of computer investment had 
been in the “unmeasurable” sectors, the productivity effects were “largely invisible” (Griliches 
 126
1994:11). Griliches believes that this explains the computer productivity paradox. More 
specifically, he (1994: 3) imagined a “degrees of measurability” scale with a dividing line between 
measurable and unmeasurable sectors in GNP. Measurable sectors are agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing, transportation, communications and public utilities, whereas the unmeasurable 
sectors are construction, trade, finance, other services, and government (Griliches 1994:3, note 
to figure 1). Between 1947 and 1990, the measurable sectors’ shares dwindled from 48.7 to 
30.9% of GNP, implying that the unmeasurable sectors had risen from about one-half (51.3%) to 
above two-thirds (69.1%) (Griliches 1994:11, table 2). Measurement problems have therefore 
worsened and along with it the ability to interpret total factor productivity (Griliches 1994:10). 
Indeed, Griliches (1994:11) argues that 
the consequence of this shift is what has become known as the “computer paradox.” We 
have made major investments in computers and in other information-processing 
equipment. … Why has this not translated itself into visible productivity growth? The 
major answer to the puzzle is very simple: over three-quarters of this investment has 
gone into our “unmeasurable” sectors…and thus its productivity effects, which are likely 
to be quite real, are largely invisible in the data. 
The fact that services output is difficult to measure is also argued by Sherwood (1994), Diewert 
and Fox (1999:262-263) and McGuckin and Stiroh (2000). 
According to Roach (2003), in the services sector, both the productivity numerator (or services 
output) and the denominator (hours worked) are inaccurate. Output measurement (the 
numerator) is “hopelessly vague for services” and official measures are inaccurate because they 
have used worker compensation as a proxy for output in many service industries. White-collar 
productivity is overstated since working hours (the denominator) have become longer (owing to 
modern communication technology), whereas the official average work week has been 
unchanged since 1988 at 35.5 hours.  
Output mismeasurement is discussed more fully in the next section.  
 
6.14. Mismeasurement of output 
Both output and input can be subject to mismeasurement. Brynjolfsson (1993) argues that 
mismeasurement of output is largely the inability to calculate accurate quality-adjusted price 
deflators. Sichel (1997a:90) contends that output is intangible and hard to measure. He 
(1997a:90-100) discusses several aspects of output mismeasurement: (1) mismeasurement and 
neoclassical contribution to growth; (2) the Boskin Commission report and the measurement gap; 
(3) mismeasurement and final demand; and (4) whether mismeasurement has increased over 
time. The first issue was discussed above, while the Boskin report is dealt with below. 
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Gilbert (1961:288) contends that, in essence, an increase in output means that “all the goods of 
the base year are available (with quality unchanged) plus additional units of some goods. The 
additional units constitute the increase in output”. Hence “economic welfare as a measurable idea 
must be restricted to telling us if we are better off only by our having more goods. Any broader 
idea of welfare which would take account of the character of the goods available, or the 
satisfaction they give, may be a perfectly valid subject for speculative appraisal, but it is not 
measurable” (Gilbert 1961:288).   
 
6.15. Neoclassical framework 
Sichel (1997a:91), in his seminal work, points out that computer output mismeasurement or 
unmeasured output will have little effect on the contribution of computers to output growth in the 
neoclassical framework. This is so because “the estimates of computing services’ contribution to 
output growth were derived from the input side and do not rely on estimates of real output growth 
… the neoclassical contribution to output is calculated from capital and labour inputs that 
generate computing services, along with assumed rates of return for these inputs. Thus 
mismeasurement of output would not affect neoclassical contributions to growth” (italics in 
original) (Sichel 1997a:91).  
Sichel (1997:93)also states the following: 
an assertion that the neoclassical contribution to output growth is too low because some 
of the output generated by computers is not measured is essentially an assertion that 
computer hardware and software earn supernormal returns.…Unless one is prepared to 
assert that computer hardware or software earned supernormal returns, 
mismeasurement of output growth will have little impact on the size of the neoclassical 
contribution of computing services to output growth.  
Similarly, Sichel (1997b) argues that mismeasurement problems of industry output shares are 
related to the method of calculating aggregate GDP. Sichel’s (1997b:368, footnote 5) argument is 
worth quoting in full:  
Strictly speaking, output shares should be based on a final product decomposition, rather 
than an industry decomposition. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) obtains its 
official measure of aggregate GDP by adding up expenditures on final products, 
corresponding to the familiar income accounting formula Y = C + I + G + X - M. Once this 
total is obtained, the industry output figures are derived by dividing up this total. As 
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pointed out forcefully by Denison (1989)2 and Baily and Gordon (1988), 
undermeasurement of one industry's output does not imply that total output is 
undermeasured because the total has already been fixed. Rather, undermeasurement of 
one industry's output within this already fixed total implies that output in some other 
industry is overmeasured (italics added). For this reason, final product shares are more 
appropriate for an analysis of mismeasurement of aggregate output. Having said that, it 
turns out that the growth in the measurement gap owing to a share shift appears similar 
using either set of shares. 
 
6.16. Intermediate products 
As mentioned in the above quote by Sichel, according to Denison (1989:60-64), productivity 
studies by industry (used in the NIPAs and by the BLS and BEA) as opposed to productivity 
studies by final or end product are problematic and plagued with statistical problems as well as 
conceptual ambiguities. Statistical problems refer to the lack of accurate data, data gaps and 
inconsistencies and biases introduced by indexes (Denison 1989:61-62), as discussed in chapter 
3.  
To recap, many services are not final products. Intermediate goods or products are used during 
the production process of other goods rather than for final consumption (Pearce 1992:211). Final 
goods are used for consumption purposes (Pearce 1992:152). A clear distinction needs to be 
drawn between “service industries and final products that are services … they are enormously 
different” (Denison 1989:60).  
Thus, according to Denison (1989:13-4 & 60), services accounts for only 33% of output if 
classified in terms of final product, whereas the SNO shows a 59% contribution. More particularly, 
conceptual problems are threefold with intermediate products: (1), productivity increases show up 
in the using industries; (2) productivity originates in a third industry; and (3) productivity shows up 
in no industry at all. 
Firstly, in the presence of intermediate products, productivity increases emerge in the industries 
that use the improved products and not in the industry that generates the productivity 
improvements. Intermediate products are raw materials, supplies, containers, business services, 
structures and equipment. Denison (1989:62) states that “If the product is intermediate, the 
                                                 
2  “Output valued in constant prices in the business sector as a whole is estimated by deflating 
the final-product components of the sector’s gross national product. No use is made of data for 
industries. The output of the sector as a whole is divided among industries. … Thus estimates of 
output by industry in no way affect the business sector’s total output” (Denison 1989:7). 
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productivity increase appears instead in the industry that consumes the better product and 
thereby reduces costs.” 
Triplett (1999a:5-6) echoes this argument in stating that most output of the computer-using 
industries is intermediate output, not final output, such as in business services and the wholesale 
trade. Aggregate productivity measurement applies to final demand categories, which 
complicates productivity analysis. 
Secondly, Denison (1989:63) states the following: “Many advances in knowledge that raise 
productivity originate in neither the producing nor the using industry but in some third industry 
from which technology is transferred. Or they may not originate in any industry within the 
business sector, but instead in an inventor’s garage, a government or college office or laboratory, 
someone’s home, or another country. … most improvements have many parents.” 
Thirdly, “some changes in the productivity of a business sector appear in no industry at all if the 
data are accurate” (Denison 1989:63). Examples are the gain from improved allocation of 
resources among industries (a shift of excess labour out of low-productivity farming into high-
productivity industries, thus raising productivity in the whole economy) and increased 
specialisation among industries (when the market size increases) (Denison 1989:13 & 63).  
However, process innovation and managerial improvements show up in an industry’s own 
productivity (Denison 1989: 13 & 63).   
Finally, Denison (1989:64) remarks on the pervasiveness of the productivity slowdown that “the 
productivity slowdown appeared in almost all major industries in almost all industrial countries 
after 1973” so that industry productivity allocation is not of great concern in this regard.  
 
6.17. Gross versus net measures of output 
There is disagreement on whether gross or net output should be used as a measure of output, 
that is, GDP versus NDP, or GNP versus NNP. This question is relevant to the productivity 
paradox debate because ICT and computers typically depreciate at a faster rate that other types 
of capital. Equipment and software have increasingly shorter life cycles which means that the rate 
of depreciation is high. Spending on depreciation replaces worn-out or obsolete equipment and 
software, and hence does not add to the economy’s productive capacity. The usefulness of gross 
measures of output has therefore declined (Spant 2003:39-42).  
Also, according to Diewert and Fox (2005:2): “There is a strong case for greater focus on this 
thorny issue in light of the ‘new economy’, or the economic environment that has been created by 
the large increase in the use of computers and information technology in the last couple of 
decades”. These authors also consider two depreciation models which can be used as extremes 
or “bounds” for other models in the light of different countries adopting different depreciation 
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methods in their national accounts (Diewert & Fox 2005:7-12). Whelan’s (2000:1) study of 
computer productivity introduces a new method for calculating computer depreciation 
(technological obsolescence) and uses computer capital stock with embodied technological 
change. Although “computers are not everywhere”, computer capital stock is more ubiquitous 
than estimated in Sichel’s seminal 1997 study. This study (Sichel 1997a:10) found that computers 
make up only about 2% of the USA capital stock, and therefore constitute a small share of the 
inputs used to produce output. The main reason for the small share is the rapid rate of 
depreciation and obsolescence of computer stock.  
Similarly, Diewert and Fox (2005:1) believe that “economists (and accountants) have long thought 
that the correct measure of output for many purposes is net output, as this takes into account the 
consumption of capital, or the decline in the efficiency of the available capital stock”. 
The divergence between gross and net output measures is a recent phenomenon which did not 
exist between 1947 and 1973 (see table 6.3 below). The rising investment in computers and 
software caused this divergence (Baker & Rosnick 2007:4).  
However, according to Diewert and Fox (2005:2), depreciation methods are problematic and 
different methods yield different depreciation rates: “The problem of how to best calculate 
depreciation has been a long-standing one…. The best solution to this problem is unclear and 
this has lead to different national statistical agencies employing different methods.”  
Hulten, in two related papers (1992a & 1992c) and Denison (1989) interrogate this problem. 
Hulten (2000:7-8) argues that the consumer-welfare interpretation of productivity is a perennial 
concern in the interpretation of productivity and net measurements are preferred to gross 
measurements. This issue has “introduced a fundamental ambiguity about the nature of the total 
productivity index”, which, according to Hulten (2000:8), is evident even today. 
Denison (1989), a growth accounting pioneer, makes the case that net output must be used – in 
fact his entire productivity analysis is based on net output. Denison employs NNP, or national 
income, rather than GDP. He prefers a net product measure, because society’s goal of enjoying a 
large output can best be achieved through maximising output net of capital consumption, since it 
is pointless to maximise the quantity of capital goods used up in production (Denison 1989:6). 
Denison (1989:9) also points out that there are flaws in the BLS methodology, since the additional 
output generated by better computers is counted twice in GDP: the production of computers is 
counted in the computer manufacturing industry, and the use of computers in computer-using 
industries. However, net national product counts the additional output generated by computers 
only once and in computer manufacturing industries. In computer-using industries, the rapid 
depreciation of computers offsets any quality adjustments, thus preventing computers from 
increasing productivity. 
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Denison (1989:21) estimates that the effect of exceptional computer productivity on computer 
output and thus on output per hour is different, depending on the use of NNP per hour rather than 
GNP per hour: the growth rate of NNP is about 67% of that of GNP of the nonresidential business 
sector. He concludes that because of depreciation, computers cannot raise productivity in the 
computer-using sectors. 
Spant (2003: 41) makes a similar case and points out that in a country like the USA, where 
investment in ICT has increased as a portion of total investment, capital depreciation has grown 
faster than GDP. As a consequence, a widening gap has emerged between GDP and NDP 
growth rates (Spant 2003:41). Spant (2003:42) – see table 6.2 – calculates that for the USA, real 
GDP growth was 0.28 percentage points higher (3.42 minus 2.93) than real NDP between 1995 
and 2001; and depreciation as a percentage of GDP was 2.45 percentage points higher (14.03 
minus 11.58) in 2001 compared to 1995. Similar trends can be seen in other OECD countries, but 
to a lesser extent: gross and net measures of domestic product diverge by 0.15 percentage 
points; and depreciation by 0.75 percentage points on average.  
 
 
Baker (2002:120) provides similar calculations (table 6.3), based on BLS data, and demonstrates 
the difference between gross and net measures of productivity in the USA in recent years. Table 
6.3 shows that after 1979, gross and net measures of productivity growth rates started to diverge, 
which broadly coincides with the productivity decline in the 1970s. Baker also argues in favour of 
net measures and contends that productivity growth of 2.5% per annum in the “new economy” 
period between 1995 and 2000 is possibly too high because a greater share of output is allocated 
to replace old plant and equipment (Baker 2002:118): “Output used to replace worn-out 
equipment (depreciation), while a necessary cost, is not increasing the nation’s consumption or 
increasing its ability to produce goods and services in the future”.  
Table 6.2: GDP and NDP growth and depreciation in 16 OECD countries 
 Compound annual average 
growth rates 1995-2001 
Real depreciation as a 
percentage of real GDP 
 Real GDP Real NDP 1995 2001 
OECD* 3.06 2.91 13.86 14.60 
USA 3.42 2.93 11.58 14.03 
Source: Spant (2003:42, table 1), based on OECD data. Note: * Unweighted average of 
16 OECD countries, including the USA 
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This problem relates to the embodiment controversy discussed in chapter 2.  Embodied technical 
progress implies that new or more recent vintages of capital equipment (or computers) are more 
productive, or should potentially be more productive, than equipment of older vintages. In a 
nutshell, new capital is better than old capital (Greenwood & Jovanovic 2000:2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The case of software reclassification is illustrative. Chapter 4 discussed the impact of the 1999 
change in the NIPA methodology to reclassify software as investment rather than as an 
intermediate input. The reclassification increased total nominal investment by about $95 billion in 
the private sector and by $20 billion in the public sector, thus increasing nominal and real GDP by 
around 1.5% in 1999. However, NDP was little changed because depreciation rose equally. 
According to Spant (2003:41), the reclassification also caused the gap between GDP and NDP to 
widen, weakening the former’s significance as a measure of general welfare.  
Spant (2003:43) concludes that “the implications of placing almost all emphasis on GDP and 
neglecting NDP is to overestimate: the real rate of economic growth; productivity increases; the 
potential for increasing wages without inflationary risks to the labour market; gross business 
profits, thus increasing the risk of stock market bubbles; and differences in growth rates between 
countries (e.g. between the United States and Europe)”.  
As mentioned above, according to Madrick (1998:55-58), Sichel’s (1997a) study finds that if 
software investment is included, computers would boost productivity by only 0.75% per annum; 
and if computer depreciation is included, the productivity boost is reduced to 0.15% per annum.  
Table 6.3: US productivity growth (% annual average rates) 
Period Published data Estimated net measure 
1949-59 2.8 2.8 
1959-69 2.8 2.8 
1969-79 1.9 1.9 
1979-89 1.4 1.2 
1989-2000 1.9 1.7 
1995-2000 2.5 2.1 
Source: Baker (2002: 120, table 1) 
 133
In a related concern, Hulten (1992c) asks whether productivity measures capacity or welfare. He 
concludes that gross product is the correct concept to measure the structure of production, and 
that net output is appropriate for measuring the welfare consequences of economic growth.  
 
6.18. Mismeasurement of input 
It is possible that input may also be mismeasured. Roach (1998a:156 & 158), for example, has 
made the claim that some inputs are understated. He argues that labour input is understated 
because people are in fact working longer hours, which is unmeasured, leading to an 
overstatement of productivity growth.  
Computer input, that is, the stock of ICT, can also be mismeasured. Denison (1989:24-32) 
addresses the issue of computer capital and measurement problems and finds that capital goods, 
including computer capital, can be measured only with great difficulty. Denison (1989:25-32 & 
1993) describes four methods to quantify quality changes of capital goods: (1) capital measured 
by cost; (2) capital input proportional to total output; (3) capital measured by marginal products; 
and (4) capital measured by consumption foregone. 
Denison (1989:9) contends that all direct and indirect labour and other inputs should be counted 
in computer models. The BEA’s measures of computers are flawed because the measured 
computer product doubles when a new computer’s output is double that of an old model, ignoring 
the labour and other inputs in the new model even if these are much higher or lower.  
6.19. Primal versus dual measures 
Hsieh, in various papers (1999, 2002), analyses the East Asian growth miracle. He disagrees with 
Young (1995), who found that factor accumulation played a fundamental role, whereas TFP 
played an insignificant role, in the East Asian growth miracle. A brief discussion is included here 
because of its importance to productivity growth generally rather than computer productivity 
specifically. This problem relates to the productivity paradox in the measurement problem 
context.  
Hsieh (2002:519) highlights the difficulties involved in constructing reliable national accounts and 
capital stock data and calculates productivity using the dual rather than the primal method. The 
dual is regarded as a complementary method to the primal method (Hsieh 1999:237). Hsieh 
(1999:138) concludes, particularly in the case of Singapore, that technology can be shown to 
have played a greater role in economic transformation when productivity measures are based on 
the dual rather than the primal measure.  
Fernald and Neiman (2003:3-5) provide a succinct summary of how the primal and dual 
calculations are arrived at (see also Aiyar & Dalgaard 2005:84-85). Primal TFP measures are 
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based on quantities and dual TFP measures on prices (Fernald & Neiman 2003:1). In principle, 
these measures should give the same result, but in practice they may differ (Fernald & Neiman 
2003:4). 
Overall, the equivalence of the primal and dual measures is a significant conclusion and shows 
that productivity can be measured in terms of both quantities and prices. This could help to 
overcome data problems in the national accounts, as was the case of the East Asian growth 
miracle debated by Hsieh (1999, 2002) and Young (1995). 
 
6.20. Inflation and the understatement of productivity 
Measurement of inflation and price indexes play a key role in the productivity paradox.  
The idea of the overstatement of the CPI (or an upward bias) goes back to at least Gilbert’s 1961 
paper, Quality changes and index numbers. As Gilbert (1961:287) states, we are concerned with 
the fact that if a rise in price is overstated, then a rise in real output is understated. Thus 
productivity could also be understated. The US price statistics were also under official scrutiny in 
1961 by the Stigler Commission (Boskin et al. 1998: 4). Subsequently, the Advisory commission 
to study the consumer price index, also known as the Boskin Commission study, published in 
1996, investigated the calculation of consumer price inflation data (Advisory Commission … 
1996). The commission’s members are all eminent economists: Michael Boskin (Chairman), Ellen 
Dulberger, Zvi Griliches, Robert Gordon and Dale Jorgenson. The study was followed by 
additional publications and responses to criticisms to the study by the commission (see Boskin et 
al. 1997, 1998).  
The Boskin study found that several factors influence the measurement of inflation and reduce its 
accuracy. The factors are: (1) the substitution bias; (2) the retail outlet bias; (3) the quality bias 
and the new goods bias; and (4) the formula bias. In general, quality improvements account for 
the bulk of the overstatement. The commission’s study concluded that, because price indexes do 
not account accurately for these factors, the CPI was overstated by an average (or suffered from 
an upward bias) of about 1.1 percentage points per annum over an extended period. Generally, 
the study found that the CPI does not adequately reflect the changes in the cost of living. Since 
the productivity growth rate is a real variable (nominal output is deflated by an appropriate price 
index, the inflation rate, to arrive at a real productivity growth rate), real output, and hence 
productivity growth, should be higher than stated in the official data. The focus has been on the 
accuracy of the price deflator (CPI), rather than the adjustment to nominal output or inputs.  
The commissions’ results are summarised in table 6.4.  
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The commission’s study elicited a number of responses. The Monthly Labor Review published 
three articles on “Prices and productivity measures” by Eldridge (1999), Gullickson & Harper 
(1999) and Dean (1999) in February 1999. In particular, Moulton (1996), who is the Chief, 
Division of Price Index Number Research at the BLS, examined the evidence of CPI bias. 
Moulton and Moses (1997) also review the Boskin Commission’s report.  
In an insightful article, Baker (1996:26), discovers flaws in the Boskin Commission’s arguments 
and points out that consumer price indexes are essential for “nearly every economic calculation 
that involves historical comparisons” and that adjustment of the historical inflation rates “will 
change nearly everything we thought about the economy”! Put simply, Baker (1998c) believes 
that “the new economy does not lurk in the statistical discrepancy”. 
Baker (1996:28) argues that if the findings are correct, “economists have been promulgating a 
great deal of nonsense over the last fifty years”. In particular, if the inflation rate is overstated or 
biased upward, the commission’s result implies that if real incomes or wages are recalculated 
backwards or reconstructed to the early 1950s – which is a period of post-war affluence 
(Krugman 1998:190) – most of the typical American families were living below the 1994 poverty 
Table 6.4: Boskin Commission estimates of biases in CPI 
Source of bias Contribution 
 Percentage points per 
annum 
Percent 
Upper and lower level 
substitution 
0.4 36.4 
New outlets 0.1 9.1 
New products/Quality 
change 
0.6 54.5 
Total 1.1 100.0 
Plausible range 0.80 – 1.60  
Source: Boskin et al. (1996): Table 3 (no page numbers) 
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line. Similarly, future generations could look forward to far greater prosperity than previously, 
because real wages will grow at a faster rate. In essence, Baker provides a reductio ad absurdum 
of the commission’s report. He (1998a:7-8) also believes that the commission only focused on 
areas of possible overstatement, ignoring the new and additional costs that new technologies 
impose on consumers, but incorporating the gains. Madrick (1998:58) adopts a similar view and 
points out that mismeasurement could also be in the opposite direction: a fall in quality could also 
be mismeasured, such as in retail services and airline travel. Baker (1996:33) concludes by 
noting that “there is not much work in economics that will be left standing” if the report’s findings 
are accepted.  
Eldridge (1999) examines the effects of price indexes on productivity measures in detail and 
provides a considered assessment of the Boskin Commission’s study. Eldridge concedes that the 
current indexes (as at 1999) do have biases and that the BLS and BEA are aware of these 
problems.  
Moreover, according to the BLS economists, the Boskin study itself contains several faults 
(Eldridge 1999:39). Therefore the Boskin Commission’s study is not the final say on the CPI 
controversy. The commission does not claim that the CPI is overstated now more than it was in 
the past (Baker 1998c:6). Hence, the overstatement of inflation argument cannot be advanced to 
resolve the productivity paradox.   
 
6.21. Conclusion 
This chapter reviewed the main explanations of the productivity paradox from the philosophical 
and methodological approach to the more specific and technical aspects. At many levels of 
explanation, problems of meaning and interpretation were found and flaws in methodology 
encountered. The philosophical objections dealt mainly with the neoclassical paradigm, which has 
long been under attack by economists, who have pointed out the unrealistic assumptions upon 
which this paradigm is built. The construction and interpretation of the Cobb-Douglas production 
function also came under scrutiny and were criticised accordingly.  
The measurement of productivity in official statistics, through the construction of index numbers 
(as is the case with many economic time series), forms the central area of investigation, because 
this information is used in many productivity studies and is reported in the financial media. 
Economic historians and cliometricians typically use figures produced by the official agencies to 
analyse economic trends. Macroeconomic analysts rely on the historical data to study 
macroeconomic trends and provide forecasts. Also, policymakers, especially central bankers, 
such as the Federal Reserve, base their analyses and judgements on official productivity data.  
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Therefore an understanding of the purpose, function and limitations of economic indexes, 
especially price indexes, clarifies many issues relating to the productivity paradox, because they 
affect productivity measures directly. For example, the Boskin Commission, whose research can 
be taken as the most comprehensive in this regard, did not conclude that the mismeasurement of 
CPI has increased over time or that there are breaks in inflation trends, only that there is a 
general overstatement of the CPI over time. 
The measurement of quality change is not a new phenomenon, nor confined to computers, 
because many indexes do not account adequately for quality improvements in a number of 
products and services. Some authors believe that the available indexes are accurate enough, but 
others contend that measurement error can explain the productivity paradox.  
Shortcomings and inaccuracies have been discovered in the national accounts, which are the 
subject of on-going debate. Most of the important issues are discussed in this chapter. The USA 
statistical agencies, the BEA and BLS, however, are alert and receptive to academic research 
and often make adjustments and improvements to the official data when the evidence of 
mismeasurement is convincing. Other issues also have a bearing on the measurement of 
productivity, such as the net versus gross output debate as well as alternative ways of calculating 
productivity (e.g. primal versus dual measures).  
Several authors have doubted the veracity of the mismeasurement hypothesis. Some of the 
arguments put forward are that computers comprise such a small a share of total inputs that they 
cannot impact significantly on output, even if they were substantially undermeasured; since 
computers are generally used as intermediate inputs, so that the final-demand share of 
computers in difficult-to-measure services output, is small; and the measurement gap has not 
widened since the widespread use of computers in recent decades.  
For some economists, the paradox has been resolved and was a mere statistical discrepancy and 
artefact, but for others, the new economy does not lurk in the statistical discrepancy. 
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7. CHAPTER 7: OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF THE PRODUCTIVITY PARADOX 
7.1. Overview 
Following the previous chapter’s theme, other explanations of the computer paradox are 
examined in this chapter. The general purpose technology hypothesis is investigated first. 
Secondary explanations are the mismanagement, input substitution and the sceptical 
hypotheses.  
Whereas there are several explanations of the productivity slowdown, such as the oil price shock 
in the 1970s, only those hypotheses that relate to the Solow productivity paradox are examined 
here .  
Some of the explanations that have been postulated to explain the productivity slowdown are 
briefly mentioned. 
7.2. The general purpose technology hypothesis 
The general purpose technology or time lag hypothesis states that the productivity benefits from 
IT investment are still forthcoming because there is a lag between IT spending and the ultimate 
realisation of productivity benefits. The reason for the time or diffusion lag is that IT is a general 
purpose technology (GPT) which takes many years or even decades to affect output and 
productivity positively. This view is based on historical observations of other GPTs. The 
inventions of steam power and electricity are the prime examples of earlier types of GPTs, and 
ICT and computerisation are of a more current vintage. Other technologies such as the internal 
combustion engine and railways are also mentioned in the GPT literature. 
According to David and Wright (1999:10), GPTs share the following four characteristics: the 
technologies can be improved and expanded over a wide range of applications; they have many 
different and varied applications and uses; they have the potential application for use in an array 
of products and processes; and they can form complementarities with existing or potential new 
technologies.  
Old GPTs such as the steam engine, the electric motor (also electricity, electrification, etc.) as 
well as new GPTs, such as semiconductors, function as “enabling technologies”, opening up new 
opportunities through potentially pervasive use in a broad range of industries. Although GPTs do 
not provide ultimate solutions they can generate productivity gains throughout the wider economy 
(Bresnahan & Trajtenberg 1995:84).  
David’s (1990) short but seminal paper, The dynamo and the computer: an historical perspective 
on the modern productivity paradox views the productivity paradox from a historical perspective 
and discusses various characteristics of general purpose engines, David’s terms for GPTs. David 
mentions the steam engine but selects the electric dynamo as an example of a general purpose 
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engine. David (1990:346) compares the slow adoption and diffusion of the electric dynamo and 
the lagged effects on industrial productivity, with computerisation and productivity lags, for the 
following reasons: “Computer and dynamo each form the nodal elements of physically distributed 
(transmission) networks. Both occupy key positions in a web of strongly complementary technical 
relationships that give rise to ‘network externality effects’ of various kinds.”  
Adoption of GPTs is often slow, that is, there are “diffusion lags”, because of the long learning 
curve, consumer inertia and resistance to abandon older and more expensive technologies.  
David’s (1991) more comprehensive paper Computer and Dynamo: The Modern Productivity 
Paradox in a Not-too-Distant Mirror, which is included in a collection of papers on the productivity 
paradox published by the OECD, expands on his 1990 paper. David responds to economists who 
are perplexed by the “contemporary conjunction of rapid technological innovation and 
disappointingly slow gains in measured productivity”. He (1991:322) stresses that drawing 
parallels and finding resemblances (“We see the dynamos everywhere but in the productivity 
statistics”) between the dynamo and computer have their limitations and must not be taken too 
literally. Although David (1990: 360; 1991: 336) states that “Computers are not dynamos”, he 
suggests that there are parallels: namely “pervasive diffusion”, “incremental improvement” and 
“confluence with complementary technologies” over a long time frame (David 1991:315).  
Around 1900, industrial countries started to experience a technological transition from a reliance 
on steam to electricity. The productivity benefits of electrification of industrial processes did not 
fully emerge until 40 years after about half of factory capacity had been electrified (David 
1991:335-336).  
Helpman and Trajtenberg (1994) developed a growth model based on successive new 
generations of GPTs, characterised by recurrent cycles over the long run. The initial impact of a 
new and more productive GPT is to lower output (Helpman & Trajtenberg 1994:2). The new 
GPTs also give rise to repetitive cycles. Each cycle consists of two distinct phases: in the first 
phase, output and productivity growth slows or declines, real wages stagnate and the  rate of 
profit declines, whereas in the second phase, growth starts to take off, wages rise and profits 
recover. The authors (1994:2) conclude: “Over the entire cycle the economy grows at the rate 
determined by the rate of advance in the GPT itself.” 
Thus productivity does not necessarily rise significantly during periods of rapid technological 
progress. This counter-intuitive notion is demonstrated by the slow rise in productivity during the 
Industrial Revolution (Crafts 2002:3; Trehan 2003:1). The full effects of technological revolutions 
are often evident only several decades after their invention and introduction. These technological 
revolutions are typically supported by GPTs. For example, Crafts (2002:21) re-examines 
productivity growth during the Industrial Revolution, using a revised growth accounting 
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methodology, and calculates the sources of growth estimates during this period to back up this 
claim (table 7.1). 
 
 
In his approach to the problem, Crafts (2002:19) takes account of the embodiment of 
technological change in new varieties of capital goods. He finds that in the early years of the 
invention of a GPT there is little productivity growth. The issue of disembodied and embodied 
technical change was discussed in chapter 2. Essentially, what needs to be reconciled is the 
“slow macroeconomic TFP growth with spectacularly successful microeconomic innovations in 
several important industrial sectors” (Crafts 2002:3). For example, in the case of electricity, Crafts 
(2002:4) observes the following: “While the excitement of the electrical age arrived in the 1880s, 
the main (very substantial) productivity impact came only in the 1920s when the possibilities for 
re-design of the factory were realized.” 
Using the dual technique based on factor prices, Antràs and Voth (2003), also investigate 
productivity growth during the British Industrial Revolution (1770-1860) and find that it was slow 
during this period, thus reinforcing Crafts’s primal method, based on quantities. The dual method 
is complementary to the primal method as discussed in chapter 6.  
Jacobs and Nahuis (2002:244) argue that GPTs can explain the Solow paradox. They contend 
that computerisation causes a slowdown in output growth, because highly skilled workers 
temporarily spend their time accumulating new knowledge and thus neglect current production.  
The GPT theory has its opponents. Roach (1998a:159-160), for example, disagrees with the GPT 
theory, calling it “the fallacy of historical precedent”. He argues that there are vast differences 
between the tangible-goods (i.e. factory-based) production of the Industrial Revolution and the 
intangible knowledge creation of the services-based ICT information age.  
Table 7.1: Accounting for growth during the British Industrial Revolution 
% per year  Contributions from 
Period Output growth Capital Stock 
Growth 
Labour Force 
Growth 
TFP 
1760-1780 0.6 0.25 0.35 0.0 
1780-1831 1.7 0.60 0.80 0.3 
1831-1873 2.4 0.90 0.75 0.75 
Source: Crafts (2002:21, table 1) 
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Similarly, Gordon (2000b:64-5) asserts that diminishing returns in computers do not support 
David’s analysis and have already eroded any ICT productivity gains. Diminishing returns were 
discussed in chapter 5. Furthermore, contrary to the GPT hypothesis, Gordon argues that “it is 
more plausible that the main productivity gains of computers have already been achieved”! The 
reason is that some industries, such as airlines, banks and insurance companies, rapidly adopted 
mainframe computers - as early as the 1960s and 1970s - and that computers have accordingly 
already provided benefits for almost 50 years.  
Stiroh (2001a:48) echoes this interpretation and argues that the “critical mass and delay 
hypothesis is beginning to lose credibility” because computers can no longer be viewed as new 
investments given that the first commercial purchase of a mainframe computer, the UNIVAC, was 
in 1954, and computer investment already appears in the national accounts in 1958.  
Moreover, Gordon (1999b:127) argues that earlier inventions were “more fundamental creators of 
productivity than the electronic/internet era of today”. Computers do not compare to the great 
inventions of the past, which historically boosted productivity growth. The earlier inventions are 
broadly classified into four clusters: the electricity cluster, which includes electric motors, the 
electric light and consumer appliances; the internal combustion engine cluster, which includes 
motor and air transport, superhighways, supermarkets and suburbs; the rearrangement of 
molecules clusters, which include petrochemicals, plastics and pharmaceuticals; and the 
communications/entertainment cluster, which includes the telephone, radio, movies and television 
(Gordon 1999:127).  
Madrick (1998:52) also criticises David’s 1990 paper, arguing that David does not take into 
account many other factors that contributed to the significance of electricity, from assembly-line 
mass production techniques to useful home appliances, such as washing machines and radios, 
which could account for as much of the output growth as electricity itself.  
Some authors have argued that ICT was itself responsible for the slowdown in productivity 
through the slow and costly learning, implementation and diffusion process. Greenwood and 
Yorukoglu (1997), Greenwood (1997) and Greenwood and Jovanovic (2000) examine the 
problems associated with the adoption of a new technology such as steam, electricity and ICT. 
Greenwood (1997) and Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997) ask whether the year 1974 was a 
watershed, ushering in a new (third) Industrial Revolution. However, because inexperience of 
new technologies led to inefficiencies and lower productivity growth, rapid technological 
advancement is associated with slow productivity growth. Greenwood and Jovanovic (2000), 
discussing post-war economic growth in the USA, postulate that there was a slowdown in 
productivity growth because it is costly and slow to implement information technologies. Huggett 
and Ospina (2001) also find that productivity falls after the adoption of new technology during a 
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period of technology-specific learning, because some expertise can fail to transfer from the old to 
the new technologies. 
Kiley (1999:1) also contends that ICT itself was responsible for the slowdown. Computers, 
particularly the PC, are still relatively new and the various investment adjustment or transition 
costs of “incorporating the new technology into business practice are substantial”. These large 
adjustment costs, such as reorganising plant layout, managerial costs, work interruptions, worker 
training and on-the-job-learning, lowered growth in MFP by some 25% from 1974 to 1991. Kiley 
(1999:15) concludes that the contribution of the ICT revolution to output growth in the last few 
decades has been mostly negative through a combination of high adjustment costs and the surge 
of computer investment.    
Hornstein and Krusell (1996) also argue that technology improvements themselves can cause 
productivity slowdowns. This means that a “transition to a new technological regime can actually 
slow productivity growth as firms take time to learn how to use the new technology”. This period 
of “learning-by-doing” is one of the more intriguing explanations why productivity improvements 
are postponed (Sumo 2006:31).  
 
7.3. The mismanagement hypothesis 
This hypothesis states that companies typically underestimate the full costs of new information 
technology and consequently misallocate technology resources (Stolarick 1999). Dempsey et al. 
(1998:137) summarise the view well: “Once a cost centre, IT is now at the core of many 
businesses. It can be a source of competitive advantage if managed well, a liability if managed 
badly.”  
Many business journals such as the Harvard Business Review and McKinsey Quarterly (Cho & 
Neiman 2002; Dempsey et al. 1998; Olazabal 2002) discuss issues relating to the management 
of ICT. For example, IT failures are not widely reported, perhaps because companies are loath to 
be seen to have made mistakes. Carr (2004:110-111) cites some examples of IT projects that 
failed, based on a 1995 study:  
Of more than eight thousand systems projects … examined, only 16% were considered 
successes – completed on time and on budget and fulfilling the original specifications. 
Nearly a third were cancelled outright, and the remainder all went over budget, off 
schedule, and out-of-spec. Large companies – those with more than $500 million in 
annual sales – did even worse than the average: Only 9 percent of their IT projects 
succeeded. 
The above quote is from Carr’s (2004) book, which rhetorically asks Does IT matter? The book is 
based on his controversial 2003 article, published in the Harvard Business Review, in which Carr 
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contends that IT has become an infrastructure resource. He argues that IT has become a 
homogenised commodity, which means that it has become “essential to competition but 
inconsequential to strategy” (Carr 2004:108).  
Business success is generally linked to its business model rather than its technology. Based on 
several studies by reputable research companies, Carr (2004) concludes that there is no 
correlation between IT spending and business performance. Much IT expenditure by businesses 
is wasted, particularly on personal computers. He also argues that companies that excel at IT, 
excel more in other aspects of running a business, such as in strategy. Examples are Wal-Mart (a 
US retailer) and Dell (a US computer company) (Carr 2004:87-129). Investment in IT has also not 
led to higher profits (Carr 2003:49). 
In distinguishing these related hypotheses, the mismanagement hypothesis blames management 
rather than IT as such, whereas both the GPT and the sceptical hypotheses blame computers 
themselves.   
 
7.4. Computerisation and input substitution 
This interpretation states that the computer paradox is solved by interpreting computerisation as 
an input substitution event and not as an MFP event. This view emphasises a type of sectoral 
approach (i.e. computer-producing versus computer-using sectors) instead of the aggregate 
approach, as well as a production function approach. The interpretation of MFP in terms of 
production function shifts was discussed in chapter 2, while the aggregate and sectoral 
approaches were dealt with in chapter 5.  
The differential in MFP performance between the computer-producing and computer-using 
sectors is discussed in section 5.7 on the economics of ICT. To recap, researchers found MFP 
gains in the manufacture of computers (computer-producing sector), but little MFP improvement 
in their use (computer-using sector). The rapid decline in the price of computers (see chapter 5) 
has led firms to invest more in computers and less in other labour and non-computing inputs and 
investments. This did not raise MFP, but increased computer accumulation (Stiroh 1998:176) – 
hence, the conclusion that “the economic impact of the computer is not a productivity story at all” 
(Triplett 1999b:314)!  
Stiroh (1998) also argues that the computer revolution is largely characterised by input 
substitution, investment and capital accumulation. This argument states that the computer 
revolution is characterised by input substitution, not MFP growth. Computers are both “an output 
from one sector and an input to other sectors” (Stiroh 1998:175). In the computer-producing 
sector, MFP has been high, and the production function has shifted, which implies MFP growth. 
In contrast, the computer-using sector, has not experienced MFP growth, and there are thus 
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movements along the production function, rather than a shift of the function. An aggregation 
approach is therefore avoided in favour of the disaggregated sectoral approach.  
 
7.5. The sceptical hypothesis 
The sceptical (or pessimistic) hypothesis states that computers are simply not productive and that 
this is a real phenomenon rather than a paradox in need of an explanation.  
According to the Canadian Centre for the Study of Living Standards publication, Productivity: key 
to economic success (CSLS 1998:33-35), the benefits of IT are exaggerated and there are 
several good reasons why computers are unproductive. The first is that IT investment makes up 
only a small share of total economy-wide investment. However, if a distinction is made between 
IT’s share in nominal (current dollar) and real (constant dollar) terms, the picture changes. (This 
issue was discussed in chapter 6 and the mismeasurement hypothesis.) The second reason is 
that IT does not fundamentally change the production process; nor does it improve the quality of 
decision making. The third reason is that IT costs are understated; if the actual costs were 
calculated, IT’s productivity benefits would be significantly lower. The costs associated with the 
“Y2K bug” are a case in point, as well as the many international virus attacks on government, 
business and other computer networks, which can paralyse e-mail systems, destroy databases, 
install spy-ware and disrupt internet and other business services.  
The problems associated with ICT, particularly PCs, have reached comic proportions in the view 
of some users. For example, Triplett (1999b:324) quotes a cartoon character, Dilbert, who 
comments that “the total time that humans have waited for Web pagers to load … cancels out all 
the gains of the information age”. Another humorous example is the exchange between General 
Motors and Microsoft, “If GM were like Microsoft ”, which is reproduced in the appendix to this 
chapter.  
Triplett (1999b:324-326), in a more serious vein, lists several objections to the idea that 
computers improve productivity. The rapid pace of technological progress and the concomitant 
rapid obsolescence and scrapping of hardware have led to the replacement of hardware before 
being worn out. Yet these massive investments into state-of-the-art technology in the past period 
show no return in the present period. This applies to both software and hardware. Costs of 
upgrading are rarely considered and could be wasteful. The addition of new or enhanced features 
to a faster upgraded computer may result in poorer performance compared to an older PC with 
fewer and less flashy features, leading to the quip: “What Intel giveth, Microsoft taketh away” (i.e. 
so-called “bloatware”, a play on the word software). Time costs during change-overs are also 
rarely accounted for.  
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Computers have many detractors and there are numerous articles confirming this. Jorgenson and 
Stiroh (1999:110) disparagingly refer to the rising IT investment as “a kind of Computer Cargo 
Cult among economists and economic historians, patiently awaiting a deluge of spillovers like 
those that supposedly accompanied earlier technological revolutions”.  
Even researchers working in the computer industry are sceptical. As Michael Dertouzos, a 
Director of MIT Laboratory for Computer Science since 1973, explains in a magazine interview 
(Bielski 2001:50):  
I’ve been complaining for years that computers are wonderful but infantile. … They’re 
hard to interact with, and they don’t often give us information we can use. Take the 
internet. … It is little more than a virtual society of exhibitionists and voyeurs. The 
companies are the exhibitionists – bragging about who they are and what they have. The 
surfers are the voyeurs. And sprinkled intermittently in this “brew” is a small percentage 
of the world’s commerce, about $200 billion or 1% of the world’s economy. We can do 
much more with the technology. 
Landauer (1995:75), in The Trouble with Computers, succinctly sums up the productivity paradox 
in the context of the services sector by stating the following: “IT made it possible to do more work 
but not to do work more productively. … The total new output from services just about equalled 
the total new input in IT equipment and the labour hours it required.”  
In essence IT enabled more work to be done at the same productivity level (Landauer 1995:76).  
Bowen (1986) argued there has been a “puny payoff from office computers” because productivity 
was no higher in the 1980s compared to the 1960s, despite businesses spending hundreds of 
billions of dollars on office computers. Bowen argues that managers are still learning how to use 
them.  
Krugman (1998:102-103), always an insightful iconoclast, wrote as follows: 
the startling thing about computers is not how fast and small they have become but how 
stupid they remain … Even where computers have become ubiquitous … it is very 
questionable how much they actually raise productivity. Recently many companies have 
begun to realize that when they equip their office workers with computers they also 
impose huge hidden costs on themselves – because a computer requires technical 
support, frequent purchases of new software, repeated retraining of employees, and so 
on. That $2,000 computer on your employer’s desk may well impose $8,000 a year in 
such hidden costs”.  
Stephen Roach (1998a:158), a well-known computer sceptic, points out the huge costs 
associated with the Year 2000 bug or Y2K, “a prime example of the deadweight of the information 
age.”. According to Lawson (2006:14), the Y2K bug, otherwise known as the Millennium Bug, was 
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an “illusory infection…In 1999, billions were spent on prophylactic treatment for an imaginary 
condition. In the Western world, only the Italian government took the decision not to listen to the 
dire warnings from self-interested software companies (almost all of them American). And, as we 
know, not a single Italian-owned computer went down coughing and spluttering with the 
Millennium Bug.“  
Roach (1991:85) wrote that the massive investments in IT have not improved productivity in the 
services sector but instead made service firms less profitable and even less competitive. 
Economic studies generated similar results. Morrison and Berndt (1991) found that in 1986, at the 
industry level, marginal costs of high-tech IT equipment exceed marginal benefits which implies 
an overinvestment in IT capital. Berndt, Morrison and Rosenblum (1992) found a negative 
correlation between labour productivity growth and investing in high-tech equipment (as a ratio to 
total capital stock) between 1968 and 1986 at industry level.  
Madrick (1998: 52) argues that many computers enthusiasts’ opinions are “not so much 
hardheaded analyses as expressions of faith, almost religious in nature, which often sarcastically 
chide those who resist the message of true believers”. Progress is regarded as linear; thus 
assuming that today’s innovations will have the same impact as yesterday’s (Madrick 1998:53). 
Madrick (1998:54) also contends that much of the enormous computer power is superfluous 
because the ease of obtaining and processing information may be easier, but quality of output is 
not necessarily better; for example economic forecasting has not improved simply because 
calculations are faster (Madrick 1998:54). He claims that modern computing technology has not 
made a large impact on efficiency as is generally assumed.   
 
7.6. Explanations of the productivity slowdown 
The various interpretations of the productivity slowdown (which is a vast and interesting topic), 
which do not relate specifically to computerisation and the ICT sector’s possible role in the 
apparent slowdown have not been examined here. It would be useful to make brief mention of 
these factors for conceptual clarification.  
Factors that have been postulated to explain the productivity slowdown are as follows: the energy 
crisis in the 1970s; the exhaustion of the technological boom; low investment and savings; high 
taxation of savings; excessive government regulation; low public investment in infrastructures; the 
decline of investment in research and development; sociological explanations, such as the 
increasing laziness of the workforce; and the decline in quality of education, and other factors 
(Krugman 1994a).  
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Gordon (1999b:123) is convinced that explanations that rely on a single cause of the productivity 
slowdown are incomplete. It seems that the productivity slowdown cannot be pinned down by a 
single cause. Therefore, it is unlikely that ICT was the single cause of the slowdown.  
 
7.7. Solow’s later responses to the computer productivity paradox 
It is worth considering some of Solow’s remarks and comments on his eponymous statement of 
the computer paradox, that “computers are everywhere but in the productivity statistics” (Solow 
1987:36), as a prelude to the conclusion. It was this remark that sparked the line of research 
known as the productivity paradox of information technology – indeed a “Quip that launched a 
thousand production functions” (Kraemer &  Dedrick 2001 2). The views expressed by Solow on 
the computer paradox are briefly reviewed here. 
Solow’s quip appeared in a review of Cohen and Zysman’s book Manufacturing matters: the myth 
of the post-industrial society (1987) published in the New York review of books. They contend 
that manufacturing is at the heart of the modern economy and that the notion of the post-
industrial society – where services reign supreme – is misplaced and incorrect. Cohen and 
Zysman (1987) argue that many service activities are closely linked to manufacturing and a loss 
of manufacturing activities will result directly in a loss of these service activities. 
The following year, Solow (1998:120), in his review of Sichel’s book The computer revolution, 
argued that the stock of computer capital (including software) is simply too small a fraction of 
overall fixed capital stock to make a difference to productivity. Solow (1998:121) also believed 
that “the role of the computer appears to be a paradox only because many people expect too 
much. Sheer technical innovation may be mind-boggling, but GDP does not respond to boggle”.  
In March 2000, in a New York Times interview, Solow stated the following: “You can now see 
computers in the productivity statistics”, but added that “I will feel better about the endurance of 
the productivity improvement after it survives its first recession” (Uchitelle 2000:4). Solow’s 
retraction is in response to Oliner and Sichel’s 2000 paper analysing the recovery of the 
productivity growth rate in 1995.  
Subsequently, in a 2002 interview, Solow, in response to the productivity revival from 1995 to 
2000, stated the following (Clement 2002): 
Now what would it mean to resolve the paradox? It could mean that eventually 
productivity responded, that at last we do see computers in the productivity statistics. 
That is possible and, in fact, even likely. Why should all that technology not affect 
productivity? Even now, however, we don’t have the complete story. 
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In retrospect, we know that the period from around 1970 to 1995 – a whole quarter of a 
century – was a time of extremely slow productivity growth, and that is the period during 
which the computer was really penetrating our society. … but it’s not a clear certainty, 
that some or all of that acceleration of productivity is the computer at last bearing fruit.  
Then Solow argued as follows (Clement 2002): 
… there does not appear to be a miracle in productivity terms that we can attribute to the 
computer (italics added). Comparing the computer with electricity or the internal combustion 
engine just doesn’t seem to me to be justified yet. … there’s also some respectable evidence 
that within the service sector, gains or accelerations in productivity are not much correlated 
with improved computer use. … So I think that the outcome is still unresolved. … the paradox 
has dissipated in part. I don’t think that we fully understand the answers yet. 
The above quote therefore affirms that, in Solow’s opinion, computers are not as productive as 
generally believed and that the story is unresolved. Solow’s comments are of a recent enough 
vintage relative to the productivity revival in 1995 to have incorporated the recent productivity 
statistics.  
 
7.8. Counterfactual research: the world without computers 
A full understanding of the computer paradox still needs to be written. The methodology may well 
be to study the counterfactual proposition: “what productivity growth would have been without 
computers” to discover the true impact of computers (McGuckin & Stiroh 1998:45). This approach 
– the so-called “new economic history” or cliometrics – is certainly not new in economics, but 
generally unknown (even in the economics profession) despite the Nobel Prize for Economics 
having been awarded to Robert Fogel in 1993 (shared with Douglass North) for “research in 
economic history by applying economic theory and quantitative methods studies” (Nobel Prize 
1993). Computers have often been compared to the railroads as the sine qua non for modern 
economic growth.  
Fogel (1962 & 1966) examined the economic impact of railways – known as the “railroad 
revolution” because of its perceived central role as the main driver of economic growth after 1840 
in the USA – based on counterfactual arguments. Fogel concluded –  counter-intuitively –  that 
the invention and installation of railroads had quite a small impact on economic growth in the 
USA. He analysed what economic growth would have been without railroads, or what growth 
would have been if the same resources had been invested in alternative (but existing) industries 
(Fogel 1966:16), thus challenging the notion that railways were indispensable for US economic 
growth (Ferguson 1999:17). The growth impact is small because railroad transport has several 
transport substitutes. Thus the economy would have been only slightly smaller without railways in 
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1890 (Ferguson 1999:17). Fogel (1966:40) found that railroads increased the economy’s 
productive potential only by about 3% of GDP. 
 
7.9. Conclusion 
This and the previous chapters showed that many economic factors have been found to impact 
on the Solow computer paradox. In this chapter, three more explanations and hypotheses were 
reviewed, in addition to those reviewed in chapter 6.  
The general purpose technology argument is intuitively appealing and appears to be borne out by 
historical events. The explanation, however, is not watertight, because ICT cannot be compared 
in the same way to steam or electricity since they are different types of entities, as pointed out 
earlier. However, the economics of GPTs does shed light on the Solow paradox as the passage 
of time plays a key role in technology diffusion.  
Computers themselves are accused of being the culprits, in that the adoption of new ICT 
innovations is not an instant and costless process, but its success depends on several factors, 
particularly human capital and organisational capacity.  
The mismanagement hypothesis explores the many expensive failures to implement and manage 
complex computer systems properly in organisations as a possible explanation of the Solow 
paradox. As reported above, less than one-tenth of ICT projects are successful, an appalling 
record for an industry that is acclaimed by insiders to be a driver of productivity. 
The input substitution hypothesis denies that computerisation is a productivity story. According to 
this hypothesis, the real story is the substitution of cheap computer capital for other more 
expensive forms of capital, as well as for labour.  
The sceptical view forks into two areas. There are some researchers - and even industry insiders 
- who cannot abide the new computer age and resort to ridicule. Although some observations are 
anecdotal and therefore not quantifiable, there is a grain of truth in many of the computer-related 
jokes and anecdotes. Others believe that the actual costs of computerisation have not been 
included properly into the calculations.  
Solow’ own pronouncements on the later developments were reviewed. Solow does not believe 
that there is a productivity miracle as yet, despite high expectations, and that the computer 
paradox remains unresolved.  
Counterfactual research on the computer paradox, if ever attempted, could shed new light on the 
complex issue.  
In the next and final chapter, the conclusion is drawn that it is unlikely that a unified theory can be 
found that will be able to fully explain the complexity of the Solow computer paradox. 
 150
 
7.10. Appendix - “If General Motors were like Microsoft” (2004) 
If General Motors Were Like Microsoft. 
At a recent computer expo (COMDEX), Bill Gates reportedly compared the computer industry 
with the auto industry and stated: "If GM had kept up with technology like the computer 
industry has, we would be driving twenty-five dollar cars that got 1000 miles to the gallon." 
In response to Bill's comments, GM issued a press release stating (by Mr. Welch himself): 
If GM had developed technology like Microsoft, we would be driving cars with the following 
characteristics: 
1. For no reason whatsoever your car would crash twice a day. 
2. Every time they repainted the lines on the road you would have to buy a new car. 
3. Occasionally your car would die on the freeway for no reason, and you would just accept 
this, restart and drive on. 
4. Occasionally, executing a manoeuvre such as a left turn, would cause your car to shut 
down and refuse to restart, in which case you would have to reinstall the engine. 
5. Only one person at a time could use the car, unless you bought "Car95" or "CarNT." But 
then you have would have to buy more seats. 
6. Macintosh would make a car that was powered by the sun, reliable, five times as fast, and 
twice as easy to drive, but would only run on five percent of the roads. 
7. The oil, water temperature and alternator warning lights would be replaced by a single 
"general car default" warning light. 
8. New seats would force everyone to have the same size butt. 
9. The airbag system would say "Are you sure?" before going off. 
10. Occasionally for no reason whatsoever, your car would lock you out and refuse to let you 
in until you simultaneously lifted the door handle, turned the key, and grab hold of the radio 
antenna. 
11. GM would require all car buyers to also purchase a deluxe set of Rand McNally road 
maps (now a GM subsidiary), even though they neither need them nor want them. Attempting 
to delete this option would immediately cause the car's performance to diminish by 50% or 
more. Moreover, GM would become a target for investigation by the Justice Department. 
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12. Every time GM introduced a new model car buyers would have to learn how to drive all 
over again because none of the controls would operate in the same manner as the old car. 
13. You'd press the "start" button to shut off the engine. 
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8. CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
8.1. Overview 
Many economists concur that in the long run, productivity matters greatly for improving a 
country’s living standards. The productivity paradox has therefore provoked considerable interest, 
not only because of the widespread use of computers, computer networks and the internet in 
government, business and private spheres, but also because of the substantial investments that 
the ICT sector has absorbed in recent decades. The productivity paradox, as stated by Solow 
(1987:36), questions the widely held belief that the widespread use of computers has increased 
productivity and hence the standard of living. Solow’s responses to the evolving productivity 
debate are discussed to shed light on the robustness of his earlier views. Solow did not 
dramatically amend his subsequent views from his original formulation. 
This chapter reviews the multilayered complexity of the Solow paradox and the conclusions from 
previous chapters are reviewed and evaluated accordingly. The Solow productivity paradox 
focuses on the period between 1973 and 1995, but productivity trends before 1973 and after 
1995 are briefly explored to give a broader historical context of the paradox. The modern 
computer has a timeline dating back to the invention of the transistor in 1947 and the launch of 
the first IBM PC in 1981. Although the Solow paradox remains largely unresolved, counter-factual 
research (which is based on the so-called “new economic history” or cliometrics, the application 
of econometric techniques to economic history) may be a useful avenue for future research.  
 
8.2. Productivity trends before 1973 and after 1995 
Gordon (1999b:123) argues that the relatively lower productivity growth rates before 1913 and 
after 1972 should perhaps be regarded as normal trends; and the “glorious” 60 year period of 
high productivity growth from 1913 to 1972 (shown in red/diagonal shading), preceding the Solow 
paradox period,  should rather be regarded as exceptional and atypical, and which thus requires 
explanation.  
Gordon (1999b) describes productivity growth from 1871 to 1996 as “one big wave”, which is 
confirmed by a visual inspection of the data and shows the sudden decline in 1972 (figure 8.1). 
Hence, in Gordon’s view, there is therefore nothing exceptional in the productivity slowdown after 
1973. Similar data are shown in chapter 1, from Arnold and Dennis (1999:10).  
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Furthermore, according to Bosworth and Triplett (2003:1), a new productivity paradox has 
emerged since 1995: “The post-1973 puzzle was never resolved, just abandoned by economists 
when they were confronted with a new problem – the acceleration of U.S. productivity after about 
1995.” 
In a recent paper by Oliner et al. (2007), ICT and the productivity revival are reviewed 
extensively, but there is no mention of the computer productivity paradox. It is simply no longer 
discussed.  
The productivity revival after 1995 appears to have put the matter to rest. The respected London-
based Economist newspaper declared that the ‘”productivity paradox” has been solved’ (Paradox 
lost 2003:13).  
Similarly, Gordon (2004b) found that there are now five new puzzles after the 1995 productivity 
revival. The puzzles are: (1) the cyclical versus the trend effect after the revival; (2) the 
productivity acceleration after 2000 when the ICT investment boom collapsed; (3) the key 
innovations that caused the revival; (4) the revival of ICT investment; and (5) the failure of Europe 
to experience a productivity growth revival (Gordon 2004b:118). In particular, Gordon asks why 
there was a growth acceleration after 2000 when the ICT investment boom collapsed? Figure 8.2 
clearly shows the investment collapse (an “investment strike”) after 2000.  
Gordon’s key question is why the initial impact of computers on productivity growth slowed from 
the 1970s to 1995, a period marked by a continuous stream of significant innovations and the 
introduction of the first commercial computer in 1951 (Gordon 2004b:119 & 124). The period from 
Figure 8.1: Long-run MFP trends: Gordon’s “one big wave” 
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1995 to 2002 is informative, because the big box retail trade sector generated most of the 
productivity advances. Big box retailers are large US supermarkets such as Wal-Mart, Home 
Depot and Best Buy. According to Rogoff (2006), the importance, but paradoxical nature, of the 
services sector is illustrated by the “stunning fact” that Wal-Mart and other big box retailers 
generated about half of the productivity gains. Gordon (2004b:126) believes that the productivity 
improvements did not result from ICT investment per se, but from organisational and managerial 
advancements, such as ”large size, economies of scale, efficient design … and large scale 
purchases”.  
According to Gordon (2004b:127), the surge in ICT investment from 1996 to 2000 and the 
collapse in 2001 and 2002 can be explained by five factors. These are: (1) the invention of the 
World Wide Web (WWW), which stimulated investment as companies developed internet web 
sites, investment which is not repeated as the WWW can be invented only once; (2) the negative 
return earned by many start-up internet companies resulted in these “dot.com” firms going 
bankrupt; (3) new memory-intensive business software packages necessitated new and 
upgraded hardware purchases to run them, but subsequent advances in hardware capacity did 
provide adequate memory capacity; (4) the Y2K crises prompted a once-off and early 
replacement of computer equipment and software; and (5) the communications sector was 
deregulated in 1996, leading to overinvestment and spare capacity in fibre-optic communications 
infrastructure. 
These various developments reveal the complexity of productivity analysis in the context of the 
computer paradox.  
 
8.3. The study of the Solow computer paradox  
This section discusses the salient points from previous chapters which shed light on the Solow 
computer paradox. It is not intended to provide a complete summary of all the arguments put 
forward. The bibliographic references of the arguments presented in earlier chapters will not be 
repeated here. 
The Solow computer paradox literature has endeavoured to explain the phenomenon of rapidly 
rising IT investment but moderating productivity growth, particularly between 1973 and 1995. The 
computer revolution is evident in the IT investment data, which surged, but not the MFP data, 
which hardly responded.  
Why would private individuals, businesses and organisations spend billions of dollars on ICT 
investments if there were no productivity payoff, as efficiency gains are some of the most 
important expected benefits and payoffs? 
 155
A visual inspection of figure 8.2 illustrates the main features of the Solow computer paradox. The 
figure plots IT investment against MFP growth. Labour productivity shows a similar trend. MFP is 
plotted because Solow had multifactor productivity rather than labour productivity in mind, 
according to Triplett (1999b:328, footnote 5). The two vertical lines mark the structural break 
years of 1973 and 1995. Actual data for these graphs are given in the NIPAs, discussed in 
chapter 4. In particular, see figure 4.4 for MFP growth trends over the three periods. 
It should be kept in mind that the USA experienced a recession in 2001. According to the 
Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), US 
economic activity reached a peak in March 2001, followed by a trough in November 2001. The 
latter date marked the end of the short recession and the start of an economic expansion. In 2000 
the US stock markets also fell dramatically, especially the IT- and new economy-heavy NASDAQ 
composite stock index. Although MFP is procyclical, that is, it can be expected to grow more 
slowly, or to fall during a recession, and to rise steeply during a recovery (Fernald & Ramnath 
2004:53), the sharp and sudden IT investment collapse follows a period of over 40 years of 
uninterrupted and rising investment in IT. 
Figure 8.2: Productivity growth trends and IT investment from 1959 to 2002 and the 
Solow computer paradox 
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8.4. Productivity and technical change 
In order to understand the Solow productivity paradox, the general framework and methodological 
assumptions are discussed in chapter 2. The historical and current foundation of productivity 
analysis rests on several neoclassical assumptions, a growth accounting framework and the 
aggregate production function, and more specifically, the widely used Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Many of these components have been challenged from dissenting philosophical and 
methodological positions, which tend to weaken, but not reverse, the subsequent results.  
Neoclassical theory generally holds that capital accumulation dominates productivity as a source 
of growth; this tenet is referred to as “capital fundamentalism”. However, because diminishing 
returns to capital set in over time, productivity is the main cause of long-run economic growth. 
Denison (1980a:220), in his short paper Contribution of capital to economic growth argues that 
capital should not be regarded as the prime source of growth, but that there are many 
determinants of output and growth. Even earlier, Salter (1960:1) argued that “behind productivity 
lie all the dynamic forces of economic life: technical progress, accumulation, enterprise, and the 
institutional pattern of society. These are areas where our understanding remains rudimentary”.  
The different classifications and interpretations of technical progress and the associated 
embodiment controversy reveal the complexity of how technical progress affects economic 
growth. The basic disagreement is whether or not technical progress requires capital 
accumulation and investment.  
 
8.5. Productivity measurement 
The next building block of the analysis and its statistical and econometric underpinnings are the 
use of index numbers, which also present a number of theoretical and practical problems. This is 
reviewed in chapter 3. The index number problem remains central to the understanding of the 
computer paradox because the correct construction and interpretation of index numbers 
determined the accuracy of many important economic time series (such as GDP, CPI, etc.) upon 
which many economic and econometric analyses are based. According to Dean et al. (1995:28-
29), the development of several measurement techniques, while not perfect, can provide an 
acceptable solution to the index number problem.  
Index number bias applies in particular to the potential distortion of measuring quality change and 
computer output inaccurately. This is because computer prices have been falling rapidly and 
continuously since the 1970s, whereas by comparison, the prices of most other goods have 
changed moderately. 
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8.6. Official data 
The productivity statistics, as captured and calculated by the US agencies in the NIPAs, were 
reviewed in chapter 4. This formed the point of departure for much of the debate about the 
computer paradox, as many researchers criticise the BLS’s and BEA’s statistics and provide their 
own estimates.  
There is a ongoing interaction between the agencies and academic researchers to refine and 
improve the national accounts and productivity statistics. Agencies frequently publish papers in 
accredited academic journals, which address issues raised by economists in these same 
journals. Many researchers revise official data in the light of their own models and the BLS and 
the BEA also revise the official data – these are the main reasons why precise figures and dates 
are sometimes difficult to pin down. Sometimes the data and dates are not identical; they do, 
however, reveal the same overall trends.  
Productivity is an omnibus term that captures the interrelationship between output and the factors 
of production – land, capital, labour and entrepreneurship –  as well as many other factors that 
influence the trajectory of output growth. In many instances, these factors are discussed 
separately and unrelated to their actual effects on output. The NIPAs are to “blame” because they 
capture what has been required historically rather than what is needed for productivity analysis.  
Broadly speaking, there are two strands of opinion: the first claims that the NIPAs are largely 
correct and that there are sound economic explanations of the paradox; the second claims that 
the NIPAs are mostly wrong as the impact of ICT specifically and the services sectors generally 
are not captured accurately in the official data. Researchers in the latter camp have tried to 
disprove the computer paradox and to build models that establish the links between computers 
and productivity (Kraemer & Dedrick 2001:3).  
However, tampering with the inflation and productivity statistics as published in the national 
accounts would render these accounts chaotic – as argued by Baker (1996:26-28) in his review of 
the Boskin Commission’s (Advisory Commission …1996) findings that US inflation was 
overstated by 1.1% over a long period. This was discussed in chapter 6.  
The NIPAs and their methodological building blocks provide a coherent picture, albeit grounded 
on several contestable foundations, as argued in Chapter 6.  
 
8.7. Economic aspects of ICT 
Chapter 5 reviewed the many economic aspects of ICT, mainly for conceptual clarification. A 
timeline of computing history illustrates the rapid development of computing since the 1950s; and 
the operation of Moore’s law on the steep decline of semiconductor prices, a problem that is 
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central to the measurement of computerisation in the national accounts. The “three faces of IT 
value” can be found in raised productivity (theory of production); greater business performance or 
profitability (theories of competitive strategy); and improved consumer value (theory of 
consumer), but computerisation is only related to the first value and should not be confused with 
the other two values, as it often is. A basic growth accounting framework is set out which 
incorporates ICT and non-ICT capital. Software, as a component of ICT capital, was incorporated 
into the NIPAs only in 1999. Computer-producing and computer-using industries are examined to 
see whether there are spillover effects from the former to the latter. Diminishing returns to ICT 
investment may already have set in, which implies that productivity gains from computers are now 
a thing of the past.  
Declining computer (including software) prices – referring to hedonically adjusted computer 
prices, not what consumers actually pay in shops – have spurred large investment expenditures 
in ICT equipment since 1960. The hedonic method is used to estimate the effects of quality 
changes on prices by separating quality changes from price changes. Declines in computer 
prices are largely supply-side driven, and these have led to the substitution of ICT equipment for 
more expensive forms of capital and labour. This represents a movement along the production 
function, not a shift of the function, implying that there is no technical change. 
The so-called “new economy” and the internet are based on the computer revolution and its take-
off coincides to some extent with the productivity resurgence in 1995. Opinion is divided on 
whether the internet has ushered in a frictionless economy in which inflation will vanish and 
business cycles will disappear (Shiller 2005:119). The question has been posed whether the “new 
economy” measures up to the great historical inventions of the past, such as the steam engine 
and electric motor (David 1990). 
Productivity studies at the aggregate level are more important than industry- and firm-level 
studies. The dominance of aggregate-level studies can be gleaned from the fact that in 2003, 
Amazon.com (an online retailer) recorded profits of $30 million, yet global music industry profits 
declined by nearly $2.5 billion. According to music industry executives, the simultaneous creation 
of profits in the one industry and their destruction in the other is caused by internet music 
download and online piracy (Harford 2007:153).  
Hence, computers are not everywhere, because ICT capital is concentrated in the services 
sector. The services sector is generally characterised by low productivity growth rates, a 
phenomenon referred to as Baumol’s unbalanced productivity hypothesis (Baumol 1967; Baumol, 
Blackman & Wolf 1985). McGuckin and Stiroh (1998:42, table 1) show that three service sectors 
are particularly intensive in the use of computers: trade; finance, insurance and real estate 
(FIRE); and other services, such as business and personal services (i.e. software, healthcare , 
legal services, etc.).  
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Figure 8.3 illustrates that the stock of ICT capital is concentrated in particular services industries 
(shown in red/solid).  
Services sector activities are difficult to measure and a large body of research has probed these 
measurement problems, as explored in chapter 6. No consensus has as yet emerged: some 
researchers find that services productivity has recovered, but others that the recovery is simply 
based on old economy laws and competitive intensity.  
 
 
Some economists argue that IT is a transcendent technology that affects all other industries and 
drives overall economic growth (Kettell 2001:247). Thus ICT resembles the railroads in the 
nineteenth century and motorcars in the twentieth century. The computer revolution is regarded 
as the third industrial revolution.  
 
8.8. Explanations of the paradox 
Chapter 6 and 7 reviewed the explanations of the paradox, building on the conceptual tools 
developed in earlier chapters.  
Chapter 6 probed the heart of the Solow paradox: the many measurement problems, particularly 
the measurement of quality change, and related issues, (such as hedonic indexes, intangible 
Figure 8.3: ICT stock as a percentage of equipment stock (private nonresidential 
fixed assets) by industry (2002)  
ICT as share of equipment stock, incl. software, excl. structures
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Source: BEA, National Economic Accounts, fixed asset tables. Note: FIRE = finance, 
insurance and real estate.  
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capital, factor income shares, services sector output, factor income shares and inflation 
measurement) that have emerged in the productivity paradox literature.  
The Cambridge Controversy debates the aggregation problem and the validity of neoclassical 
theory in this regard, which presents a number of conceptual and theoretical problems. 
The most convincing explanation of the paradox, the mismeasurement hypothesis, does not fully 
explain the Solow paradox, but only a small part of the productivity slowdown. Measurement 
errors are encountered routinely in many statistical analyses. The sudden decline in the 
productivity growth rate in 1973, however, cannot mean that the indexes should henceforth be 
rejected as unreliable. The claim that inadequate adjustments for quality in the indexes 
fundamentally tarnish the productivity statistics is argued to be exaggerated. 
In chapter 7 the GPT hypothesis was reviewed, which boils down to an argument about the 
timing, i.e. the delayed impact, of ICT on output and productivity. The argument that IT “has 
become a competitive necessity, but not a source of competitive advantage” (Hitt & Brynjolfsson 
1994:265) was put forward. This view was echoed by Carr (2003) in an influential article in the 
Harvard Business Review – subsequently turned into a book (Carr 2004) – that “IT doesn’t 
matter”.  
The economics of ICT, examined in chapters 4 and 7, guided the interpretation that the rapid 
decline in computer prices propelled its substitution for other more expensive inputs and 
investments, so that “the economic impact of the computer is not a productivity story at all” 
(Triplett 1999b:314)! Stiroh (1998:175) and Jorgenson and Stiroh (1999:109) make the same 
point. The economic incentives for substitution by IT, provided by falling computer prices, have 
led to capital deepening, not invisible spillovers into various other industries (Jorgenson & Stiroh 
(2000b:186). Thus the differentiating effect of ICT on labour productivity (LP) compared to 
multifactor productivity (MFP) may resolve the Solow paradox (McGuckin & Stiroh 1998). The 
impact of computers can be seen in the accumulation of computer capital (i.e. capital deepening 
through substitution), but not in MFP (McGuckin & Stiroh 1998:48). Although LP revived 
somewhat after 1979, MFP remained sluggish. Growth in the computer-producing sector from 
1979 to 1991 is attributable to MFP (McGuckin & Stiroh 1998:47).  
The correct calculation of factor income shares is thus crucial to the assessment of the relative 
contribution of capital accumulation compared to productivity: a higher share of capital implies a 
lower contribution of TFP to economic growth.  
Some authors have argued that intangible capital, which is largely excluded from the NIPAs, can 
account for the productivity slowdown. Corrado et al. (2006:1), after incorporating intangibles into 
the NIPAs (discussed in chapter 6), argue that the productivity data indeed started to show the 
computer revolution in the mid-1990s. The slowdown is therefore seen as a statistical mirage: 
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“computers are everywhere” if intangible capital is included. Similarly, if intangibles are counted 
as capital, the role of MFP in economic growth is reduced and capital deepening becomes the 
dominant cause (Corrado et al. 2006: abstract).  
Solow’s later responses to the computer paradox were reviewed in chapter 7. The conclusion in 
this dissertation is consistent with Solow’s views and consistent with the productivity data in the 
NIPAs, namely that there has been some productivity revival, but that the paradox – which 
applies to the 1973 to 1995 period – largely remains unresolved.  
Counterfactual research, discussed in chapter 7, may well prove to be a rewarding topic for future 
research into the computer paradox. It cannot be speculated here what such research, if ever 
conducted, would conclude, but counterfactual analysis of the impact of computerisation on 
productivity, would shed more light on this complex problem, if not help resolve the debate. It may 
well be consistent with Solow remarks that computers are not as productive as expected. 
Contrariwise, it could also be argued that if computers had not been invented, the productivity 
and growth slowdown might have been more severe – that is, the productivity and growth 
contribution of computers might be much greater than what the actual data show. Fogel’s 
(2004:9-10) arguments on the understatement of the true increase in the standard of living 
through the mismeasurement of quality change in the USA were reviewed in chapter 6. His 
optimistic opinion on the true level of living suggests that he might be in favour of this 
interpretation. 
 
8.9. Final remarks 
Brynjolfsson and Yang (1996:2) aptly described the productivity paradox as a clash of 
expectations and statistics, echoing Solow’s (1998:121) remarks (see chapter 7). The “new 
economy” enthusiasts raised expectations about a business future unconstrained by old economy 
laws. The enthusiasm of the “new economy” faithful and productivity optimists was dissipated by 
the collapse of the technology and new economy stocks in 2000. It is probably too early to tell if 
there is a “new economy'”(Stiroh 1999) and whether the recent productivity upsurge can be 
sustained. There is now more scepticism about the singular impact of computers on productivity.  
Denison (1980b), a productivity pioneer, was perplexed by the productivity slowdown after 1973 
and believed that it remains a mystery. He attributed the slowdown to a number of possible 
factors, each of which can only explain a small part of the decline. Denison’s prescient insight, 
formulated so soon after 1973, is endorsed by Gordon (1999b:123), who, a quarter century later, 
shares the view that single-cause explanations have failed. Many hypotheses have been put 
forward to explain the paradox, but no single account is entirely satisfactory; nor is there any kind 
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of consensus on the computer paradox. The paradox was abandoned, not resolved, as Solow 
suggests. 
The productivity paradox therefore leads back to Abramowitz’s (1956:11) view, which referred to 
the productivity residual as “some sort of measure of our ignorance about the causes of economic 
growth”. This characterisation was adopted by many other economists and is often repeated in 
the productivity literature.  
Madrick (1998:61) argues as follows: “The irony is that the greatest machine as yet known to 
mankind, the computer, is creating, not reducing demand for the most human of capabilities, the 
human imagination.”  
It is human ingenuity, embodied in technical progress, and the advancement of knowledge, 
embodied in physical and human capital, which drives productivity and improvements in the 
standard of living. Computers fulfil a role in this advancement, but their extent and significance 
remain largely unresolved. 
 
End. 
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